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Author’s Note 
 
 Abbreviations used in the thesis are taken from the Oxford Classical Dictionary (4th 
ed., 2012), apart from Lycurgus’ Against Leocrates, which has been shortened to ‘Lyc. Leo.’ 
in accordance with current scholarship on the speech.  Greek text has been cited as it appears 
in the editions of the Loeb Classical Library unless otherwise specified. All dates referred to 
in the body of the thesis (excluding bibliographic information) are B.C.E. unless otherwise 
stated.   
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Introduction 
‘While other economies around the world tumbled into recession, we in this 
country…continue to have a Triple-A credit rating and stable outlook’1  
 
 
ἐγὼ τὴν τῆς πόλεως τύχην ἀγαθὴν ἡγοῦµαι, καὶ ταῦθ᾽ ὁρῶ καὶ τὸν Δία τὸν Δωδωναῖον ὑµῖν 
µαντευόµενον, τὴν µέντοι τῶν πάντων ἀνθρώπων, ἣ νῦν ἐπέχει, χαλεπὴν καὶ δεινήν 
 
I believe this city has good fortune [Good Fortune], and I notice that so too does the oracle of 
Dodonian Zeus, but the fortune of all humankind, as it is now, I believe to be harsh and 
terrible.2 
 
 Orators, whether in the Athenian assembly during the fourth century BCE or on 
Australian television in the twenty-first century AD, use sources of authority to engage and 
persuade their audience.   In the modern world, a speaker can employ statistics, polls, 
commissioned research or, in the case above concerning the Australian economy in 2013, an 
external evaluation of a country’s credit risk to convince their fellow citizens.  In the ancient 
world, a rhētōr could refer to witness testimonies, written laws, prayers and, in the case 
above concerning the tribulations of Athens during the 330s BCE, oracular pronouncements.  
 The sources of authority that public figures look to in these situations can tell us a 
great deal about what they and their audience considered most important. Rudd’s emphasis 
on Australia’s credit rating implies that his voters have been worried about how their 
livelihood will be impacted by the economic difficulties of other countries.  Demosthenes’ 
use of an oracle asserting that Athens has ‘τύχην ἀγαθὴν’ suggests that Athenians have been 
concerned that they will suffer the harsh fortunes experienced by their neighbours.3   
                                                                                                                                                  
1Kevin Rudd, Canberra 4 August 2013.   
2 Dem. 18.253; See Bowden 2005, 157-8 and Eidinow 2013, 143 who makes a similar comparison between 
Demosthenes and Alan Greenspan. 
I have used the translations given in the Loeb Classical Library series for all quoted passages in this thesis.  
Some passages (including this one) have been adapted to reflect a more literal translation.  See bibliography for 
individual translations used. 
3 τύχην ἀγαθὴν is also a stock phrase that would have had some resonance with the audience, although its 
meaning at this point in time is difficult to ascertain.  The Athenian cult of Agatha Tyche emerges in the years 
after this speech.   See Eidinow 2011, 148-152 with 100-1; IG II2 333; Parke 1967, 141-2. 
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The role of oracles in the culture, religion, literature and even cognition of Ancient 
Greece has been subject to increased scrutiny in recent decades.4  The oracles used by the 
orators of ancient Athens, such as the example above, have yet to be included in our 
understanding of oracles and their place in the ancient world.  In the most comprehensive 
coverage of the oracles that appear in Athenian rhetoric, Bowden concludes that oracles were 
used as ‘a source of authority, parallel with the nomoi (laws and customs) of Athens’.5  While 
Bowden’s conclusion explains two short quotations of oracular pronouncements by 
Demosthenes, orators also used oracular authority in diverse ways.6  Speakers included stories 
from both myth and living memory that hinge on the involvement of the oracular; prosecutors 
denigrated defendants for not consulting oracles in times of need; and public figures 
demonstrated their attentiveness to the religious sphere by highlighting their closeness with 
Delphi and Pythian Apollo. This thesis seeks to determine what the role of these oracles in 
Athenian oratory was, and what this public function of the oracular can tell us about the 
people of the polis. 
 Almost all the oracles used in extant Athenian rhetoric were presented in symbouletic 
oratory, speeches that were presented in the assembly of Athens when it functioned as a 
democracy.7  For this reason, the primary focus of scholarship on the oracles used in 
Athenian rhetoric has been to determine the function of oracles and divination in Athenian 
democracy.  For example, Parker has argued that oracular authority in democratic politics 
was secondary to the ‘autonomy of the assembly’.8  Parker acknowledges that oracles were 
part of a repertoire of persuasive devices available to Athenian speakers, but a comprehensive 
exploration of the argumentative function of each oracle used in rhetoric is yet to be 
                                                                                                                                                  
4 Bowden 2005; Johnston 2008; Graf 2009; Flower 2008; Struck 2016. 
5 Only concerning oracles from Delphi.  Bowden 2005, 57. 
6 Dem. 21.52 and 43.66. 
7 See methodological discussion below. 
8 Parker 2006, 115. 
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undertaken.9   Bowden has opposed Parker’s view, which downplays the prominence of 
oracles in Athenian democracy, arguing that the polis was first and foremost a ‘system for 
establishing and enforcing the will of the gods’.10  Oracles, then, have a clear role in oratory 
from Bowden’s perspective, as they are ‘presented as an arbiter as of correct conduct’ by 
speakers seeking to establish moral norms to an audience preoccupied with pleasing their 
gods. 11  However, the approaches to Parker and Bowden to the relationship between 
divination and democracy have yet to fully unpack the range of ways in which oracles were 
used by orators. Rather than addressing the bigger picture of the place of the oracular in 
Athenian democracy, this study collects the oracles presented in Athenian speeches and 
determines the effect they might have had on their audience. This approach largely excludes 
some very high-profile depictions of Delphi and oracles more generally in Athenian 
democracy.  Herodotus’ story of the ‘wooden wall’ and Aristophanes’ lambasting of 
Athenian oracle-mongers, for example, only enter into my discussion as brief comparisons.12 
 Earlier approaches that have directly dealt with a larger proportion of the oracular 
material used in oratory have done so attempting to uncover either how the prophetic 
sanctuaries functioned, both practically and as a socio-political institution, or to determine the 
‘historicity’ of responses presented in the ancient sources.  Parke and Wormell, in their 
extensive collection of 615 oracular responses of the Delphic Oracle, examine 14 oracles 
                                                                                                                                                  
9 Parker 2006, 115 and Parker 1985, 320 n. 76 for treatment of Dem. 19.299 and Din. 1.78 and 98.  See also: 
Parker 1985, 323 ‘As a procedural guarantor of decisions, therefore, an oracle is redundant in a democracy’; 
Morgan 1990, 153-4 ‘Oracles… sanction decisions taken on the accumulated wisdom of community leaders’. 
10 Bowden 2005, 159. 
11 Quote from Bowden 2005, 57; see also Bowden 2003, 274 for the increasing use of oracular sources in the 
Athenian assembly during the fifth century, contra Parker 2006, 115 arguing that consulting oracles (especially 
the state consultations that are less of a focus here) generally became ‘less necessary and appropriate’ during the 
same period. 
12 Rather than being covered in detail, as Herodotus is in most monographs on Delphi cited in the thesis: Crahay 
1956, 295-304; Parke and Wormell 1956, 169-170; Fontenrose 1978, 124-9; Bowden 2005, 100-8 cf. Kindt 
2016, 50-2.  On Aristophanes, see: Smith 1988; Muecke 1998; Bowden 2003 and 2005, 55-6.   
 8 
referred to in Athenian rhetoric.13  These authors analyse oracles for the information they 
contain about Athens’ interaction with Delphi at various times and whether or not the 
responses were in prose or verse.14  While these are valid inquiries to which the authors 
contribute a great deal, most oracular responses are removed from their textual context in 
order to assess what a ‘normal’ response from Delphi might have looked like.  With such a 
broad scope and an aim to generalise, the approach has a limited capacity to explore the role 
of a single oracle in the speech of which it was originally a part.  Although this thesis is 
attempting to find a generic function of the oracular in Athenian oratory, I also seek to 
highlight the idiosyncrasies of individual uses of oracles and oracle stories within their 
original speech. 
Studies that followed Parke and Wormell examined oracular source material with the 
intention of determining the accuracy of individual responses.  Fontenrose’s comprehensive 
organisation of the oracles in the Parke and Wormell catalogue two decades later also sought 
to establish a less subjective method of assessing the historicity, or at least authenticity, of a 
Delphic prophecy.15  Fontenrose rejected the reliability of a great deal of oracular evidence 
provided by the speeches from Classical Athens.16  Fontenrose’s classification system is 
useful for establishing when an oracular response might have emerged in the sources, but 
cannot tell us why an orator like Lycurgus can use a ‘legendary’ oracle in the same breath as 
                                                                                                                                                  
13 Parke and Wormell 1956b.  Oracles from Athenian logography (with correspondence to Fontenrose 1979): 
Aeschin. 3.108 = PW 17 = F. Q70; Aeschin. 3.130 = PW 265 = F. Q71; Dem. 19.297 = PW 263; Dem. 21.52 = 
PW 282 = F. H8; Dem. 43.66 = PW 283 = F. H29; Isoc. 4.31 =PW 162 = F. H9; Isoc. 6.17 = PW 287 = F. L60; 
Isoc. 6.23, 6.31 = PW 296 = F. Q13; Lyc. Leo. 84 = PW 164 = F. L49; Lyc. Leo. 93 = PW259 = F. H18; Lyc. 
Leo. 99 = PW 195 = F. L32.  For the responses from Dodona: (Din 1.77 and 98 [Dem. 19.297 = PW 263] and 
Hyp. 4.24-5) see Parke 1967a, 140-2. 
14 i.e. PW 259 (Lyc. Leo 93) and PW 17 (Aeschin. 3.108) for Parke and Wormell reconstructing verse responses 
from prose paraphrases in the original sources.  See Parke and Wormell 1956a for a chronological history of 
Delphi drawn from these sources, esp. 217-243. 
15 Fontenrose 1978, 7.  Fontenrose also incorporated the works of Amandry 1950; Delcourt 1955; Crahay 1956 
and Nilsson 1958. 
16 Although most of the oracles from the orators are grouped in the ‘historical’ and ‘quasi-historical (Q)’ 
categories, most are deemed ‘not genuine’.  The H and Q categories indicates that the responses were recorded 
soon (within a generation) after being produced and occurred in a period for which we have corroborating 
evidence (sc. not from myth), see Fontenrose 1978, 7-8. 
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a ‘historical’ oracle for the same persuasive purpose.  The oracles used by the orators do not 
conform to the characteristics prescribed by Fontenrose’s survey of the ancient texts, yet the 
Delphic oracles most frequently examined in present in scholarship on divination and 
Athenian democracy are two oracles from the ‘historical’ category.17  The role of the other 
oracles in rhetoric, those taken from the Greek storytelling tradition that Fontenrose classes 
as legendary or not genuine, remains to be explored.  This thesis will begin to examine these 
oracular responses that draw from myth and seek to move beyond any lingering reliance on 
Fontenrose’s classification system.  It will be clear that oracular authority in Athenian 
rhetoric was not dependent on the variables that might lead Fontenrose or other scholars to 
question the authenticity of an oracle or oracle story.  
 
Rhetorical Retelling 
 Oracles in oratory, then, must be approached with attention to the oracles of the 
various literary traditions with which both orators and their audiences were closely familiar.  
Regardless of how we classify their role in democratic decision-making, oracles permeated 
Athenian life during the period from which we have rhetorical sources.   
Oracles feature in all genres of literary sources that record, interrogate and challenge 
the actions of humans and the divine.  Rather than aiming to determine when, where and why 
an original oracular consultation in these sources might have taken place, another approach 
has been to examine the function of these oracles within the texts and genres in which they 
were recorded.  The present study seeks to apply scholarship exploring oracles within their 
narrative context to a new body of ancient sources: rhetoric.   
                                                                                                                                                  
17 Dem. 21.52-1 and 43.66, see Parker 2006, 108-9 and Bowden 2005, 57.  Parker 1985, 320 n. 76 and 2006, 
108-9 also refer to two oracles from Dodona that Fontenrose does not classify: Dem. 19.297 and Dem. 18.253.  
It should be noted that both of these oracles from Dodona would certainly be labelled ‘historical’ according to 
Fontenrose’s methodology, see Fontenrose 1978, 7-9. 
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Athenian oratory straddles an important divide in modern classification of ancient 
genres, intended for both public and private consumption, as speech and as text.18  Further, 
speeches written for an immediate purpose, i.e. a court case, not only addressed arguments 
made by others on the day, but also drew from all other Athenian discourse with which the 
audience and orator were familiar.  Orators quote tragedies, Homer, oracles, myths, laws and 
previous speeches regularly during their arguments.  Although rhetoric should not be seen as 
purely literary genre, this collection of oracles will show that Athenian logographers and 
speakers used all available methods of engaging and convincing their audience.   
 Examples of the approach to oracles that examines their function within their literary 
context have looked at the role of the oracular in Athenian genres such as tragedy and 
poetry.19 However, Maurizio has also shown the interconnectedness of the oracle stories that 
appear in these distinct genres due to the ‘oral circulation of oracles’.20  Maurizio argues that 
these oracles in written sources are single manifestations of a much broader tradition of 
telling stories about oracles in oral format.21  Maurizio’s perspective has allowed subsequent 
inquiries to explore the meanings and functions of these oracular narratives in greater depth.  
Returning to the notions of oracular authority raised by the excerpt from On the Crown at the 
beginning of this chapter, the role of divine advice in Greek prose has been explored before. 
Kindt has shown that Herodotus’ use of the oracular voice allows his history to convey 
meaning and authority that could only come from a divine source.22  Kindt’s work has also 
explored the function of oracles in sources ranging from Herodotus to Athenaeus, but shows 
                                                                                                                                                  
18 Fox and Livingstone 2007, 542-3. 
19 Tragedy: Roberts 1984; Bushnell 1988; Vogt 1998 and Bowden 2005, 40-55. Comedy: Smith 1988; Muecke 
1998; Bowden 2003 and 2005, 55-6. For all the challenges faced by characters looking to Delphi for answers in 
tragedy, the sanctuary always supports Athens and general order, see Bowden 2005, 54-5 and 64.  While oracles 
of Bacis and their chresmologoi are object of much ridicule in Aristophanic comedy, Delphi is largely spared: 
Smith 1988, 154; Muecke 1998, 264-6; Bowden 2003; Bowden 2005, 56 with notes. 
20 Maurizio 1997, 312. 
21 Maurizio 1997, 313-5.   
22 Kindt 2006, 45 and 49 n. 78 for Thucydides establishing an authoritative voice in opposition to the oracular. 
See also Hornblower 1992. 
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that these sources represent a ‘unified body of narratives’.23  These narratives demonstrate 
Greeks defining and questioning the place of humanity through its interaction with and 
opposition to the divine.24  The oracles used by Athenian orators must also be seen as 
influenced by and reliant on these representations and functions of oracles from other areas of 
ancient life.  
Either Oracles or Oratory 
 Scholarship on oratory as a genre, however, tends to look past or downplay the 
oracular elements of the speeches.25  This observation is not a criticism, oracles in rhetoric 
are infrequent and often sit seemingly independent of the general argumentative strategy.26  
Parker has argued that all religious features of oratory are limited by the rules of public 
speech, such that speakers express ideas about the divine with ‘compulsory optimism’.27  
Even within studies that explore the religious attitudes expressed by Athenian orators, oracles 
have remained peripheral.28  I look to augment focused analyses of rhetoric by demonstrating 
the interconnectedness of the oracles of rhetoric with oracular in Athenian myths, rituals, 
texts and cognition.  The argumentative strategies that modern scholarship on oratory has 
sought to uncover and explain will be shown to have been strengthened and developed by 
orators’ recourse to oracular authority. 
 
Limits and Methodology 
This thesis is limited to discussing oracles that were used in the speeches made by the 
‘Attic orators’ of the fourth century BCE.  Issues with the texts of these speeches are 
                                                                                                                                                  
23 Kindt 2016, 14. 
24 Kindt 2016, 164. 
25 Although commentaries on the speeches have proved invaluable to anylyses that are presented here, esp. 
MacDowell 1990, 2000; Worthington 1992, 1994; Harris 1995; Carey 2000; Yunis 2001. 
26 Such is the view expressed by MacDowell on Dem. 21.51-2 
27 Parker 1997, 158. 
28 See Martin 2009. 
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discussed in detail when relevant, but as a body of sources, the surviving material is treated 
as reliable evidence of how a speechwriter might seek to convince an Athenian audience of 
this era, even if there is doubt about the identity of the author or whether the speech was ever 
presented in the form in which we have it.  I make reference to the depictions of oracles in 
Athenian political debate from historiographical and poetic sources, but the oracular 
pronouncements from Athenian logography are the core of this analysis.  Similarly, 
epigraphic evidence of oracular consultation in Athens is often relevant to issues arising from 
the discussion of oracles in rhetorical sources. 
I will use the term ‘oracle’ as meaning ‘a response or utterance from an oracular 
source’ in this thesis.  This includes oblique references to oracles and is not restricted to 
instances where an entire oracle is read to the audience.  The terms ‘oracle story’ or ‘oracular 
narrative’ will be used as they have been in previous scholarship on the tales in Greek 
storytelling in which the actions of characters are influenced by an oracle.29  
The thesis collects and analyses the oracles used in Athenian speeches between 347/6 
and 323/2 BCE. These year limits have been imposed by the source material, as the first 
extant quote of an oracle is in Against Meidias from 347/6 and the last in Against 
Demosthenes from 323/2..  The oracular references in Isocrates’ works before this date are 
included in my analysis, but the focus is on speeches that were presented in public cases.  
However, there are no references to oracles in the Lysianic corpus or in speeches made to the 
Athenian assembly at the turn of the fifth and fourth century. 
In this sample from the later fourth centruy, there are 15 oracles and oracle stories 
from roughly 64 complete speeches surviving from Athens. I include in this sample the 
potentially spurious speeches from the Demosthenic corpus as they remain reliable as 
evidence for speechwriting during the period, even if Demosthenes himself did not write 
                                                                                                                                                  
29 See Maurizio 1997; Kindt 2006 and 2016. 
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them.  Examination of fragments was beyond the scope of this project, and will be explored 
more productively once the oracles that survive in their argumentative contexts have been 
explored. Two oracles from the full sample feature in speeches that could be classed as 
forensic (Dem. 21.51-2 and Dem. 43.66) and two occur in Isocrates’ philosophical 
logography.  The remaining eight, despite appearing to be a disparate collection, were 
delivered to a relatively constant audience (the Athenian assembly) over a period of twenty-
five years.  It is possible, or even likely, that a sizeable number of male citizens would have 
been present at all of these speeches that use oracular authority.30   
 
Direction and Delphi 
 This thesis will explore the uses of oracles in the speeches that survive from Athens 
during the Classical period.  I argue that the role of oracles in oratory is to provide divine 
authority to mortal arguments.  The persuasive function of the oracular voice in rhetoric was 
drawn from its thematic consistency with the literary and oral traditions of oracle stories in 
the Athenian imagination.  The orators’ use of oracles was not contingent on either the 
authenticity of the response or its relationship with developing consensus in the democratic 
polis.  There are clear connections between the oracles of oratory and those of the storytelling 
tradition and I also aim to show that there was a characteristic mode of oracular authority 
used in Athenian speech.  Rather than employing the ‘enigmatic mode’ of divine 
communication that defines the meaning of oracle stories in other ancient sources, Athenian 
orators stress the clarity of oracular pronouncements.31 
                                                                                                                                                  
30 Oracles from Athenian logography (with correspondence to Parke and Wormell 1956b and Fontenrose 1979): 
Aeschin. 3.108 = PW 17 = F. Q70; Aeschin. 3.130 = PW 265 = F. Q71; Dem. 19.297 = PW 263; Dem. 21.52 = 
PW 282 = F. H8; Dem. 43.66 = PW 283 = F. H29; Isoc. 4.31 =PW 162 = F. H9; Isoc. 6.17 = PW 287 = F. L60; 
Isoc. 6.23, 6.31 = PW 296 = F. Q13; Lycurg. Leoc. 84 = PW 164 = F. L49; Lycurg. Leoc. 93 = PW259 = F. 
H18; Lycurg. Leoc. 99 = PW 195 = F. L32.  For the responses from Dodona: (Din 1.77 and 98; Dem. 18.253 
and Hyp. 4.24-5) see Parke 1967a, 140-2. 
31 ‘Enigmatic mode’ see Kindt 2016, 159-64. 
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The nature of rhetorical sources immediately limits this study’s contribution to some 
key questions concerning the role of divination in the lives of the ancient Greeks. Two 
notable limitations of this body of speeches are the narrow time period during which they 
were given and the small range of oracular sources that are quoted by the speakers.  These 
features of Athenian oratory limit the scope of the study, but also facilitate conclusions that 
are specific to a body of similar sources and a historical period.  Although assembly speeches 
remain from the late fifth and early fourth century, no speech attributed to Lysias, Antiphon 
or Andocides contains an oracle.  Further, despite much direct evidence showing a role for 
chresmologoi sharing oracles from collections in Athenian public life throughout the 
Classical period, only oracles from Delphi and Dodona are referenced by orators.32   
To address these characteristics of the oracles in oratory, this thesis will approach the 
argumentative purpose of the oracular responses in their speeches and reconcile them with 
the scholarship that examines the broader function of Delphi and Dodona as panhellenic 
sanctuaries.  The ongoing archaeological excavation at Delphi has grown into an analysis of 
the spatial and cultural competition of poleis and other groups in the ancient Mediterranean.33  
This multi-disciplinary effort has offered innovative and reliable insights into the function of 
Delphi as more than its oracle, a site that was a unique political entity.34  Scott has shown that 
the crucial relationship between Athens and Delphi was under pressure during the fourth 
century period from which these speeches come.35   The interaction of individual orators and 
Athens as a whole will be demonstrated to have influenced how oracular authority from 
Delphi and Dodona was used in public speech. 
The thesis is divided into three chapters.  The first chapter seeks to show that oracle 
stories were a means of addressing a crisis in Athenian identity after the battle of Chaeronea 
                                                                                                                                                  
32 On chresmologoi see Ar. Eq. 996-1110; Thuc. 2.48.1-54.5 with Bowden 2003; Parker 2006, 111-115. 
33 Scott 2010 and 2014. 
34 Jacquemin 1999; Scott 2010, 2014. See also Arnush 1991 and Malkin 1989. 
35 Scott 2014, 240-60.  Athens and Delphi: ‘Athenians needed what Delphi had to offer’ Bowden 2005, 157.  
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in 338.  Lycurgus’ inversion of the ‘enigmatic mode’ of oracular communication throughout 
his speech Against Leocrates was part of Athens’ wider reengagement with Apollo and his 
oracle in the face of an uncertain future.  For this purpose, Lycurgus conflates tales from the 
mythical and recent past to highlight not only Leocrates’ treasonous behaviour, but also the 
importance of Athens’ continued attention to Apollo and Delphi. 
The second chapter will extend this explanation of oracles in rhetoric as providing 
clear response to crisis.  The trial of Ctesiphon, mere months after Lycurgus’ prosecution of 
Leocrates, become a public discussion of the causes of Athens’ decreasing autonomy during 
the expansion of Macedon. Aeschines emphasises the clarity of the warnings the city had 
received from Delphi, again in both the mythical and recent past, to argue that Athens’ 
misfortune was a result of Demosthenes’ neglect of the city’s relationship with the gods.  In 
his defence, Demosthenes addresses Aeschines’ use of oracles and looks to Dodona for 
prophetic wisdom as he offers an alternative model of human and divine interaction.  Thus, 
oracular discourse forms a central part of this public negotiation of the balance between 
human decision-making and the role of the gods. 
The final chapter demonstrates the necessity of approaching all uses of oracles in 
oratory from this perspective.  A survey of the oracles given in public speeches in the decade 
either side of the trials in 330 will address two main questions: whether the two key oracular 
sanctuaries of Delphi and Dodona were used differently; and whether the enigmatic nature of 
oracular communication crucial to other literature featured in rhetoric.  I conclude that the 
sanctuaries were used differently by the orators in this period, but that the oracular voices of 
Apollo and Zeus were only ever presented as an absolute authority.  Similarly, I show that the 
 16 
pattern of ‘consultation-interpretation-solution’ that has been examined in epiphanic 
narratives from other Greek sources is not present in oracles presented by the orators.36 
The conclusion brings together the features and purposes of oracles in Athenian 
speeches from the late fourth century.  I also explore the implications the use of oracles in 
oratory has for our understanding of oracles in other sources and at other points in Athenian 
history. 
Overall, then, this thesis hopes to make a contribution to an understanding of how 
ancient people viewed and developed their interaction with the oracular.  Further, I seek to 
show that this interaction existed well beyond an original consultation at a prophetic 
sanctuary.  The uses of oracular authority in oratory relied on a constant engagement with the 
oracular sphere that was an important part of Athenian politics, storytelling and identity. 
                                                                                                                                                  
36 Narrative structure: Maurizio 1997, 311. Epiphanic narratives: Platt 2011; Petridou 2014; Kindt 2016, 163-4. 
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Chapter One:  
Mything the Point?  Oracles and Rhetoric in the Lycurgan era 
 
εἰς Δελφοὺς ἰὼν ἠρώτα τὸν θεὸν τί ποιῶν ἂν νίκην λάβοι παρὰ τῶν πολεµίων. χρήσαντος δ᾽ 
αὐτῷ τοῦ θεοῦ, τὴν θυγατέρα εἰ θύσειε πρὸ τοῦ συµβαλεῖν τὼ στρατοπέδω, κρατήσειν τῶν 
πολεµίων, ὁ δὲ τῷ θεῷ πειθόµενος τοῦτ᾽ ἔπραξε, καὶ τοὺς ἐπιστρατευοµένους ἐκ τῆς χώρας 
ἐξέβαλε. 
 
[Erechtheus] went to Delphi and asked the god by what means he could assure a victory over 
the enemy. The god proclaimed that if he sacrificed his daughter before the two sides engaged 
he would defeat the enemy and, submitting to the god, he did this and drove the invaders from 
the country.37 
 
Oracles and prophecies are familiar features of stories from ancient Greece just as 
they are in the modern storytelling tradition.38  At first glance, the three stories featuring 
oracles from Lycurgus’ Against Leocrates, such as the one above, fit the pattern with which 
Greek audiences would have been accustomed.  The stories contain a problem, a consultation 
and a resolution.39   As familiar as they are, these types of stories have been deeply 
problematic for traditional scholarship on Delphi in the 20th century.  The story presented 
above gives no answers to historians questioning whether this consultation ever happened, or 
what the mantic session might have looked like. The existence of an Erechtheus, let alone his 
visit to Delphi, is impossible to know with any certainty and the speaker gives no details 
about the process of consultation.40 
                                                                                                                                                  
37 Lyc. Leo. 99. 
38 Prophecies in a variety of forms have driven the plots of the highest grossing movie worldwide for five of the 
past ten years: Beauty and the Beast 2017; Star Wars: The Force Awakens 2015; Frozen 2013; Harry Potter 
and the Deathly Hallows: Part 2 2011; Pirates of the Caribbean: At World’s End 2007.  Three of the top five 
highest grossing movie franchises of all time centre on prophecies and their eventual fulfilment: Harry Potter 
(Warner Bros.); Star Wars (Lucasfilm) and J.R.R. Tolkien’s Middle Earth (New Line).   
39 For this ‘almost invariable plot structure’ see Maurizio 1997, 311; Kindt 2016, 157-8. 
40 Lyc. Leo. 99 is classified by Fontenrose as ‘legendary’ and the broad range of sources that refer to 
Erechtheus’ sacrifices (see entry L 32 at Fontenrose 1978, 367-8) complicate any further analysis of 
‘authenticity’. 
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The oracular narratives of Athenian public speeches present an excellent opportunity 
to combine two approaches to the history of Delphi and its oracle. Firstly, the function of 
oracle stories within their speeches can be examined for literary effect and cultural meaning 
using the same methods as previous scholars exploring the oracles of historiography, myth 
and other Greek forms.  Secondly, this ‘genre specific’ analysis within a relatively stable 
performance context can be reconciled with broader trends in Athenian religious life during 
the same period.  This chapter will demonstrate that the emergence of oracular narratives in 
Athenian oratory in the late fourth century is part of a purposeful reengagement with Delphi 
by Athens.   
The most recent assessment of the role of oracles in oratory is that the 
pronouncements act as ‘a source of authority, parallel with the nomoi (laws or customs) of 
the city of Athens.’41  These oracle stories, unlike those offered by Demosthenes that 
complement existing nomoi, suit a wide range of argumentative purposes not restricted to 
Athenian laws.  Lycurgus refers to Delphic oracles in three moralistic tales from the Athenian 
past in his speech, neither parallel with existing laws nor corresponding to the famous 
enigmatic language of oracles presented in Greek myth and history.42      
This chapter seeks to expand Bowden’s summary of Delphi in public speech to 
explore the function of the oracle stories in Against Leocrates.  The three oracle stories 
presented by Lycurgus are doing far more than reasserting the traditional laws and customs of 
Athens. Lycurgus deemphasises the ‘enigmatic mode’ of oracular communication to 
highlight the reciprocal relationship between Athens and Delphi in both myth and recent 
memory. Although investigating whether the Pythia gave ambiguous or unclear prophecies to 
enquirers is not the focus of this research, the obscure nature of Delphic language remains 
                                                                                                                                                  
41 Bowden 2005, 55.   
42 See Kindt 2006, 2016 16-54 and 55-86. 
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crucial.  For oracle stories to have accessible meaning, Apollo’s advice must be (somewhat 
paradoxically) difficult, but possible, for humans to interpret.43   
In most literary sources, Delphic oracles are inextricable from the narratives in which 
they feature, as the meaning of an oracle story for the audience is drawn from the interaction 
between the Apollo’s prophecy and human behaviour before and after the consultation. 44 
Once the problematic questions of authenticity are sidelined, we can start to examine the way 
that authors use the oracular storytelling tradition within historical narratives and what this 
function can tell us about Greek culture more broadly.45  The following analysis will explore 
how Lycurgus uses the traditional form of the oracle story to support his arguments against 
Leocrates. 
From this textual basis, we can move to examining how these oracular narratives 
related to their context.  For all the recent scholarship on Delphi and the role of Delphic 
oracles in storytelling, the relationship between the oracular story tradition and the broader 
history of Delphi as a sanctuary has yet to be analysed in detail or a specific case study. The 
mid-fourth century was a period during which Athens’ relationship with Delphi and Apollo 
was actively strengthened by physical dedication, religious legislation and mythological 
genealogies.  The emerging practice of quoting or paraphrasing oracular consultation in 
political speeches must be understood as part of Athens’ emphasis on its closeness with the 
sanctuary.  All thirteen oracles in the extant speeches of the Athenian logographers and 
orators were given during this time.46  Assembly audiences in the year 331/0 alone would 
                                                                                                                                                  
43 Bowden 2005, 51. 
44 For Delphi in Attic tragedy, see Bowden 46-54; for Athens and Delphi in Herodotus see Kindt 2016 47-54. 
45 Kindt 2016, 160-162 and appendix.  
46 See introduction for full list.  Earliest possible date would be Isoc. Arch. 31 in the 360s and the latest possible 
is Din. Dem. 98 in the late 320s.  
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have heard five oracles and oracle narratives from three different speakers: Lycurgus, 
Demosthenes and Aeschines.47 
Lycurgus’ varied use of oracles in Against Leocrates demonstrates that these 
narratives of oracular knowledge were a way for the orator to use myths and past events 
within the pursuasive framework of his prosecution.  Further, the shared understanding that 
the orator and his audience have of the traditional discourse of Delphi and its oracles 
strengthens Lycurgus’ argument that Leocrates’ cowardice is an offence against Athens and 
its religious and cultural heritage.48  Thus, Lycurgus’ use of oracular discourse is not ‘always 
in agreement with the nomoi of the city’.49  His emphasis on Delphi is in fact innovation, 
rather than a return to previous laws and customs. 
My argument is divided into three parts.  Firstly, a brief exploration of context of the 
case in post-Chaeronea Athens will show that the city as a whole was attempting to reassert 
ownership over the socio-political capital of its past during its conflict with Macedon. It will 
also be shown that Lycurgus’ personal affiliation with the sanctuary at Delphi influences the 
way the audience would have received his oracular argumentation.  Finally, a close 
examination of the oracle stories themselves will reveal that Lycurgus deemphasises the 
enigmatic mode of oracular communication to support his argument for human susceptibility 
to deception.  His oracle stories explore human fallibility and reliably link it to his 
prosecution of Leocrates. 
Apollo and Lycurgus 
Even before his political prominence in the period after Chaeronea, Lycurgus appears 
to have been noticeable in Athenian public life for his role in religious affairs.50  Although it 
is unlikely that he held the priesthood of Poseidon Erechtheus himself, his genos supplied 
                                                                                                                                                  
47 All dates from here are BCE. 
48 Allen 2000, 26; Steinbock 2011, 282; Hanink 2014, 58-9. 
49 Bowden 2005, 57. 
50 Plut. Mor. 841D; Humphreys 2004, 79; Martin 2009, 152-6; Hanink 2014, 5. 
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both that position and the priestess of Athena Polias.  Lycurgus’ attention to religious affairs 
in both speechmaking and legislation has been well covered by other authors.51  What this 
section seeks to emphasise is the consistent involvement that Lycurgus had with Delphi. This 
connection accentuates the impact and authority of the oracles in Against Leocrates and 
frames the audience’s engagement with the past.  In a period that is often known for the 
emergence of ‘documentary’ proof of the past, Lycurgus’ use of oracles combines 
documentary and oral religious authority.52 
Lycurgus’ tenure as the chief financial administrator of the city is marked by an 
increase in legislation, much relating to religious practice, by the board of nomothetai.  While 
the legislative processes of the nomothetai remain matters of debate, some features of the 
body’s activity in the later fourth century clearly demonstrate that the public would have been 
aware of Lycurgus’ closeness with Delphi and its oracle.   During the 340s and 330s, laws 
proposed to the nomothetai become associated with the individuals endorsing the motion.53   
Thus, the law proposed by Lycurgus in 335/4 that regulated dedications at temples and the 
procession of the Panathenaia has greater ramifications for the speech delivered in 330.  Not 
only is Lycurgus’ attention to religious legislation conspicuous and individual, but the law 
also required a theōria to Delphi.54  Regardless of whether Lycurgus himself led the theōria, 
legislation that was identifiably his initiative required the involvement of Delphi.   
This is not an isolated action; Lycurgus interacted with Delphi and sanctuaries to 
Apollo more frequently than any Athenian politician about whom we have comparable 
evidence.  The temple of Apollo Patroos was constructed during Lycurgus’ financial 
administration of the city and he proposed a decree in honour of Neoptolemus of Melite, who 
                                                                                                                                                  
51 See especially Humphreys 2004 and Lambert 2010 for legislation; Martin 2009 for speechmaking. 
52 Lambert 2010, 225.  Documentary evidence of the past refers to the increase in inscriptions, records of laws 
and oaths we have from this period. 
53 Humphreys 2004, 82. 
54 θεωρία… κελεύου[σι  IG ii2 333; Humphreys 2004, 83. 
 22 
gilded the cult statue.55  In 326/5, Lycurgus led the first Pythaïs to Delphi in thirty years, 
accompanied by an all-star list of his contemporaries.56  It is this delegation that might well 
have dedicated the Acanthus column that, in the time-honoured tradition of dedications at 
Delphi, purposefully detracted attention from monuments built by rivals. 57   
Athens was, and Athenians were, deeply involved with building and festival 
developments at Delphi during the late 330s as Macedonian influence over the sanctuary and 
its Amphictyony subsided.58  This involvement corresponded with distinctive changes in 
mythological narratives that introduced Apollo as an ancestor of Athenians and all Ionic 
peoples. 59  Lycurgus as an individual was involved in both of these trends.  His financial and 
honorific activity placed great importance on the growth of the cult of Apollo Patroos in 
Athens, and on Athenian prominence within the sanctuary at Delphi.  As we will shortly see, 
his rhetoric actively promoted Apollo’s long-standing goodwill towards Athens.   
 
Putting the ‘Cur’ in Lycurgan Athens 
The only speech delivered by Lycurgus that remains, Against Leocrates, was 
delivered in the spring of 330.  Lycurgus brought a procedure for treason (eisangelia) against 
a blacksmith and grain merchant named Leocrates, who left Athens in the aftermath of the 
Battle of Chaeronea in 338.  While Lycurgus had been successful prosecuting a prominent 
member of the Areopagus named Autolycus in similar circumstances, it appears that 
                                                                                                                                                  
55 Plut. Mor.  843. 
56 Phanodemos, Demades, Epiteles, Nikeratos, Neoptolemus of Melite et al. Three of these men would become 
proxenoi at Delphi. See SIG3 296; Humphreys 2004, 95; Csapo forthcoming, 13.  Fontenrose H 57 for sources. 
57 Vidal Naquet 1981, 314; Rutherford 2013, 31; Scott 2014, 163-4.  The column was positioned in front of a 
statue group dedicated by Daochus of Thessaly, an ally of Philip.  See Jacquemin and La Roche 2001. 
58 Scott 2014, 160-65. 
59 See Eur. Ion; Pl. Euthyd. 302C; Phanodemos FGrH 328 F75. 
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Leocrates had left Athens either before the law restricting movement was passed or at least 
before it became treasonous to leave the city.60  
Early explanations of the idiosyncratic rhetoric of this speech have seen Lycurgus as a 
religious zealot or, more helpfully, as struggling to make a case against a citizen who may not 
have done anything against the laws of Athens at the time. 61  These are contributing factors, 
but the ways in which Lycurgus constructs his arguments from poetry and mythology are 
worthy of investigation in their own right. Recent scholarship engaging with these previously 
problematic features of Lycurgus’ rhetoric has shed light on the function of poetry and myth 
in Against Leocrates. 62  Danielle Allen has examined how poetry and civic imagery help 
Lycurgus develop a removed ‘public prosecutor’ persona in forensic oratory that usually 
relied on a more personal emotive strategy.63  Bernd Steinbock has taken a similar approach 
to the stories of Codrus and Erechtheus in the speech, arguing that they personify key 
Athenian values around which Lycurgus builds his case.64  Johanna Hanink, however, has 
seen Lycurgus’ use of poetic examples as aimed beyond the case, defending and promoting 
the value of civic-minded poetry.65   
The oracle stories that are the focus of this analysis develop from and add to aspects 
of each of these arguments.  Lycurgus’ use of the oracular voice strengthens his rhetorical 
position as the defender of Athenian values in his prosecution of Leocrates.  This 
unprecedented and never emulated prosecution strategy is contingent on Lycurgus’ role as at 
the forefront of a resurgence in Athenian involvement with Delphi. The stories emphasise the 
goodwill between Athens and Apollo and highlight the rigidity of the relationship between 
humans and divinity.  This strict hierarchy, in Lycurgus’ argument, compels the dikastai to 
                                                                                                                                                  
60 Martin 2009, 50. 
61 Petrie 1922, xxviii; Hansen 1975, 109; Bleicken 1986, 13 n. 16. 
62 Martin 2009, 50. 
63 Allen 2000. 
64 Steinbock 2011. 
65 Hanink 2014, 25-59. 
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prosecute Leocrates more pressingly than the laws of Athens themselves.  Lycurgus, a man 
with close ties to Delphi, at a time when Athens is self-consciously expanding its relationship 
with the sanctuary, uses oracle stories that complement the city’s identification with Apollo.  
These oracle stories are therefore promoting a public discourse rethinking, rather than 
reaffirming, Athenian nomoi.   
 
Telling Tales 
Lycurgus introduces the stories from myth and Athenian history as educational 
examples for the jurors:  
βούλοµαι δὲ µικρὰ τῶν παλαιῶν ὑµῖν διελθεῖν, οἷς παραδείγµασι χρώµενοι καὶ περὶ τούτων 
καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων βέλτιον βουλεύσεσθε 
 
I wish to remind you of a few short tales of old, consulting with which you will reach a better 
verdict concerning this case and others.66 
 
This passage has led commentators to see Lycurgus’ short tales (µικρά) as part of the 
orator’s adoption of impersonal moral authority.67  The stories, as we shall see, effectively 
contrast legendary Athenian bravery with Leocrates’ cowardice.  As Allen has convincingly 
shown, Lycurgus replaces the tone of personal outrage common in most Athenian 
prosecution speeches with an impersonal ‘morality of the battlefield’. 68   Steinbock’s 
argument that the audience would have been receptive to this code of morals on account of 
their participation of in the ephebate as youths has persuasively grounded Allen’s focus on 
Lycurgus’ rhetorical strategy.69   While Allen is right to emphasise Lycurgus’ unusual 
impersonal argumentative style, it should be noted that the orator’s tone also aligns with his 
public persona as it is portrayed in other sources. The fact that no other orator appears to have 
                                                                                                                                                  
66 Lyc. Leo. 83. 
67 Martin 2009, 163-4; Allen 2000, 26-9; Steinbock 2011, 311-2. 
68 Allen 2000, 31. 
69 Steinbock 2011. 
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adopted a similar rhetorical strategy implies that Lycurgus’ style was dependent on his 
standing in Athenian public life.70 
Underlying the binary morality of Athenian bravery and ‘unAthenian’ cowardice are 
Lycurgus’ constant reminders of the presence, omniscience and intervention of the gods.71  
Martin argues that there are two complementary sides to Lycurgus’ argumentation:  that 
Leocrates has betrayed you, men of Athens, and must be punished; and that Leocrates has 
violated the gods and will suffer their vengeance.72  I put forward that the oracular narratives 
at the centre of Lycurgus’ speech are crucial to the connection between these complementary 
arguments of human and divine betrayal.   
Lycurgus’ authority on religious matters has been well established from a wealth of 
epigraphic evidence and assorted fragments of his own oratory beyond Against Leocrates.73  
While the actions of Athenians in the oracle stories in the speech serve to contrast ancestral 
Athenian courage with Leocrates’ cowardice, the role of Delphi in the narratives emphasises 
a consistent reciprocal relationship between the Athens and Apollo.  Moreover, the presence 
of Delphi in tales from both the audience’s lifetime and from their collective myths grounds 
the narratives from very different storytelling traditions more firmly in the present.  
Lycurgus’ oracle stories share fundamental structures and themes not only with each 
other, but also with the robust ‘oracular discourse’ recently explored by Julia Kindt.74  The 
narratives presented in the wide range of sources examined by Kindt all centre on humanity’s 
persistent attempts to understand divine omniscience.  Lycurgus’ stories in Against Leocrates 
are no different.  The orator highlights the limits of mortal knowledge by telling his audience 
three tales in which humans attempt to comprehend the divine wisdom of Apollo. 
                                                                                                                                                  
70 Martin 2009, 164-5. 
71 Lyc. Leo.  
72 Martin 2009, 160. 
73 Regulation of various cult activities IG ii2 333; sale of dermatikon IG ii2 1496; regulation of Mysteries IG ii2 
1672; see Humphreys 2004, 83-8; Martin 2009, 154 n. 59; Lambert 2010, 230-1. 
74 Kindt 2016, 157-8. 
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Human Deception and Divine Justice 
After Lycurgus establishes the narrative of Leocrates’ alleged treason (when he left 
Athens, by what method, with whom and so on), the orator uses the refutatio to introduce 
another series of accusations.  In anticipation of a very unlikely argument defending 
Leocrates’ flight from Athens by comparison with the flight to Salamis during the Persian 
invasion, Lycurgus reminds the judges of the ephebic oath.75  A secondary point put forward 
by Lycurgus about the ephebic oath also acts as a preface for his oracular narratives: 
καὶ µήν, ὦ ἄνδρες, καὶ τοῦθ᾽ ὑµᾶς δεῖ µαθεῖν, ὅτι τὸ συνέχον τὴν δηµοκρατίαν ὅρκος ἐστί. … 
τοὺς µὲν γὰρ ἀνθρώπους πολλοὶ ἤδη ἐξαπατήσαντες καὶ διαλαθόντες οὐ µόνον τῶν παρόντων 
κινδύνων ἀπελύθησαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν ἄλλον χρόνον ἀθῷοι τῶν ἀδικηµάτων τούτων εἰσί: τοὺς 
δὲ θεοὺς οὔτ᾽ ἂν ἐπιορκήσας τις λάθοι οὔτ᾽ ἂν ἐκφύγοι τὴν ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν τιµωρίαν. 
 
There is a further point which you should notice, gentlemen. The power which keeps our 
democracy together is the oath…For human beings have often been deceived. Many criminals 
evade them, escaping the dangers of the moment, yes, and even remaining unpunished for 
these crimes for the remainder of their lives. But the gods no one who broke his oath would 
deceive. No one would escape their vengeance.76 
 
Lycurgus follows these statements with the oath sworn by the allies at Plataea, as part 
of the explicit contrast between legendary Athenian acts of bravery and those of Leocrates.  
However, the ruminations above also serve as an introduction to the theme of human 
knowledge and misunderstanding that underpins the oracular narratives.  Lycurgus stresses 
the ease and frequency of humans being deceived (πολλοὶ ἤδη ἐξαπατήσαντες) and the trust 
humans must have in divine justice to overcome their limitations.  Lycurgus’ version of the 
Codrus myth continues to highlight humanity’s imperfect knowledge and susceptibility to 
deception: 
καὶ πρῶτον µὲν εἰς Δελφοὺς ἀποστείλαντες τὸν θεὸν ἐπηρώτων εἰ λήψονται τὰς Ἀθήνας: 
ἀνελόντος δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ αὐτοῖς ὅτι τὴν πόλιν αἱρήσουσιν ἂν µὴ τὸν βασιλέα τὸν Ἀθηναίων 
Κόδρον ἀποκτείνωσιν, ἐστράτευον ἐπὶ τὰς Ἀθήνας… Κλεόµαντις δὲ τῶν Δελφῶν τις 
πυθόµενος τὸ χρηστήριον δι᾽ ἀπορρήτων ἐξήγγειλε τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις…λαβόντα πτωχικὴν 
                                                                                                                                                  
75 Lyc. Leo. 74-78.  See Steinbock 2011 for detailed discussion of the oath. 
76 Lyc. Leo. 79.  
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στολὴν ὅπως ἂν ἀπατήσῃ τοὺς πολεµίους, κατὰ τὰς πύλας ὑποδύντα…παροξυνθέντα τῷ 
Κόδρῳ καὶ νοµίσαντα πτωχὸν εἶναι, σπασάµενον τὸ ξίφος ἀποκτεῖναι τὸν Κόδρον. 
 
First, [the invading Peloponnesians] sent to Delphi and asked of the god whether they would 
capture Athens. When the god replied that they would take the city as long as they did not kill 
the King of Athens, Codrus, they marched against Athens… A certain Cleomantis of Delphi, 
having learned of the oracle told the Athenians, although it was a secret… [Codrus] took up a 
beggar’s cloak so that he could deceive the enemy and slipped out of the gates… provoked by 
Codrus and thinking him to be a beggar, [the scout] drew his sword and killed Codrus.77 
 
 Perhaps the most notable way in which Lycurgus encourages the judges to reflect on 
their ability to know is by inverting the tradition of oracular ambiguity.  The obscurity of 
Apollo’s wisdom, prominent in oracular tales from elsewhere in the Greek canon, forces 
reflection on the part of a successful enquirer or highlights the folly of those who confidently 
misinterpret prophecies.78   
In contrast, Lycurgus presents consultation at Delphi in a very streamlined way, 
detracting the audience’s attention from the process of enquiry and prophecy.  It is the god 
who is asked and the god who responds, without mention of the Pythia (εἰς Δελφοὺς 
ἀποστείλαντες τὸν θεὸν...ἀνελόντος δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ). Lycurgus’ later oracle stories all place the 
same emphasis on Apollo, or ‘the god’, delivering the prophecies directly.79  While this is 
one of the conventional ways of describing the process of consulting the oracle from Delphi, 
Lycurgus’ language minimises the surrounding ‘noise’ of the mantic session. 80  This is a 
slight deviation from the ‘almost invariable plot structure’ of oracular narratives perpetuated 
through oral transmission in the Greek world.81  Without the characteristic hexameters of the 
                                                                                                                                                  
77 Lyc. Leo. 84-87 = PW 215 = F. L49. For briefer fifth and fourth century references to Codrus that do not 
feature oracles see: Pl. Symp. 208 D; FGrH 3 fr.154 (Pherecydes). 
78 Fontenrose 1978, 236-8; Maurizio 1997, 311; Bowden 2005, 49; Kindt 2016, 157-8. 
79 Lyc. Leo. 84-6; Lyc. Leo. 93 καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἐν Δελφοῖς ἀκούσαντα ὅτι ἂν ἔλθῃ Ἀθήναζε τεύξεται τῶν 
νόµων; Lyc. Leo. 99 εἰς Δελφοὺς ἰὼν ἠρώτα τὸν θεὸν τί ποιῶν ἂν νίκην λάβοι παρὰ τῶν πολεµίων. 
80 This is consistent with the only earlier account of the Codrus myth, that of Hellanicus of Lesbos (ἐχρήσεν ὁ 
θεὸς τοῖς Δωριεῦσιν...) FGrH 4 fr.125.  There are a range of common phrases introducing Delphic prophecies: 
from the impersonal ‘oracle declared/ordained’ to the more direct phrases ‘the Pythia/ the god replied’. See 
Fontenrose 1978, 11-57. 
81 Maurizio 1997, 311. 
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Pythia or the obscurity of Apollo’s wisdom, Lycurgus’ tale focuses on the interaction 
between human players, rather than on human interaction with divinity.  
The oracle given to the Peloponnesians does not require interpretation or reflection.  
Although the story plays on the limitations of human knowledge, it does not explore this 
theme through the obscurity of Delphic language.  Rather, the Peloponnesians are actively 
deceived by Codrus with some help from a Delphian man, Cleomantis.82  Codrus leaves 
Athens in order to deceive the enemy (ὅπως ἂν ἀπατήσῃ) after Cleomantis learns of the 
oracle despite it being secret (πυθόµενος τὸ χρηστήριον δι᾽ ἀπορρήτων).  The actions of both 
of the characters defending Athens in the story rely on deception.  Nevertheless, human 
understanding of the prophecy remains constant between the invading Peloponnesians, the 
besieged Athenians and the Delphian.  In contrast to one of the popular strands of oracular 
discourse, humans are being deceived by each other, rather than by an ambiguous prophecy.   
As we saw above, Lycurgus has already warned the audience that humans have often 
been deceived (πολλοὶ ἤδη ἐξαπατήσαντες).  The role of the oracle in this message is the 
inverse of its role in most other examples of oracle stories in the Greek tradition.  It is 
Athens’ close relationship with Delphi that provides noble Codrus with an opportunity to 
save the city, rather than a forced appreciation of the nuances of divine language.83   
Lycurgus offers further support for the mutual respect between Athens and Delphi in 
the time of Codrus by introducing some very contemporary honorific language to the 
mythical narrative: 
τῷ δὲ Κλεοµάντει τῷ Δελφῷ ἡ πόλις αὐτῷ τε καὶ ἐκγόνοις ἐν πρυτανείῳ ἀίδιον σίτησιν 
ἔδοσαν. 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
82 Cleomantis, meaning ‘seer of glory’, is an attested Delphian name outside of this story, but may also have 
developed in the Codrus myth in a similar way to other narratives featuring similar ‘nominative determinism’ 
e.g. Euenius in Hdt. 9.93-105; Aethra in Paus. 10.10.6. On which, see Griffith 1999 and Dougherty 1992, 39-40.   
83 See Kindt 2016, 42-52 for Herodotus’ use of the oracular voice to support the structure of his history. 
 29 
To Cleomantis of Delphi, the city granted eternal sitēsis for himself and his descendants in the 
prytaneion.84 
 
Lycurgus here adopts the standard formula for the granting of dining rights (sitēsis) in 
the fourth century to describe Athens’ honouring of Cleomantis in the distant past.85  
Granting sitēsis was, however, very uncommon in Athens until the early third century.86 
Lycurgus’ use of Athenian myth and history in this speech has been frequently noted, but the 
reference to sitēsis here is quite the opposite.  Lycurgus is introducing a contemporary 
honorific practice, a practice with which he was associated, into the mythical past.87  While 
the Codrus tale is a part of Athens’ shared past, Lycurgus’ retelling places unprecedented 
emphasis on the relationship between Athens and Delphi.  Lycurgus not only highlights the 
favourable prophecy from Apollo, but also a reciprocal relationship between citizens of 
Delphi and Athens in the age of heroes.  His use of a contemporary honorific formula stresses 
the continuity of this ancient relationship to the present day.  
 
Sign Language 
After summarising the contrast between Leocrates’ cowardice and Codrus’ bravery, 
Lycurgus returns to the theme of human ignorance.  The prosecutor presents some 
unidentified poetry and another oracular narrative to refute an argument that Leocrates’ 
defence might put forward: that Leocrates would not have returned to Athens if he were 
guilty.88  The orator explains that the reasoning of men who have betrayed their city and their 
gods is taken away from them:  
                                                                                                                                                  
84 Lyc. Leo. 87.  
85 See IG II2 77 with Osborne 1981; Henry 1983, 275-279; MacDowell 2007. 
86 Osborne 1981, 170; Humphreys 2004, 109-10; MacDowell 2007, 111.  Osborne argues for three grants of 
hereditary sitēsis before the honour becomes more common in the third century, MacDowell for four. 
87 For Lycurgus’ role in grants of sitēsis see Humphreys 2004, 109-110; MacDowell 2007, 111 cf. IG I3 131. 
88 Lyc. Leo. 90. 
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οἱ γὰρ θεοὶ οὐδὲν πρότερον ποιοῦσιν ἢ τῶν πονηρῶν ἀνθρώπων τὴν διάνοιαν παράγουσι: καὶ 
µοι δοκοῦσι τῶν ἀρχαίων τινὲς ποιητῶν ὥσπερ χρησµοὺς γράψαντες τοῖς ἐπιγιγνοµένοις τάδε 
τὰ ἰαµβεῖα καταλιπεῖν: 
“ὅταν γὰρ ὀργὴ δαιµόνων βλάπτῃ τινά,  
τοῦτ᾽ αὐτὸ πρῶτον, ἐξαφαιρεῖται φρενῶν  
τὸν νοῦν τὸν ἐσθλόν, εἰς δὲ τὴν χείρω τρέπει  
γνώµην, ἵν᾽ εἰδῇ µηδὲν ὧν ἁµαρτάνει. 
 
For the first step taken by the gods in the case of wicked men is to unhinge their reason; and 
personally, I value as the utterance of an oracle these lines, composed by ancient poets and 
handed down to posterity: 
“When gods in anger seek a mortal's harm, 
first they deprive him of his sanity, 
And fashion of his mind a baser instrument, 
That he may have no knowledge when he errs.”89 
 
Again, Lycurgus highlights the frailty of human comprehension of their world.  
Reason (τὴν διάνοιαν and τὸν νοῦν τὸν ἐσθλόν) is not a constant of human cognition, but 
rather an unstable feature of human decision-making subject to divine influence.  Lycurgus is 
encouraging the audience to interpret the misguided actions of Callistratus in the following 
tale, and by implication those of the defendant, as being a result of a poorly maintained 
relationship with their homeland (πατρία) and its gods.  Had these men been more diligent in 
their observance of their gods, they might have been presented with less ambiguous signs 
(σηµεῖα).90  Lycurgus introduces oracular discourse to develop a view of the world in which 
human comprehension is disconcertingly fallible. 
Lycurgus then explores the limitations of human knowledge with a recent example of 
oracular interpretation: 
τίς γὰρ οὐ µέµνηται τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἢ τῶν νεωτέρων οὐκ ἀκήκοε Καλλίστρατον, οὗ 
θάνατον ἡ πόλις κατέγνω, τοῦτον φυγόντα καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἐν Δελφοῖς ἀκούσαντα ὅτι ἂν 
ἔλθῃ Ἀθήναζε τεύξεται τῶν νόµων, ἀφικόµενον καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν βωµὸν τῶν δώδεκα θεῶν 
καταφυγόντα, καὶ οὐδὲν ἧττον ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως ἀποθανόντα; δικαίως: τὸ γὰρ τῶν νόµων τοῖς 
ἠδικηκόσι τυχεῖν τιµωρία ἐστίν. 
 
Who does not know the fate of Callistratus, which the older among you remember and the 
younger have heard recounted, the man condemned to death by the city? How he fled and 
later, hearing from the god at Delphi that if he returned to Athens he would have fair 
treatment by the laws, came back and taking refuge at the altar of the twelve gods and was 
                                                                                                                                                  
89 Lyc. Leo. 92 
90 Lyc. Leo. 93 cf. Heraclitus fr. 93. On the idea of divinity ‘speaking through signs’ (σεµαινεῖν) see Tor 2016. 
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none the less put to death by the state, and rightly so, for “fair treatment by the laws” is, in the 
case of wrongdoers, punishment.91 
 
Lycurgus here explains the death of Callistratus, a few decades before this speech was 
delivered in 330, in a narrative featuring the ‘enigmatic mode’ of oracular communication 
that would have been very familiar to his audience.92  Unlike the tale of Codrus above, the 
Callistratus story hinges upon the interpretation of cryptic advice from the god at Delphi.  
Kindt has argued that the enigmatic oracle story is one in which the narrative serves to define 
features of human experience in opposition to the gods.93 The example Lycurgus presents as 
part of his refutatio works very much within this framework. 
Callistratus, in exile for betraying Athens, believes that Apollo’s words are 
confirming his desired return to the city.  The oracle is, of course, merely observing that he 
will meet his punishment (already) laid out in the laws.94  Thus, Delphi is simultaneously 
upholding Athens’ nomoi and expediting their fulfilment by presenting the treacherous 
Callistratus with abstruse sēmia: 
ὁ δέ γε θεὸς ὀρθῶς ἀπέδωκε τοῖς ἠδικηµένοις κολάσαι τὸν αἴτιον: δεινὸν γὰρ ἂν εἴη, εἰ ταὐτὰ 
σηµεῖα τοῖς εὐσεβέσι καὶ τοῖς κακούργοις φαίνοιτο.  
 
And thus, the god too acted rightly in allowing those who had been wronged to punish the 
offender. For it would be an unseemly thing if revelations made to good men were the same 
as those vouchsafed to malefactors.95 
 
Lycurgus’ authorial aside on Callistratus’ misfortune develops ideas explored in the 
Codrus story.  Athenians benefitted from their relationship with Delphi in both tales of 
                                                                                                                                                  
91 Lyc. Leo. 93 = Fontenrose H18; PW 259 c. 356 BC. 
92 Kindt 2016, 26-27; 159-164. 
93 Kindt 2008; 2016, 160-2.  Kindt argues that these narratives have three levels on which to explore the human 
condition: the ontological difference between omniscient gods and fallible mortals; the temporal difference 
between the unchanged divine perspective and the changed mortal perspective on events as the oracle moves 
from prediction to fulfilment; and the cognitive mode by which humans move from ignorance to knowledge.   
94 It is worth noting that both Parke and Fontenrose argue that this is an ‘unambiguous’ oracle onto which a 
double meaning was later projected: Parke and Wormell 1956b, 105; Fontenrose 1978, 250. 
95 Lyc. Leo. 93. 
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oracular knowledge, but only here does Lycurgus explicitly state that this reflects Athens’ 
eusebia. 
The purpose of these oracular narratives, quite apart from possibly representing 
Lycurgus’ own perspective on human interaction with the divine, is to offer the audience a 
persuasive interpretation of the actions on which they were deliberating.  On the one hand, 
Lycurgus uses an oracular narrative to understand past events: Callistratus returned to Athens 
because traitors are deprived of their ability to comprehend divine signals.  On the other, 
explaining the event in this way projects the familiar narrative framework of the oracle story 
onto the case of Leocrates. The audience’s familiarity with the structure and themes of the 
‘enigmatic mode’ of oracular communication also complements Lycurgus’ broader argument 
for this section of the speech as whole.  
Human understanding, in the stories of both Codrus and Callistratus, is dependent on 
their maintenance of reciprocal goodwill with the gods.  Athenian nobility, according to 
Lycurgus, prompts Cleomantis to help Codrus deceive the Peloponnesians and fulfil one of 
the prophecy’s potential outcomes.  In this instance, the relationship between Athens and 
Delphi resolves an Athenian crisis by helping exploit human susceptibility to deception.  In 
the case of Callistratus, Lycurgus again depicts the enemies of Athens falling victim to 
Delphic pitfalls.  Callistratus, as one of the kakourgoi, has misunderstood divine signals from 
Delphi due to his transgression against Athens and her temples.96   
These oracle stories, despite key differences in structure, develop the same argument 
for Athens’ trust in the processes of advice from the sanctuary. The consistency of Delphi’s 
alignment with Athenian interests in both early myth and the present day supports the 
immediate relevance of Lycurgus’ framework of human-divine interaction. 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
96 Lyc. Leo. 93. 
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Exemplary Erechtheus 
Lycurgus’ use of poetry in his prosecution of Leocrates has often been the focus of 
scholarship on the speech. Foremost amongst the poetic examples is the extended quotation 
of Euripides’ Erechtheus.97  Here I wish to focus on the continuity of Lycurgus’ oracular 
storytelling from earlier in the speech with the excerpt of Euripides he reperfoms.  This final 
oracular narrative builds on the stable relationship between Athens and Delphi established in 
the previous stories: 
εἰς Δελφοὺς ἰὼν ἠρώτα τὸν θεὸν τί ποιῶν ἂν νίκην λάβοι παρὰ τῶν πολεµίων. χρήσαντος δ᾽ 
αὐτῷ τοῦ θεοῦ, τὴν θυγατέρα εἰ θύσειε πρὸ τοῦ συµβαλεῖν τὼ στρατοπέδω, κρατήσειν τῶν 
πολεµίων, ὁ δὲ τῷ θεῷ πειθόµενος τοῦτ᾽ ἔπραξε, καὶ τοὺς ἐπιστρατευοµέ νους ἐκ τῆς χώρας 
ἐξέβαλε. 
 
[Erechtheus] went to Delphi and asked the god by what means he could assure a victory over 
the enemy. The god's answer to him was that if he sacrificed his daughter before the two sides 
engaged he would defeat the enemy and, submitting to the god, he did this and drove the 
invaders from the country.98 
 
The passage above is perhaps the briefest possible oracle story that could be told.  
Once again, the consultation and response of the god is streamlined. Rather than mentioning 
the intermediary Pythia, it is the god who responds to Erechtheus’ enquiry and the king 
brings the prophecy to completion without any complicating events.  Indeed, Lycurgus’ two-
word resolution of the play’s dilemma (τοῦτ᾽ ἔπραξε) entirely avoids the moral conundrum 
on which Euripides’ tragedy certainly focused.99  Lycurgus thanks Euripides for ‘believing 
that in the conduct of those people [i.e. Erechtheus and Praxithea] citizens would have a fine 
example … and so implant in their hearts a love for their country’100.  This quote immediately 
follows Lycurgus’ quick synopsis of the story, in which the only event described in detail is 
visiting and obeying Delphi.  While three clauses are devoted to describing Erechtheus’ 
consultation of Apollo, only two words are given to the king’s sacrifice of his own daughter. 
                                                                                                                                                  
97 Wilson 1996; Bowden 2005, 55; Hanink 2014; Calame 2011. 
98 Lyc. Leo. 99. 
99 Wilson 1996, 314. 
100 Lyc. Leo. 100. 
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In Lycurgus’ lengthy reperformance of Praxithea’s speech, Erechtheus’ unenviable decision 
is similarly superseded by his wife’s patriotic pseudo-epitaphios.101 Moreover, the story (τὸν 
µῦθον) that Lycurgus praises as an example (τὰ παράδειµα) before presenting Praxithea’s 
speech is based far more on Erechtheus’ cognitive response to crisis than on his deeply 
problematic sacrifice.  As Peter Wilson has outlined, part of Lycurgus’ emphasis here must 
be attributed to the tricky process of co-opting a play devoted to a moral dilemma between 
familial and patriotic responsibility as an unproblematic patriotic text.102  Highlighting 
Erechtheus’ attentiveness and deference to Apollo in the tale appears to be another way of 
developing tragedy into what Johanna Hanink has called ‘civic poetry’ demonstrating 
Athenian excellence, rather than a genre exploring challenging human situations.103 
The similarities between Lycurgus’ inclusion of Delphi in this short synopsis and the 
previous two oracle stories demonstrates the role of the oracular voice in Lycurgus’ speech 
and in fourth century Athens.  The audience are compelled to acknowledge Erechtheus’ and 
Praxithea’s actions protecting Athens as examples of fine civic behaviour, but Lycurgus also 
makes a point to praise their decision-making process.  By framing their actions as deference 
to divine authority, Lycurgus not only avoids the problematic aspects of the myth, but also 
continues to develop previous arguments for the frailty of human reasoning in the popular 
Erechtheus story.104  
This oracular perspective complements Lycurgus’ use of ta palaia in his prosecution 
of Leocrates.  The three oracle stories show the tradition and importance of Athens’ goodwill 
with Delphi.  Leocrates’ betrayal of Athens was not only cowardly, but has also placed him 
outside of the religious life of the polis. The existential (between human and divine) and 
                                                                                                                                                  
101 Wilson 1996, 313; Hanink 2014, 37-38. 
102 Wilson 1996, 312-14 
103 Hanink 2014, 25; 32-4. 
104 For the popularity of retellings of the Erechtheus myth in Athenian public discourse see Loraux 1986, 393; 
Thomas 1989, 207-218; Calame 2011, 8; Steinbock 2012, 50-8; Hanink 2014, 32-35. 
 35 
cognitive (between human and crisis) themes of oracular discourse promote the interpretation 
of Leocrates’ alleged treason according to broader community morality rather than specific 
Athenian laws. 
 
Mythed Opportunity 
Lycurgus’ use of oracles in Against Leocrates is crucial to the development of one 
aspect of his prosecution.  For twenty sections of the speech, the orator focuses on the frailty 
of human reasoning in times of crisis.  The three oracular narratives that comprise this line of 
argument have different outcomes and come from disparate story-telling traditions: heroic 
myths, recent memory and a mix of both in Euripidean tragedy.  Nevertheless, the role of 
Delphi and its oracle in the stories is consistent.  The oracle provides divine advice that can 
assist human decision-making.  Lycurgus stresses that benefiting from Apollo’s responses 
requires strict adherence to ritual processes and a recognition of the inherent division between 
divine and mortal.  For the Athenian kings, Codrus and Erechtheus, this involved complete 
submission to divine suggestion despite harm to them or their family.  The treacherous 
Callistratus demonstrated the fatal consequences of confidently interpreting divine advice in a 
way favouring the individual over Athens and its nomoi.  Lycurgus’ use of the oracular voice 
to establish this absolutism conflates tales of Athenian bravery with the everyday observance 
of collective rituals. 
My argument is in accordance with previous assessment of the role of oracles in 
Athenian oratory.  In each example, the orator uses advice from Delphi in the narratives as ‘a 
source of authority, parallel with the nomoi of the city of Athens.’105  However, Lycurgus 
constructs this argument from ta palaia as part of his challenge for the jurors to become 
                                                                                                                                                  
105 Bowden 2005, 55.  Italics in original. 
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nomothetai themselves.106  While the role of Delphi in the stories might be to offer support to 
pious kings, the collection of oracle stories as a whole is urging the audience to go beyond 
Athenian nomoi in prosecuting Leocrates.  Moreover, the constant role of oracles in the 
narratives allows Lycurgus to link the moral absolutes of patriotic tales with religious 
practices and ritual logic of the present day.  
It has been argued elsewhere that Lycurgus’ frequent citations of poetic examples 
reflect his ideals and agenda outside the courtroom.107  I suggest here that there is a similar 
connection between Lycurgus’ series of oracle stories and the increase in Athenian 
involvement with Delphi in the preceding decades. An increase in the amount of Apollo-Ion 
genealogies and the construction of the temple to Apollo Patroos in the 330s show greater 
prominence for Apollo in Athenian religious life. Lycurgus was at the forefront of these 
religious changes: forming councils for advice on change, honouring those who dedicated to 
Apollo, introducing legislation and leading theōria. 108 
 There is strong evidence of this focus on Delphi in the speech Against Leocrates.  
The orator uses the form and themes of oracle stories to link the moral absolutes of myth to 
contemporary politics.  Lycurgus also uses present day honorific language to emphasise the 
closeness of Athens and Delphi in the era of Codrus.  This process works in the opposite 
direction as well, as Lycurgus uses the increasingly positive sentiment toward Apollo in his 
time to mitigate the potentially problematic morality of the Callistratus and Erechtheus 
stories as unequivocally patriotic.  
The emergence of oracular narratives in Athenian public speeches during the 330s 
reflects an increase in the importance of Delphi in Athenian public life.  The oracles 
                                                                                                                                                  
106 Lyc. Leo. 9 διὸ καὶ µάλιστ᾽, ὦ ἄνδρες, δεῖ ὑµᾶς γενέσθαι µὴ µόνον τοῦ νῦν ἀδικήµατος δικαστάς, ἀλλὰ καὶ 
νοµοθέτας.  See Hanink 2014, 30 n. 24; Humphreys 2004, 201-4. 
107 A Platonic ideal of how poetry should function in the polis: Allen 2000, 30-31; Lycurgus’ appropriation of 
tragedy as a patriotically Athenian form: Hanink 2014, 40-43. 
108 For Ion genealogy see Phanodemos FGrH 328 F75.  On the relationship between Phanodemos and Lycurgus 
see Humphreys 2004 82-100 with notes.  Apollo Patroos: IG ii2 333; Plut. Mor.  843. 
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presented in the speech Against Leocrates work toward Lycurgus’ aims in a specific section 
of argumentation, in the eisangelia procedure and in his political objectives for the polis.  The 
oracle stories in the speech, as they do in other sources, highlight the risks of being overly 
confident in human decision making.  By presenting two positive examples and one negative, 
Lycurgus highlights the traditional value of trusting the god at Delphi.  The orator’s use of 
the oracular voice also encourages the jurors to view the case from a patriotic and morally 
absolute perspective, rather than simply following their nomoi as they find them.  Finally, 
Lycurgus’ personal connection with the Delphi through regulatory and honorific activity 
heightens the impact of his oracular argumentation.   
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Chapter Two: 
Turn That Crown Upside Down: Oracular Arguments in Aeschines’ Against 
Ctesiphon and Demosthenes’ On the Crown. 
 
The failure of local, state, and federal governments to respond more effectively to 
Katrina — which had been predicted in theory for many years, and forecast with 
startling accuracy for five days — demonstrates that … we are still not fully 
prepared.109 
 
 
ἀλλ᾽ οὐ προύλεγον, οὐ προεσήµαινον οἱ θεοὶ φυλάξασθαι, µόνον γε οὐκ ἀνθρώπων 
φωνὰς προσκτησάµενοι; 
 
But did not the gods forewarn, did they not indicate to us to be on our guard, all but 
adopting human voice?110 
 
Response to crisis always involves an assessment of the processes and 
preparations that were in place before the event.  For both the House of 
Representatives Select Committee and Aeschines in the excerpts above, assessments 
determined that the state’s response to a crisis was unacceptable given the extent to 
which events were either ‘forecast’ or ‘forespoken’ (προύλεγον).  The striking 
difference between these brief excerpts is the state’s method of minimising 
uncertainty toward the future — meteorological reports and oracles —  rather than the 
conclusions that have been drawn.  The conclusions of the House Select Committee 
match the prevailing attitudes of America in 2006, that the poor response to Hurricane 
Katrina by the United States Government was a result of inefficient management of 
response resources rather than inadequate warning about the storm. Aeschines 
                                                                                                                                      
109 "A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the 
Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina" February 15, 2006, 1. 
110 Aeschin. 3.130.  The comparison with the language of contemporary political committees is inspired 
by Eidinow 2011, 143-4. 
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concluded that Demosthenes had mismanaged and misled Athens, considering that the 
people had been warned so clearly about the future by Apollo.  
We saw in the previous chapter that Lycurgus used oracular discourse to link 
and develop different angles of his prosecution.  The orator and his audience had a 
shared understanding of the features, shape and meaning of oracle stories. The 
persuasive function of these tales involving oracles, then, is separate to the most 
common question in the modern scholarship, concerning the ‘authenticity’ of 
responses from Delphi.  Regardless of whether Pythia ever spoke the words that were 
read to the court, Lycurgus could use the oracular tradition to develop complex 
arguments.  However, Lycurgus’ Against Leocrates has interested commentators from 
both modern and ancient times due to its idiosyncratic style of language and 
argumentation.  It is the task of this chapter to determine whether the persuasive 
function of the oracle stories in Against Leocrates can be found in the speeches of 
other orators.   
We do not need to travel far in time to find other uses of oracular 
argumentation in Athenian oratory.  A few months after Lycurgus brought his 
prosecution against Leocrates, another case came before the Athenian courts in which 
both parties used oracles, this time from both Delphi and Dodona, in their arguments.  
This concentration of oracles in Athenian trials is rare, but the significance of these 
examples lies as much in their opposition as their closeness in time.  The expectations 
and values of the audience of Athenian jurors can be assumed to be constant between 
the suits against Leocrates and Ctesiphon, yet the three speeches we have offer very 
distinct uses of the oracular voice.  Further, the opposing speeches of Aeschines and 
Demosthenes use different oracular responses from different sanctuaries in competing 
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interpretations of the same key religious concept: tuchē.111 The orators use this 
religious discourse to debate responsibility for the failure of Athenian resistance to 
Macedon.  Analysis of this case will show that Lycurgus’ depiction of Delphi as a 
constant ally of Athens was not the only way of using the oracular voice in fourth 
century rhetoric.  Aeschines carefully appropriates and inverts traditions of oracular 
storytelling to attack Demosthenes.  Moreover, Demosthenes could avoid these 
attacks by turning to another avenue of oracular authority to develop a competing 
explanation of the relationship between humans and divine insight. 
  
Send in the Crowns 
From the Peace of Philocrates in 446 to the Battle of Chaeronea in 338 and 
beyond, Demosthenes was the most prominent advocate for absolute opposition to the 
expansion of Philip the Second.  One of his colleagues on the peace envoys of 446, 
Aeschines, became one of the many politicians advocating attempts to curtail 
Macedonian expansion through diplomatic means.112  The two orators were frequently 
and famously in opposition with each other, and the case concerning Ctesiphon’s 
proposal to present a crown to Demosthenes at the Dionysia for his services to the 
Athens is very much the culmination of their rivalry.  Aeschines brought the suit 
against Ctesiphon for improperly proposing honours for Demosthenes in 336, but the 
case did not reach trial until the autumn of 330.  The speech Against Ctesiphon is 
therefore the final expression of nearly two decades of enmity between not only 
Aeschines and Demosthenes but also their respective approaches to the expansion of 
Philip.   
                                                                                                                                      
111 On tuchē in these speeches, see Eidinow 2011, 144-150. 
112 Cawkwell 1969.  
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Aeschines prosecuted Ctesiphon on the grounds that his proposal to crown 
Demosthenes was paranomon (against law and custom).  According to Aeschines, 
Ctesiphon’s motion was improper for three reasons: that a city official could not be 
honoured at the Theatre of Dionysus; that a magistrate could not be presented with a 
crown without being subject to an audit; and finally, that there was no basis for the 
honours, because Demosthenes had never been in the practice of ‘continually advising 
and doing the best things for the people’.113 
Prosecuting Ctesiphon gave Aeschines a chance to present his damning 
interpretation of Demosthenes’ entire public career.  The contrast between Aeschines’ 
account and Demosthenes ensuing defence speech, On the Crown, makes an accurate 
reconstruction of the events of the fourth-century difficult.114  While the speeches 
offer distinct challenges to the political historian, the contrasting ways in which 
Aeschines and Demosthenes develop their arguments and interpretations of events for 
their Athenian peers can be very informative.115  Steinbock in particular has used an 
earlier pair of speeches, those concerning the embassy of 446,  to question the 
prevailing view of how modern scholars ought to approach orators’ competing 
versions of historical events.116  Rather than expecting the jurors to already have a 
clear and accurate understanding of Athenian history that politicians could manipulate 
for their own ends, Steinbock argues that there were multiple competing public 
                                                                                                                                      
113Aeschin. 3.50.  δεῖ γὰρ δή που τὸν µὲν κατηγοροῦντα ἐµὲ τοῦθ᾽ ὑµῖν ἐπιδεικνύναι, ὡς εἰσὶν οἱ κατὰ 
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114 See Cawkwell 1969 for the most comprehensive treatment of the fourth-century sources.  See also 
Carey 2000, 114-5; Rhodes 2010, 348-9. 
115 On insults and oral imagery see Worman 2004; religion: Martin 2009, 85-117 and 168-182; tuchē in 
particular: Eidinow 2011, 144-150; historical allusions: Hobden 2007; social memory: Steinbock 2013. 
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recollections in the ancient polis.117  Thus, by 330, the Athenian public had a 
remarkably broad range of possible narratives and explanations of events that 
occurred sixteen years earlier.118 
How, then, did speechmakers construct a persuasive sequence of events for 
their audience?  We saw Lycurgus use oracular narratives to develop the themes of 
his prosecution in Against Leocrates and to organise events from both Athenian myth 
and living memory.119  Aeschines’ use of oracular language similarly links his 
arguments against Demosthenes with a range of events from Athenian collective 
memory. 
Whatever the reasons for the six-year delay between Ctesiphon’s alleged 
offence and the case coming to trial, Aeschines had a strong position from which to 
attack Demosthenes.120  Demosthenes’ policies for Athens had failed, both in the lead 
up to the disaster at Chaeronea in 338 and during the brief resistance to Macedon after 
the death of Philip in 336.121  Aeschines covers this crucial period of Demosthenes’ 
public career in the second half of the speech Against Ctesiphon.  During the first half 
of the speech, after he has introduced the case and his main arguments, Aeschines 
seeks to establish that Demosthenes has been consistently impious towards the 
gods.122  He continues this theme as his argumentation shifts more openly to religious 
matters: 
                                                                                                                                      
117 Steinbock 2013, 89-91.  Steinbock points to two common misconceptions in Athens: that Xerxes 
offered peace terms before Salamis rather than after (cit. in Lys. 2.33; Isoc. 4.94-6; Dem. 6.11; 18.202-
4; Lyc. Leo. 71.) and the dating of Spartan occupation of Dekeleia before the Sicilian expedition (cf. 
Isoc. 8.84).  See also Thomas 1989 and 1992. 
118 See Hobden 2007, 501 for the role of adversarial litigation in this vast pool of potential historical 
realities. 
119 Lyc. Leo. 84-7, 93. 
120 Eidinow 2011, 144-5; Adams 1988, 305; Yunis 2000, 13; contra Richardson 1889, 23. 
121 See Cawkwell 1969, 175-7 cf. Aeschin. 3.156, 173, 209, 250-9. 
122 Aeschin. 3.64-135.  See Martin 2009, 168-171; Eidinow 2011, 147-8. 
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ἐνταῦθ᾽ ἤδη τέτακται καὶ ὁ τρίτος τῶν καιρῶν, µᾶλλον δ᾽ ὁ πάντων πικρότατος 
χρόνος, ἐν ὧ Δηµοσθένης ἀπώλεσε τὰς τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ τῆς πόλεως πράξεις, 
ἀσεβήσας µὲν εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς. 
 
I come now to the third, or rather the most bitter period [of Demosthenes’ career], in 
which Demosthenes ruined the affairs of the Greeks and of our city by being impious 
toward the sanctuary at Delphi.123 
 
Aeschines refers to two oracles from the distant past — the First Sacred War 
in the sixth century — and then raises a response from Delphi that Demosthenes 
allegedly ignored.124  The discrepancies between the accounts of Aeschines and 
Demosthenes in these speeches complicate any analysis of the historicity or 
authenticity of these pronouncements from Delphi.  For example, Parke and Wormell 
consider the oracles, although the second has not been transmitted with the text of the 
speech, as accurate to records Aeschines had available in court.125  In contrast, 
Fontenrose concludes that neither of the oracles are genuine, and that the first was 
‘obviously invented’ after the fact.126  I seek to show that Aeschines is able to use the 
Delphic oracles and the narratives surrounding them, regardless of their historicity, to 
highlight his own role in events and to exacerbate the accusations of Demosthenes’ 
impiety and contagious misfortune. 
 
Solon and good luck 
 Before describing Demosthenes’ offences against the gods, Aeschines reminds 
the jurors of a tale from the First Sacred War.127  The orator seeks to demonstrate the 
                                                                                                                                      
123 Aeschin. 3.106. 
124 Aeschin. 3.109; 3.112 and 3.130-1. 
125 Parke and Wormell 1956, 8-9. 
126 Fontenrose 1979, 291-2. 
127 The history of the First Sacred War remains very unclear.  The existence of the war itself has been 
questioned in Robertson 1978.   See Scott 2014, 71-4 for a detailed summary of the debate. 
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venerable and pious relationship between Athens, Delphi and the Amphictyony from 
the time of Solon.128  
ἄρξοµαι δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν εἰς τοὺς πληµµεληµάτων λέγειν… [οἱ  Κιρραῖοι καὶ Κραγαλίδαι] 
εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς καὶ περὶ τὰ ἀναθήµατα ἠσέβουν, ἐξηµάρτανον δὲ καὶ εἰς 
τοὺς Ἀµφικτύονας. ἀγανακτήσαντες δ᾽ ἐπὶ τοῖς γιγνοµένοις µάλιστα µέν, ὡς 
λέγονται, οἱ πρόγονοι οἱ ὑµέτεροι, ἔπειτα καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Ἀµφικτύονες, µαντείαν 
ἐµαντεύσαντο παρὰ τῷ θεῷ, τίνι χρὴ τιµωρίᾳ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τούτους µετελθεῖν.   
 
I will begin to speak from the offences [of Demosthenes] against the gods… [the 
Kirraeans and the Kragalidae] repeatedly committed sacrilege against the shrine at 
Delphi and the votive offerings there, and transgressed against the Amphictyons also. 
This conduct exasperated all the Amphictyons, and your ancestors most of all, it is 
said, and they sought at the shrine of the god an oracle to tell them with what penalty 
they should visit these men.129 
 
  Moreover, he stresses that the contested plain and harbour are known as 
consecrated and accursed (ὁ νῦν ἐξάγιστος καὶ ἐπάρατος ὠνοµασµένος).130  Martin 
has argued that Aeschines’ repetition of this phrase foreshadows his later point that 
money accepted by Demosthenes was also ἐξάγιστον and ἐπάρατον.131  Phrases such 
as these form the basis of Aeschines’ argument for the Demosthenes, but do not 
appear to have great authority or impact in their own right.132  Rather, Aeschines 
establishes the significance of his charges against Demosthenes during his 
explanation of early Delphic history.  The voice of the Pythia and the actions of Solon 
in Aeschines’ narrative develop the religious significance of Demosthenes’ (alleged) 
actions in the 440s.  Aeschines’ history of the Sacred War gives prominence to the 
process of consulting the Pythia and adhering to her responses: 
καὶ αὐτοῖς ἀναιρεῖ ἡ Πυθία πολεµεῖν Κιρραίοις καὶ Κραγαλίδαις πάντ᾽ ἤµατα καὶ 
πάσας νύκτας, καὶ τὴν χώραν αὐτῶν ἐκπορθήσαντας καὶ αὐτοὺς ἀνδραποδισαµένους 
                                                                                                                                      
128 Other sources present very different accounts, especially concerning the leader of the Amphictyonic 
effort against Kirra: Plut. Sol. 9 gives Alcmeon; Paus. 10.37.6 gives Cleisthenes of Sicyon.   
129 Aeschin. 3.107. 
130 Aeschin. 3.107.  See Martin 2009, 169. 
131 Martin 2009, 169; Aeschin. 3.114. 
132 Martin 2009, 169 n. 113.  Martin argues that this phrase is not a standard feature of inscriptions or 
religious language.  Aeschines elsewhere uses more common and emotive ritual language.  See 
Aeschin. 3.135 quoting Hes. Op. 240 ‘ὅς κεν ἀλιτραίνῃ καὶ ἀτάσθαλα’ with Martin 2009, 168 n. 112. 
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ἀναθεῖναι τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι τῷ Πυθίῳ καὶ τῇ Ἀρτέµιδι καὶ τῇ Λητοῖ καὶ Ἀθηνᾷ Προναίᾳ 
ἐπὶ πάσῃ ἀεργίᾳ, καὶ ταύτην τὴν χώραν µήτ᾽ αὐτοὺς ἐργάζεσθαι µήτ᾽ ἄλλον ἐᾶν. 
 
λαβόντες δὲ τὸν χρησµὸν τοῦτον οἱ Ἀµφικτύονες ἐψηφίσαντο Σόλωνος εἰπόντος 
Ἀθηναίου τὴν γνώµην, ἀνδρὸς καὶ νοµοθετῆσαι δυνατοῦ καὶ περὶ ποίησιν καὶ 
φιλοσοφίαν διατετριφότος, ἐπιστρατεύειν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐναγεῖς κατὰ τὴν µαντείαν τοῦ 
θεοῦ. 
 
The Pythia replied that they must fight against the Kirraeans and the Kragalidae day 
and night, bitterly ravage their country, enslave the inhabitants, and dedicate the land 
to the Pythian Apollo and Artemis and Leto and Athena Pronaea, that for the future it 
lie entirely uncultivated; that they must not till this land themselves nor permit 
another. 
 
Now when they had received this oracle, the Amphictyons voted, on motion of Solon 
of Athens, a man able as a law-giver and versed in poetry and philosophy, to march 
against the accursed men according to the oracle of the god.133 
 
In contrast to the oracular narratives presented by Lycurgus in Against 
Leocrates, Aeschines here draws out the process of consulting Apollo at Delphi.134  
The crisis leading to the involvement of the oracle is described in detail and 
Aeschines gives a lengthy paraphrase of the Pythia’s response.135  While the role of 
Solon in any sixth century conflict over Delphi has been rightly questioned due to a 
lack of direct evidence, his role in Aeschines’ narrative shows the orator emphasising 
the connection between Athenian and Delphic interests.136  The orator establishes not 
only the dedication of the land to the gods of Delphi, but also that the sanctuary’s 
early survival was dependant on a key figure in the development of Athens.  
Aeschines highlights Solon’s varied abilities (ἀνδρὸς καὶ νοµοθετῆσαι δυνατοῦ καὶ 
περὶ ποίησιν καὶ φιλοσοφίαν διατετριφότος), a description that reflects Solon’s ever-
growing reputation in the fourth century.137  Without taking up the ‘fool’s task’ of 
determining the authenticity of Solonian laws, it can still be seen that Solon was 
                                                                                                                                      
133 Aeschin. 3.108 = PW 17 = F. Q70. 
134 See esp. Lyc. Leo. 99 with chapter one above. 
135 See Parke and Wormell 1956b, 8 for a potential reconstruction of an original hexameter response. 
136 For source issues of the Solonian era see Osborne 2009, 203-11.  Solon is a clear leader in the 
conflict in the account of Aeschines but features as part of a coalition in later accounts: Paus. 10.37.5; 
Plut. Sol. 11. On the Sacred War as a whole see Forrest 1956; Davies 1994.  
137 Osborne 2009, 204. 
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viewed in this period as the figure that aligned Athens with Delphi.138  Aeschines’ 
narration of this oracle story, as familiar as it might have been to his audience, 
accentuates the authority and ongoing relevance of the Pythia’s command to dedicate 
the land. 
The oracle also allows Aeschines to introduce a previously cultivated personal 
affiliation with Solon.139  During the trial of Timarchus in 345, Aeschines contrasted 
the defendant’s indecorous style of wearing his cloak while speaking to the assembly 
with the far more respectable self-presentation of Solon. 140   Two years later, 
Demosthenes ridiculed Aeschines for adopting this Solonian posture without any of 
its corresponding virtues.141  Demosthenes also contests Aeschines’ portrayal of Solon 
by reading an extensive quotation of the lawgiver’s poetry.142  As Carey argues, the 
two year delay between Aeschines’ self-association with Solon and Demosthenes’ 
mockery of it suggests that the connection was well-known.143  While it is difficult to 
know whether Aeschines’ adoption of Solonian style impacted the audience’s 
reception of the narrative of the Sacred War in Against Ctesiphon, it is clear that 
Aeschines’ co-opted Solon and the oracular narrative to underline the ancient 
friendship between Athens and Delphi.  
The oracle thus serves two functions in establishing this section of Aeschines’ 
argument.  Firstly, Aeschines describes the Pythia’s response in detailed and powerful 
language to highlight that Demosthenes’ acceptance of cursed money was a crime 
                                                                                                                                      
138 Solon is associated with a number of oracular consultations from this era as well as the foundation 
of the board of exegetai pythochrestoi.  See Scott 2014, 75; Parke and Wormell no. 14-18; Fontenrose 
Q 67-69; Hdt. 1.29-86 for Solon’s accord with Delphi in the Croesus logos.  Quote from Osborne 2009, 
207. 
139 Carey 2015, 118.  See also Westwood 2013 for more detailed analysis of the use of Solon by the 
orators. 
140 Aeschin. 1.25-6. 
141 Dem. 19.251. 
142 Dem. 19.255-6. 
143 Carey 2015, 121. 
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against Apollo, Leto and Athena.  At the same time, the tale of the Sacred War acts as 
counter-example of Athenian conduct at Delphi.  Aeschines’ description of Solon’s 
humble acquiescence to divine advice strengthens the seriousness of the legendary 
oracular response for present day Athens.  Further, Aeschines uses Solon’s conduct to 
foreshadow his own pious actions at Delphi in the following sections. 
Before Aeschines moves on to the present day, however, he reinforces the 
seriousness of the oracle by describing the resulting oath and its associated curse: 
καὶ οὐκ ἀπέχρησεν αὐτοῖς τοῦτον τὸν ὅρκον ὀµόσαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ προστροπὴν καὶ ἀρὰν 
ἰσχυρὰν ὑπὲρ τούτων ἐποιήσαντο. γέγραπται γὰρ οὕτως ἐν τῇ ἀρᾷ … ‘εἴ τις τάδε,’ 
φησί ‘παραβαίνοι ἐναγής … ἔστω τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος καὶ τῆς Ἀρτέµιδος καὶ τῆς Λητοῦς 
καὶ Ἀθηνᾶς Προναίας…. καὶ µήποτε,’ φησίν, ‘ὁσίως θύσειαν τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι µηδὲ τῇ 
Ἀρτέµιδι µηδὲ τῇ Λητοῖ µηδ᾽ Ἀθηνᾷ Προναίᾳ, µηδὲ δέξαιντο αὐτοῖς τὰ ἱερά.’    
 
[Solon and the Amphictyons] were not content with taking this oath, but they added 
an imprecation and a mighty curse concerning this; for it stands thus written in the 
curse: “If any one should violate this,” it says… “let them be under the curse of 
Apollo and Artemis and Leto and Athena Pronaea… and may they never offer pure 
sacrifice unto Apollo or Artemis or Leto or Athena Pronaia, and may the gods refuse 
to accept their offerings.”144 
 
Throughout this section of the speech, Aeschines argues that Demosthenes’ 
actions have amounted to impiety (ἀσέβεια) and that he has brought this impiety 
(ασεβήσας) on both Athens and Greece. 145   Orators elsewhere establish broad 
accusations of ἀσέβεια using oracles and the stories around them, but here Aeschines 
combines the implications of the oracle, the oath and the curse at once to present a 
clear image of Demosthenes’ ἀσέβεια  and contagiousness.146  Moreover, Aeschines 
juxtaposes Demosthenes’ disregard of the gods with the upstanding behaviour of 
Solon above and his own conduct at Delphi. 
The final prohibition of the curse attached to the oracle is the key link between 
Solon and Aeschines.  Solon and the Amphictyony act κατὰ τὴν µαντείαν before 
                                                                                                                                      
144 Aeschin. 3.110-1. 
145 Aeschin. 3.118-121; 106; cf. 3.157 with Martin 2009, 168-170. 
146 See Martin 2009, 169 for contagiousness; other oracles see Dem. 21.51-2. 
 48 
making the curse on those who would act against the wishes of the oracle.147 
Aeschines then recounts his own speech to the Amphictyony in the same language, 
repeating the curse in both the positive and the negative.148  The ‘may they never offer 
pure sacrifice (ὁσίως θύσειαν) prohibition is repeated as he reminds the Amphictyony 
(and the present Athenian audience) of the curse.149  
The phrasing of the curse is also informative.  As Versnel has noted, the 
prohibitive ‘may they not sacrifice’ curse is amongst the most serious common 
formulae.150  The victim of the curse is not only suffering the wrath of the gods 
(famine, monstrous offspring and eventual destruction in this case) but is also 
removed from any means of placating or even contacting the divine.151  Moreover, the 
‘may they not sacrifice’ formula, perhaps because of its profound effect, is common 
in a wide range of evidence for curses from the sixth century BCE through to the 
Roman Period.152  Thus, it seems likely that Aeschines’ repetition of this phrase 
would have resonated with his Athenian audience.  Martin has argued that Aeschines 
uses religious language to construct his characterisation of Demosthenes as 
contagious.153  Framing Demosthenes as a source of risk to Athens certainly is the 
argumentative goal of this section of the speech, but the interplay of religious 
discourses leading to this goal is also revealing. 
Aeschines combines oracular language that would be familiar from oral 
narratives with the language of curses that survive to us in a very different religious 
                                                                                                                                      
147 Aeschin. 3.108 and 109. 
148 Aeschin. 3.121 and 3.127. 
149 Aeschin. 3.108 and 3.121. 
150 Versnel 1985, 263. 
151 Aeschin. 3.111 for the details of the curse. 
152 Eidinow 2007, 214 n. 45; Versnel 1985, 68. 
153 Martin 2009, 169. 
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discourse.154  Elements of each tradition are used in Aeschines’ narratives of both the 
distant and recent past.  The oracle allows Aeschines to link the mythic past with the 
religious practices of the present.  Thus, the orator collapses the temporal distance 
between the impiety against Delphi in the time of Solon and the impiety committed 
by Demosthenes.  Aeschines’ storytelling also frames him as somewhat of an 
authority on matters concerning the Amphictyony and ἀσέβεια. 
The legendary oath called for Solon and the allies ‘to help the god and the 
sacred land by hand, foot and voice’; Aeschines then says that he declared to the 
Amphictyonic council “I myself…come to help the god and the sacred land with hand 
and foot and voice…”.155  As noted above, Aeschines is also repeats the phrase 
‘ἐξάγιστος καὶ ἐπάρατος’ (dedicate and accursed) to highlight that any profit from the 
harbour and the plain around Delphi is also tainted. 156 Regardless of its potential 
significance in other contexts, the phrase is yet another way in which Aeschines can 
link past religious offences to Demosthenes in the present.  
 
Enigmatic or Automatic? 
Aeschines’ complementary tales of oracles being fulfilled in the first and third 
Sacred Wars incorporate familiar elements of religious ritual and storytelling to 
amplify the significance of his accusations against Demosthenes.  There are also, 
however, elements of Greek storytelling tradition that the orator clearly inverts or 
ignores.  At no point in Aeschines’ oracle story is there any suggestion that the 
                                                                                                                                      
154 On oracular narratives as oral storytelling, see Maurizio 1997; Kindt 2016.  On physical evidence 
for curse tablets and formulae, see Eidinow 2007. 
155 Aeschin. 3.108-9: …ἀλλὰ βοηθήσειν τῷ θεῷ καὶ τῇ γῇ τῇ ἱερᾷ καὶ χειρὶ καὶ ποδὶ καὶ φωνῇ καὶ πάσῃ 
δυνάµει and Aeschin. 3.120: ἐγὼ µὲν … βοηθῶ κατὰ τὸν ὅρκον καὶ τῷ θεῷ καὶ τῇ γῇ τῇ ἱερᾷ καὶ χειρὶ 
καὶ ποδὶ καὶ φωνῇ καὶ πᾶσιν οἷς δύναµαι. 
156 Harbour and land: Aeschin. 3.107, 113, 119; money: Aeschin. 3.114.  See also Martin 2009, 169 
with notes. 
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oracular pronouncement from the Pythia required interpretation or reflection on the 
problem it was sought to resolve.  The orator’s narrative, then, goes against the 
‘almost invariable’ plot structure associated with oracle stories from the ancient 
world.157  Aeschines’ story is not one that should be read as a ‘human quest for 
meaning’, but more in the way we approached the oracles from Against Leocrates.158  
Solon and Aeschines do not arrive at the appropriate course of action directed by the 
oracle through a process of interpretation or deliberation, but rather seek out and fulfil 
Apollo’s clear command: 
λαβόντες δὲ τὸν χρησµὸν τοῦτον οἱ Ἀµφικτύονες ἐψηφίσαντο Σόλωνος εἰπόντος 
Ἀθηναίου τὴν γνώµην … ἐπιστρατεύειν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐναγεῖς κατὰ τὴν µαντείαν τοῦ 
θεοῦ…, ἐξηνδραποδίσαντο τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ τὸν λιµένα καὶ τὴν πόλιν αὐτῶν 
κατέσκαψαν καὶ τὴν χώραν καθιέρωσαν κατὰ τὴν µαντείαν. 
 
When they received this oracle, the Amphictyons voted, on the motion of Solon the 
Athenian … to march against the accursed men in accordance with the oracle of the 
god…. They enslaved the men, destroyed the harbour and the city and dedicated the 
land, in accordance with the oracle.159 
 
As Aeschines begins to develop the other implications of not following the 
oracle’s advice in the present day, he continues to underscore the clarity of Apollo’s 
will.  In the orator’s summary of his speech to the Amphictyony, he illustrates the 
consequences of their inaction: 
οὐ γὰρ δι᾽ αἰνιγµῶν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐναργῶς γέγραπται κατά τε τῶν ἀσεβησάντων, ἃ χρὴ 
παθεῖν αὐτούς, καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἐπιτρεψάντων, καὶ τελευταῖον ἐν τῇ ἀρᾷ γέγραπται… 
 
For not in riddles, but plainly written is the penalty for those convicted of impiety, 
and for those who allowed it, as the curse ends with the words…160 
 
The cryptic reference to enigmatic divine communication (δι᾽ αἰνιγµῶν) in this 
phrase shows Aeschines’ attention to Delphic storytelling traditions.  Delphi had a 
                                                                                                                                      
157 Maurizio 1997, 311. 
158 Quote from Kindt 2016, 157.  See Lyc. Leo 84-87 and 99. 
159 Aeschin. 3.108-9. 
160 Aeschin. 3.120 cf. Aeschyl. Ag. 1112, 1183. 
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reputation in antiquity for giving responses that were not immediately comprehensible 
to enquirers, but there are very few direct examples of these oracles.161  Aeschines 
does, however, exploit the enigmatic mode of oracular communication associated 
with Delphi to further develop his prosecution and his prosecutorial persona.  
Throughout the speech, although never more obviously than in this sequence, 
Aeschines seeks to establish himself as an authority on ἀσέβεια.162  His accusation 
that Demosthenes committed an ἀσεβῆµα against Apollo by taking cursed money 
from the town of Amphissa is supported by his own claims to be part of Athens’ 
collective εὐσεβεία.163   
Aeschines’ use of the oracular voice establishes this crucial dichotomy.  Both 
Solon and Aeschines have consulted and obeyed the oracle of Apollo that the orator 
reads to the court, without any reference to any potentially divergent interpretations of 
the words.  Both Athenian statesmen have recognised the severe consequences 
outlined by the curse that is now very familiar to the audience.164  Demosthenes, on 
the other hand, has either ignored or actively jeopardised Athens’ relationship with 
Delphi.  Aeschines again returns to the concept of divine communication to 
emphasise Demosthenes’ recklessness: 
ἀλλ᾽ οὐ προύλεγον, οὐ προεσήµαινον οἱ θεοὶ φυλάξασθαι, µόνον γε οὐκ ἀνθρώπων 
φωνὰς προσκτησάµενοι; οὐδεµίαν τοι πώποτε ἔγωγε µᾶλλον πόλιν ἑώρακα ὑπὸ µὲν 
τῶν θεῶν σῳζοµένην, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν ῥητόρων ἐνίων ἀπολλυµένην. 
 
But did not the gods forewarn, did they not indicate to us to be on our guard, all but 
having adopted human sounds? Never have I seen a city offered more protection by 
the gods, but invariably destroyed by certain of its politicians.165  
 
                                                                                                                                      
161 See Fontenrose 1979, 79-83; Bowden 2005, 49-51; Kindt 2016, 8-15. All make the point that most 
oracles in this tradition come from detailed storytelling with aims beyond merely recording the oracular 
response.  On Apollo’s reputation for cryptic advice: Tor 2016 on Heraclitus Fr. 93. 
162 See also Aeschin. 3.106, 120, 121, 224. 
163 Aeschin. 3.125 and esp. 129. 
164 From repetition in the speech at the very least, without excluding the possibility of the curse being 
part of the oral history of the Sacred War and the curse formula being common during this period.  
165 Aeschin. 3.130. 
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Aeschines stresses that Demosthenes has not only committed ἀσέβεια, but has 
also surrendered the εὐσέβεια developed by Solon and Aeschines himself at 
Delphi.166  The rhetorical question again returns to oracular language, this time to link 
Demosthenes’ impious actions at Delphi back to the main argument of the paranomon 
charge.  Aeschines carefully appropriates existing speculation on the nature of oracles 
and prophecy to strengthen his case against Demosthenes.  The orator uses 
polysyndeton to link three negative rhetorical questions (ἀλλ᾽ οὐ προύλεγον, οὐ 
προεσήµαινον … [οὐκ] προσκτησάµενοι) in an ascending tricolon.167  Within this 
emphatic structure, Aeschines uses three compound verbs with a πρός-prefix not only 
for alliteration but also to stress the directness of the god’s communication.  προλέγω 
was frequently used in fourth century prose for the action of announcing the content 
of an oracle or of a law.168  The second (προσηµαίνω) has a much narrower semantic 
field concerning the prediction of gods and their oracles.169  Aeschines juxtaposes 
these two terms to not only stress the warnings ignored by Demosthenes, but also to 
evoke a key dichotomy in Greek discourse concerning divine communication.   
By implying that Apollo had both forewarned (προύλεγον) and given signs in 
advance (προεσήµαινον), Aeschines contradicts the ‘enigmatic mode’ of oracles in 
other literary sources.  The oracles presented by Lycurgus in Against Leocrates, mere 
months prior to this trial, also stress the clarity of Apollo’s directions to Athens.  Like 
Aeschines, Lycurgus argues that benefiting from divine signals is more contingent on 
collective Athenian εὐσέβεια than on individual reflection on the signs and their 
                                                                                                                                      
166 Aeschin. 3.129: τῶν µὲν θεῶν τὴν ἡγεµονίαν τῆς εὐσεβείας ἡµῖν παραδεδωκότων, τῆς δὲ 
Δηµοσθένους δωροδοκίας ἐµποδὼν γεγενηµένης. 
167 Aeschin. 3.130. 
168 Oracle: Dem. 19.298; laws: Lyc. Leo. 4. 
169 Xen. Mem. 1.1.4 (…ὡς τοῦ δαιµονίου προσηµαίνοντος).  Earlier examples: Hdt. 1.45, 6.123; Eur. 
Supp. 213. 
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meaning.170  By declaring that the gods offer better signs (σηµεῖα) to the pious (τοῖς 
εὐσεβέσι), or that there is little differentiation between speaking (προύλεγον) and 
signalling (προεσήµαινον); these two orators present oracular communication in a 
very different way to previous traditions.  Aeschines, for example, is consciously 
collapsing the key difference between divine voice and sign (οὐ προύλεγον, οὐ 
προεσήµαινον…) famously put forward by Heraclitus (οὔτε λέγει… ἀλλὰ 
σηµαίνει).171  For Heraclitus, Apollo at Delphi does not speak or hide (with his 
prophecies) but gives a sign.172  Heraclitus’ use of σηµαίνω clearly indicates that 
Apollo’s prophecies are defined by at least some opposition to any meaning that could 
be conveyed by speaking them (λέγει).173  Αs Tor and Kindt argue, the literary 
tradition with which Heraclitus’ concept of oracles corresponds is one that promotes a 
flexible and receptive process of interpreting signs (σηµεῖα) that can offer more 
insight than mortal speech (λόγος).174  In contrast, Aeschines conscientiously avoids 
associating his oracular narratives with this existing body of ‘epiphanic’ narratives.175  
Apollo’s signs were clear, to pious Athenians such as himself, and should have been 
heeded: 
ἀλλ᾽ οὐ προύλεγον, οὐ προεσήµαινον οἱ θεοὶ φυλάξασθαι, µόνον γε οὐκ ἀνθρώπων 
φωνὰς προσκτησάµενοι;…οὐχ ἱκανὸν ἦν τὸ τοῖς µυστηρίοις φανὲν σηµεῖον, ἡ τῶν 
µυστῶν τελευτή; οὐ περὶ τούτων Ἀµεινιάδης µὲν προύλεγεν εὐλαβεῖσθαι καὶ πέµπειν 
εἰς Δελφοὺς ἐπερησοµένους τὸν θεὸν ὅ τι χρὴ πράττειν, Δηµοσθένης δὲ ἀντέλεγε, 
φιλιππίζειν τὴν Πυθίαν φάσκων? 
 
But did not the gods forewarn, did they not indicate to us to be on our guard, all but 
adopting human voice? ...Was not that portent sufficient which appeared at the 
Mysteries—the death of the celebrants? In view of this did not Ameiniades warn you 
                                                                                                                                      
170 Lyc. Leo. 93 δεινὸν γὰρ ἂν εἴη, εἰ ταὐτὰ σηµεῖα τοῖς εὐσεβέσι καὶ τοῖς κακούργοις φαίνοιτο. 
171 Heraclitus fr. 93: ὁ ἄναξ οὗ τὸ µαντεῖόν ἐστι τὸ ἐν ∆ελφοῖς, οὔτε λέγει 
οὔτε κρύπτει ἀλλὰ σηµαίνει.  I follow the reading of this fragment offered by Tor 2016. 
172 Tor 2016, 89. 
173 Tor 2016, 110. See also a more literal interpretation of σηµαίνω as Apollo using the Pythia to 
‘indicate’ in his stead: Fontenrose 1978, 238. 
174 Tor 2016, 111; Kindt 2016, 162-4. 
175 Kindt 2016, 163. 
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to take precautions and send to Delphi to ask the god what to do? Did Demosthenes 
not speak against this, saying that the Pythia had Philippised?176 
 
For Aeschines, divine communication has been so clear as to nearly sound 
human (µόνον γε οὐκ ἀνθρώπων φωνὰς).  Indeed, Aeschines can refer an event from 
recent memory as a sign (σηµεῖον) that should have indicated Athens’ dangerous 
position.177  The orator again juxtaposes ways of addressing and communicating 
divine signals.  Ameiniades warned the people (µὲν προύλεγεν) having recognised the 
σηµεῖον, whereas Demosthenes spoke in opposition (δὲ ἀντέλεγε) having overlooked 
them.  Aeschines seeks to convince the audience that there was a causal link between 
Demosthenes’ use and misuse of the divine decision-making process and the eventual 
catastrophe at Chaeronea.178  Aeschines re-iterates this idea with a detailed discussion 
of Demosthenes’ ritual practices: 
οὐ τὸ τελευταῖον ἀθύτων καὶ ἀκαλλιερήτων ὄντων τῶν ἱερῶν ἐξέπεµψε τοὺς 
στρατιώτας ἐπὶ τὸν πρόδηλον κίνδυνον; καίτοι πρώην γέ ποτε ἀπετόλµα λέγειν ὅτι 
παρὰ τοῦτο Φίλιππος οὐκ ἦλθεν ἡµῶν ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν, ὅτι οὐκ ἦν αὐτῷ καλὰ τὰ ἱερά. 
τίνος οὖν σὺ ζηµίας ἄξιος εἶ τυχεῖν,ὦ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀλειτήριε; εἰ γὰρ ὁ µὲν κρατῶν 
οὐκ ἦλθεν εἰς τὴν τῶν κρατουµένων χώραν, ὅτι οὐκ ἦν αὐτῷ καλὰ τὰ ἱερά, σὺ δ᾽ 
οὐδὲν προειδὼς τῶν µελλόντων ἔσεσθαι, πρὶν καλλιερῆσαι τοὺς στρατιώτας 
ἐξέπεµψας, πότερα στεφανοῦσθαι σε δεῖ ἐπὶ ταῖς τῆς πόλεως ἀτυχίαις, ἢ 
ὑπερωρίσθαι; 
 
And did he not at last from smouldering and ill-omened sacrifices send forth our 
troops into manifest danger? And yet it was but yesterday that he dared to assert that 
the reason why Philip did not advance against our country was that the omens were 
not favourable to him. What punishment, then, do you deserve, you curse of Hellas! 
For if the conqueror refrained from entering the land of the conquered because the 
omens were not favourable to him, whereas you, ignorant of the future, sent out our 
troops before the omens were propitious, ought you to be receiving a crown for the 
misfortunes of the city, or to have been thrust already beyond her borders?179 
 
Aeschines invective continues to highlight Demosthenes’ negligence of divine 
signals that were apparent to others.  The danger of Chaeronea was foreseen (τὸν 
                                                                                                                                      
176 Aeschin. 3.130. 
177 The MSS gives σηµεῖον φυλάξασθαι, removed by most editors but could strengthening the link to 
the opening sentence of the passage if the repetition was intended. 
178 Aeschin. 3.106. 
179 Aeschin. 3.131. 
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πρόδηλον κίνδυνον) and Demosthenes has no awareness of things to come (σὺ δ᾽ 
οὐδὲν προειδὼς τῶν µελλόντων).  Aeschines repeats, juxtaposes and may even invent 
religious terms throughout the passage to highlight Demosthenes’ careless leadership 
of Athens (ἀκαλλιερήτων ὄντων τῶν ἱερῶν… πρὶν καλλιερῆσαι).180  The repetition of 
τὰ ἱερά also recalls Aeschines’ initial accusations of impiety (ἀσεβήσας µὲν εἰς τὸ 
ἱερὸν τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς).  These terms all bracket a direct address with similarly 
significant religious implications, as Aeschines calls Demosthenes the cursed man of 
Greece (ὦ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀλειτήριε).181  ἀλιτήριος is not an uncommon accusation in 
oratory of this period, being especially prominent in earlier speech Against Andocides, 
and is certainly associated with the contagious pollution of ἀσεβεία.182  The word is 
used in a range of sources to describe the Alcmeonidae, the mutilators of the Herms 
and Protagoras, all of whom were accused of ἀσεβεία in Athens.183 The term also 
effectively picks up on the curse language of the oracle narrative (ἐξάγιστος καὶ 
ἐπάρατος; ἐναγὴς ἔσται καὶ τῇ ἀρᾷ ἔνοχος) in order to highlight the incongruity of 
Ctesiphon’s motion to crown Demosthenes (πότερα στεφανοῦσθαι…, ἢ 
ὑπερωρίσθαι).  
The final reference to oracular knowledge in the speech comes as Aeschines 
introduces a passage of Hesiod to justify his proposed condemnation of Demosthenes: 
ἐὰν περιελόντες τοῦ ποιητοῦ τὸ µέτρον τὰς γνώµας ἐξετάζητε, οἶµαι ὑµῖν δόξειν οὐ 
ποιήµατα Ἡσιόδου εἶναι, ἀλλὰ χρησµὸν εἰς τὴν Δηµοσθένους πολιτείαν: 
 
                                                                                                                                      
180 ἀθύτων καὶ ἀκαλλιερήτων. ἀθύτος is very rare in relation to sacrifices and ἀκαλλιέρητος is only 
found in this speech (again at 152).  
181 Aeschines repeats the phrase later (3.157) and Demosthenes responds in kind (Dem. 18.159).  See 
Eidinow 2011, 147.  The nickname might have become commonly associated with Demosthenes, see 
also Din. 1.77. 
182 Examples are collected in Paine 1908.  See Martin 2009, 86-9 and 144.  Alcmeonidae: Thuc. 1.126 
and Eupolis fr.103 K-A vol. V; Hermai: Andoc. De Myst. 51; Lys. 6.52-3; Protagoras: Eupolis fr.157 
K-A vol. V.  
183 Protagoras: Diog. Laert. 9.8.54; on these trials more generally see Rubel 2014. 
 56 
If you disregard the poet's meter and examine only his thought, I think this will seem 
to you to be, not a poem of Hesiod, but an oracle directed against the politics of 
Demosthenes.184 
 
Aeschines cites Hesiod as an authority on the appropriate treatment for those 
who dishonour the gods.  The orator had already quoted the same passage of Works 
and Days in his defence speech On the Embassy in 343 for the same purpose.185  
Although the exact accusations of impiety differ between the speeches, both are 
directed at Demosthenes as the evil man (κακοῦ ἀνδρὸς) who commits evil and plans 
wicked deeds (ἀλιτραίνῃ καὶ ἀτάσθαλα µητιάαται).  Aeschines uses the excerpt to 
continue his emphasis on Demosthenes’ contagiousness (ἀλειτήριε and ἀλιτραίνῃ) 
and encourages his audience to view the poetry as an oracle (χρησµὸν).  Lycurgus 
uses a similar expression in Against Leocrates to introduce poetry that supports his 
argument for the frailty of human knowledge.186  When viewed with his previous uses 
of oracles by both orators, Aeschines clearly also intends for the phrase to underscore 
the authority and relevance of the lines.187  Unlike Lycurgus, however, Aeschines’ 
oracles and poetry share similar themes and language.  Lycurgus presented his oracles 
from Athenian legend as ‘positive’, he reports the prophecies indirectly and focuses 
on the positive instructions.188  In contrast, Aeschines repeatedly quotes the negative 
imprecations of the oracle and the curse throughout his narrative, then gives a passage 
from Hesiod’s epic that also describes the consequences of allowing hubristic 
individuals to go unpunished. 
 
                                                                                                                                      
184 Aeschin. 3.136. 
185 Aeschin. 2.158-9.  See Martin 2009, 168; Hes. Op. 240-1. 
186 ὥσπερ χρησµοὺς Lyc. Leo. 92. 
187 See Aeschin. 3.108-9: λαβόντες δὲ τὸν χρησµὸν… κατὰ τὴν µαντείαν… κατὰ τὴν µαντείαν. 
188 Lyc. Leo. 84: ἀνελόντος δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ αὐτοῖς ὅτι τὴν πόλιν αἱρήσουσιν ἂν µὴ τὸν βασιλέα τὸν 
Ἀθηναίων Κόδρον ἀποκτείνωσιν, ἐστράτευον ἐπὶ τὰς Ἀθήνας; Lyc. Leo. 99: χρήσαντος δ᾽ αὐτῷ τοῦ 
θεοῦ, τὴν θυγατέρα εἰ θύσειε πρὸ τοῦ συµβαλεῖν τὼ στρατοπέδω,1 κρατήσειν τῶν πολεµίων. 
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Crowning Glory 
ὁ δὲ ‘οὐκ ἂν’ ἔφη ‘ἐθαυµάζετε, εἰ Δηµοσθένους λέγοντος πρὸς ταῦτα ἠκούσατε 
 
You would not marvel so [at the outcome] if you heard Demosthenes replying to 
these arguments.189 
 
So overwhelming was Demosthenes’ response to Aeschines’ speech, the story 
goes, that the prosecutor was run out of Athens for having convinced less than a fifth 
of the jurors.190  A key part of the speech’s success, it appears, was Demosthenes’ 
reinterpretation of Aeschines’ explanation of Athens’ misfortune.191  Both Martin and 
Eidinow show that Demosthenes’ strategy relies on the lack of a single concept of 
τύχη in Athens during this period.192  Martin in particular argues that Demosthenes 
deemphasises the religious significance of the allegations concerning his own 
personal misfortune.193  While Demosthenes avoids addressing many of these serious 
accusations directly, he does respond to the oracular argumentation of Aeschines that 
we saw above.  Oracles serve two important functions for Demosthenes.  Firstly, 
appealing to Delphi helps him challenge Aeschines’ narrative of the Sacred War.  
Secondly, Demosthenes can later introduce an alternative source of oracular authority, 
Dodona, to support his interpretation of τύχη.    
The events and causes of the Sacred War of the 350s remain very obscure, 
partly due to this exchange between Aeschines and Demosthenes. 194   Where 
Aeschines argued that he was preventing impiety and presenting Athens with the 
leadership of the Amphictyony, Demosthenes argues that Aeschines incited the 
                                                                                                                                      
189 Quote attributed to Aeschines in exile: Philostr. V S 510. 
190 Philostr. V S 509 cf. Yunis 2001, 11-12. 
191 Martin 2009, 96-7; Eidinow 2011, 146-8. 
192 Martin 2009, 96; Eidonow 2011, 148. 
193 Martin 2008, 115-17. 
194 Cawkell 1969, 165-6. 
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conflict to give Philip reason to march into Central Greece.195  Demosthenes invokes 
Pythian Apollo midway through his version of these events: 
καλῶ δ᾽ ἐναντίον ὑµῶν, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοὺς θεοὺς πάντας καὶ πάσας ὅσοι τὴν 
χώραν ἔχουσι τὴν Ἀττικήν, καὶ τὸν Ἀπόλλω τὸν Πύθιον, ὃς πατρῷός ἐστι τῇ πόλει, 
καὶ ἐπεύχοµαι πᾶσι τούτοις, εἰ µὲν ἀληθῆ πρὸς ὑµᾶς εἴποιµι καὶ εἶπον καὶ τότ᾽ εὐθὺς 
ἐν τῷ δήµῳ, ὅτε πρῶτον εἶδον τουτονὶ τὸν µιαρὸν τούτου τοῦ πράγµατος ἁπτόµενον 
(ἔγνων γάρ, εὐθέως ἔγνων), εὐτυχίαν µοι δοῦναι καὶ σωτηρίαν, εἰ δὲ πρὸς ἔχθραν ἢ 
φιλονικίας ἰδίας ἕνεκ᾽ αἰτίαν ἐπάγω τούτῳ ψευδῆ, πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνόνητόν µε 
ποιῆσαι. 
 
In your presence, men of Athens, I now invoke all the gods and goddesses whose 
domain is the land of Attica.  I invoke also Pythian Apollo, the ancestral divinity of 
this city, and I solemnly beseech them all that, if I shall speak the truth now, and if I 
spoke truth to my countrymen when I first saw this defiled man putting his hand to 
that deed (for I knew it, I instantly knew it) they grant me good fortune and safety.  
But if with personal enmity or rivalry I lead a false charge, that they deprive me of 
everything good.196 
 
To complicate Martin’s generally sound argument that Demosthenes 
downplays the religious aspects of Aeschines’ accusations, the above passage is one 
of three direct prayers in the speech.197  This uncommon direct invocation of the gods 
suggests that while the total weight of divine terms and arguments may be less in On 
the Crown than Against Ctesiphon, Demosthenes does purposefully address 
Aeschines’ religious argumentation.198   
Demosthenes counters the intricate narrative of the Sacred Wars presented by 
Aeschines with an alternative, or perhaps competing, supernatural authority. 
Demosthenes consistently uses broad and optimistic language to discredit Aeschines’ 
fearmongering.  Where Aeschines has cited Delphic authority to warn the audience 
that their wives would beget monsters rather than children if they disobeyed the 
oracle, Demosthenes uses formalised prayer language to ask the god to ‘grant [him] 
                                                                                                                                      
195 Dem. 18.141-56. 
196 Dem. 18.141.  
197 Martin 2009, 96-7; Yunis 2001, 193; This the only direct prayer in the middle of speech in extant 
oratory: Wankel 1976, 768-9.  
198 Eidinow 2011, 149. 
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good fortune (εὐτυχίαν) and safety’.199  Aeschines’ direct quotation of the curse sworn 
at Delphi presents a specific and singular example of the negative outcomes 
associated with oracles.  In response, Demosthenes looks to the unspecific and 
positive aspect of Athens’ relationship with Delphi to stress their shared good fortune 
and history.  Despite this clear contrast in the medium and tone of divine 
communication, Pythian Apollo remains the only god individually invoked by 
Demosthenes in this passage.  
 This brief comparison demonstrates that adopting oracular authority in public 
speech could have opposite form and purpose.  Aeschines threatens Athens with 
Apollo’s wrath and Demosthenes calls on Pythian Apollo to ensure he speaks truly.  
Juxtaposing these examples gives the clearest evidence that oracles in oratory were 
not restricted to being ‘always in agreement with the nomoi of the city’.200  Bowden 
has argued that Demosthenes uses oracles to indicate ancestral Athenian values that 
ought to be upheld by following his advice to the city.201  The way Demosthenes’ 
unusual prayer directly opposes Aeschines’ claims to divine authority indicates that 
the usage of oracles was far more flexible and varied than this summary implies. 
The second crucial aspect of Demosthenes’ use of oracles in this speech is the 
introduction of the oracular sanctuary of Dodona.202  Athens consulted the oracle at 
Dodona frequently during the fourth century, most likely due to intermittent political 
upheaval at Delphi.203  While there are numerous other references to this particular 
oracular response from Zeus in fourth century oratory, it is intriguing to see 
                                                                                                                                      
199 Aeschin. 3.111: µήτε γυναῖκας τέκνα τίκτειν γονεῦσιν ἐοικότα, ἀλλὰ τέρατα;  
200 Bowden 2005, 57. 
201 Bowden 2005, 56-7 referring to Dem. 21.51-2 and 43.66, passages that will be dealt with in detail 
elsewhere. 
202 See also Dem. 21.51-2.  Similar oracles are given by Dinarchus and Hyperides (Din. 1.78 and 98; 
Hyp. 1.24). 
203 Although there is evidence of contact between Athens and Dodona before this period, see Eidinow 
2007, 61; Parke 1967, 141-2.  
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Demosthenes using Athens’ most frequently consulted oracular sanctuaries for 
different purposes.204 In the passage above, Demosthenes contradicts not only the 
events of Aeschines’ narrative in Against Ctesiphon but also his model of divine 
intervention.205  To support his explanation, Demosthenes prays to Pythian Apollo for 
good fortune (εὐτυχίαν).  While Martin rightly points out that this simple prayer does 
function to alleviate Aeschines’ harsh allegations of pollution, it should also be seen 
as forshadowing the crucial motif of Demosthenes’ defence, an impersonal model of 
τύχη.206     
Demosthenes carefully addresses Aeschines’ negative and personal notion of 
misfortune with his own broad and impersonal model of fortune and divine action.207  
Eidinow has convincingly argued that Aeschines’ invective of personal misfortune is 
drawn from an older discourse on the subject and Demosthenes’ defence skilfully 
appropriates more recent speculation.208  We have already seen that Aeschines builds 
his argument for Demosthenes’ personal misfortune during a detailed narrative 
following the Athenian interaction with the Delphic oracle.  While Demosthenes’ 
alternative relies on very different argumentation, it also develops from the authority 
given by Pythian Apollo and the oracular advice of Zeus at Dodona:  
…σκέψασθ᾽, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ θεωρήσατε ὅσῳ καὶ ἀληθέστερον καὶ 
ἀνθρωπινώτερον ἐγὼ περὶ τῆς τύχης τούτου διαλεχθήσοµαι.  ἐγὼ τὴν τῆς πόλεως 
τύχην ἀγαθὴν ἡγοῦµαι, καὶ ταῦθ᾽ ὁρῶ καὶ τὸν Δία τὸν Δωδωναῖον ὑµῖν 
µαντευόµενον, τὴν µέντοι τῶν πάντων ἀνθρώπων, ἣ νῦν ἐπέχει, χαλεπὴν καὶ δεινήν: 
τίς γὰρ Ἑλλήνων ἢ τίς βαρβάρων οὐ πολλῶν κακῶν ἐν τῷ παρόντι πεπείραται; 
 
                                                                                                                                      
204 There are four references to oracles from Dodona in total (Dem. 21.52; Dem. 18.253; Hyp. 4.24-5; 
then the same oracle is cited at Dem. 19.297-9 and Din. 1.77, 98) cf. ten from Delphi (Aeschin. 3.108, 
130; Dem. 21.52, 42.66; Isoc. 4.31, 6.17, 23-31; Lyc. Leo. 84, 93, 99. 
205 Eidinow 2011, 148. 
206 Martin 2009, 92-3. 
207 Eidinow 2011, 148-9. 
208 Aeschines’ personal model echoes that present in Solon’s musings in Hdt. 1.32 or Oedipus’ 
soliloquies.  Demosthenes’ impersonal τύχη resembles the nascent Hellenistic conception of τύχη as an 
impartial or blind goddess. Eidinow 2011, 148 with 100-1 and 151-2.  See also Parke 1967, 141-2. 
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Observe and consider, men of Athens, that the discourse on fortune that I will present 
is more truthful and more fitting for humans than his.  I attribute good fortune to our 
city, and this I observe the oracle of Zeus at Dodona does too, but the current fortune 
befalling all humankind is harsh and terrible. For is there anyone living, Greek or 
Barbarian, who has not experienced many evils in these times?209 
 
This oracle given to Athens, one in which the city was recognised as having 
good fortune (τύχην ἀγαθὴν), corresponds with the prayer to Apollo earlier in the 
speech seeking to be well-fortuned (εὐτυχίαν…σωτηρίαν).210  On the other hand, 
Demosthenes expresses a desire for immediate personal fortune in the prayer and a 
seeks to demonstrate that the polis has experienced collective good fortune.  While 
this oracle does not form part of an extended narrative, it does share two key features 
with the oracles used by other orators in this period: there is no suggestion that the 
god’s advice is cryptic and the oracle itself is optimistic.211  Rather than acting as the 
foundation for a line of argument, as the legendary oracle given to Solon does for 
Aeschines, Demosthenes’ oracle from Dodona supports the impersonal model of fate 
that he has developed during most of the speech.  As Martin shows, this line of 
argument only implicitly refutes Aeschines’ image of Demosthenes as a cursed man 
(ἀλιτήριος) by suggesting that Athens could not enjoy such divinely endorsed good 
fortune if it were harbouring such an evil man.212   
Demosthenes not only presents an alternative discourse of fortune, but also 
uses the oracular voice to support his discourse in a very different way.  Demosthenes 
openly mocks the seriousness of Aeschines’ narrative of the legendary Sacred War 
                                                                                                                                      
209 Dem. 18.253. 
210 Dem. 18.253 and 19.141. 
211 Although little is known about the oracular methods at Dodona, it does also have a reputation for 
double meanings and obscurity similar to that of the Delphic oracle, see Parke 1967, 129-40; Eidinow 
2007, 67-71; Parker 2016, 69-70.  Straightforward and (mostly) positive oracles in oratory: Aeschin. 
3.108; Lyc. Leo. 84-7, 99; Dem. 19.300; Dem. 21.51-2; Dem. 43.66; Din. 1.78 and 98; Hyp. 1.24.  On 
the theological optimism of oratory in general, see Parker 1997. 
212 Martin 2009, 97; Aeschin. 3.131. 
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and the rhetorical inexperience of the Amphictyons (ἀνθρώπους ἀπείρους λόγων).213  
As he finishes his description of events leading to Chaeronea,  while highlighting the 
general uselessness of Aeschines, Demosthenes emphasises the limitations of human 
understanding of events (ὅσ᾽ ἐνῆν κατ᾽ ἀνθρώπινον λογισµὸν εἱλόµην). 214  He 
explains that a statesman deduces a plan that is then subject to the will of a 
superhuman force (δαίµων) or in the hands of a god (ἐν γὰρ τῷ θεῷ τὸ τούτου τέλος 
ἦν, οὐκ ἐµοί).215  This line of reasoning is explicitly recalled when the oracle is 
introduced later in the speech, as Demosthenes questions whether any human, let 
alone Aeschines, can be privy to the divine workings of fate: 
πανταχόθεν µὲν τοίνυν ἄν τις ἴδοι τὴν ἀγνωµοσύνην αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν βασκανίαν, οὐχ 
ἥκιστα δ᾽ ἀφ᾽ ὧν περὶ τῆς τύχης διελέχθη. ἐγὼ δ᾽ ὅλως µέν, ὅστις ἄνθρωπος ὢν 
ἀνθρώπῳ τύχην προφέρει… σκέψασθ᾽, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ θεωρήσατε ὅσῳ καὶ 
ἀληθέστερον καὶ ἀνθρωπινώτερον ἐγὼ περὶ τῆς τύχης τούτου διαλεχθήσοµαι. 
 
At every point his morose and spiteful temper is conspicuous, and especially in what 
he said about fortune. As a general remark, I must say that it is a stupid thing for any 
human being to reproach his brother man on the score of fortune… Observe and 
consider, men of Athens, that the discourse on fortune that I will present is more 
truthful and more fitting for humans than his. 
 
 While Demosthenes does not imply that oracular knowledge cannot be useful 
to humans, he does stress the distance between human conception (ἀνθρώπινον 
λογισµὸν) and divine will.  He stresses throughout that human interactions that are 
contained within a mortal sphere subject to higher influence.  Demosthenes supports 
this theology with examples: the impossibility of a human knowing the divine lot of 
another (ὅστις ἄνθρωπος ὢν ἀνθρώπῳ); a well-prepared ship-owner not being 
responsible for a shipwreck in a hurricane (εἴ τις ναύκληρον πάντ᾽ ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ 
                                                                                                                                      
213 καὶ λόγους εὐπροσώπους καὶ µύθους, ὅθεν ἡ Κιρραία χώρα καθιερώθη, συνθεὶς. καὶ διεξελθὼν 
ἀνθρώπους ἀπείρους λόγων καὶ τὸ µέλλον οὐ προορωµένους, Dem. 18.149. 
214 Dem. 18.149-194.  Aeschines’ uselessness: Dem. 18.193 σὺ µέν γ᾽ οὐδὲν οὐδαµοῦ χρήσιµος ἦσθα: 
ἐγὼ δὲ πάνθ᾽ ὅσα προσῆκε τὸν ἀγαθὸν πολίτην ἔπραττον.  
215 Dem. 18.192-3. 
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πράξαντα καὶ κατασκευάσαντα τὸ πλοῖον …τῆς ναυαγίας αἰτιῷτο).216  It is within this 
considered argument that Demosthenes singles out Aeschines’ claims to oracular 
wisdom for further criticism: 
ἐπεὶ πρός γε τοῦτον τὸν κατάπτυστον βραχὺς καὶ σαφὴς ἐξήρκει λόγος. εἰ µὲν γὰρ ἦν 
σοὶ πρόδηλα τὰ µέλλοντ᾽, Αἰσχίνη, µόνῳ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅτ᾽ ἐβουλεύεθ᾽ ἡ πόλις περὶ 
τούτων, τότ᾽ ἔδει προλέγειν: εἰ δὲ µὴ προῄδεις, τῆς αὐτῆς ἀγνοίας ὑπεύθυνος εἶ τοῖς 
ἄλλοις 
 
For this contemptible fellow, I have a short, plain, and sufficient answer. Aeschines, 
if the future was revealed to you and to nobody else, you should have given us the 
benefit of your predictions when we were deliberating; if you had no foreknowledge, 
you are open to the charge of ignorance just like the rest of us.217 
 
 Without entering the debate surrounding the closeness of the text that survives 
to the speeches presented during the trial itself, this passage shows Demosthenes’ 
careful inversion of Aeschines’ equally elaborate ritual invective.218  Demosthenes co-
opts the niche language of oracular communication used by Aeschines to paint him as 
either a traitor or a charlatan.  He emphasises his own brevity (βραχὺς καὶ σαφὴς 
ἐξήρκει λόγος) and twists the same verbs and prefix (πρό-) to challenge Aeschines’ 
claims to the clarity of divine advice.  The future was apparently revealed to 
Aeschines (πρόδηλα τὰ µέλλοντ᾽) just as he claimed the city had been forewarned 
(προσκτησάµενοι).219  Moreover, Aeschines himself should have said beforehand 
(ἔδει προλέγειν…) if the gods had told him beforehand.220  Demosthenes concludes 
that all of Aeschines’ divine talk was just that: talk.221 
Demosthenes’ inversion of προλέγειν in this prophetic context may also have 
had a greater impact considering the continuous juxtaposition of his own efforts to 
                                                                                                                                      
216 Dem. 18.252, 194. 
217 Dem. 18.196. 
218 See Yunis 2001 for MSS information and MacDowell 2000, 22-4 for a good discussion of the issues 
of reading these texts records.  
219 Dem. 18.196 cf. Aeschin. 3.130. 
220 Dem. 18.16 cf. ἀλλ᾽ οὐ προύλεγον… Aeschin. 3.130. 
221 εἰ δὲ µὴ προῄδεις…Dem. 1.196. 
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warn Athens with Aeschines’ inactivity.222 The repetition of these πρό- compounds in 
direct response to the way that Aeschines used them suggests that they did have a 
clear association with oracular wisdom.  It should also be noted that Aeschines had 
also accused Demosthenes of a similar deception relating to divine communication 
early in his prosecution: 
τῶν µὲν θεῶν συµπλάσας ἑαυτῷ ἐνύπνιον κατεψεύσατο, ὡς οὐ παρὰ Χαριδήµου τὸ 
πρᾶγµα πεπυσµένος, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τοῦ Διὸς καὶ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς, οὓς µεθ᾽ ἡµέραν ἐπιορκῶν 
νύκτωρ φησὶν ἑαυτῷ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ τὰ µέλλοντα ἔσεσθαι προλέγειν… 
 
[Demosthenes] made up a vision for himself and lied about the gods, pretending that 
he had received the news, not from Charidemus, but from Zeus and Athena, the gods 
by whose name he perjures himself by day, and who then converse with him in the 
night, as he says, and tell him of things to come.223 
 
It would be easy to see these contrasting uses of προλέγειν and similar 
compounds as merely another attestation of personal enmity between the two orators, 
challenging each other’s interpretation of whatever subject was up for debate.  While 
adversarial litigation and the rivalry of the two men clearly motivates this discourse, it 
is important to recognise that oracles, prophecies and epiphanies were one of the 
many areas in which public trials were decided.  The manipulation of these tropes by 
both orators confirms the existence of a robust and varied ‘oracular discourse’ in 
fourth century Athens. 
Conclusion 
ἐπειδὰν πιεζοµένους αὐτοὺς ἐπιλίπωσιν αἱ φανεραὶ ἐλπίδες, ἐπὶ τὰς ἀφανεῖς 
καθίστανται µαντικήν τε καὶ χρησµοὺς καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα µετ᾽ ἐλπίδων λυµαίνεται. 
 
When [people] are under pressure and visible hopes have abandoned them, they turn 
to the invisible, prophecy and oracles, and other such things that cause ruin with their 
hope.224 
 
                                                                                                                                      
222 προλέγων καὶ διδάσκων Dem. 18.72; πολλάκις προλεγόντων ἡµῶν καὶ παρακαλούντων καὶ 
διδασκόντων Dem. 18.296; same criticism of Aeschines’ lack of action: οὐ προλέγων ἐν τοῖς 
ψηφίσµασιν Dem. 18.235. 
223 Aeschin. 3.78. 
224 Thuc. 5.103.2. 
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 It is not surprising to see such diverse use of oracular argumentation by 
Demosthenes and Aeschines during a case at an uncertain point in Athenian history. 
Their varied use of oracles represents one of the ways in which Athenians perceived, 
comprehended and reacted to crisis in public discourse. The two orators adopted 
oracular authority in very different ways to formulate a convincing model of both 
human and divine responsibility for Athens’ precarious position in 330.  While this 
conclusion might seem to align with the uncommonly sceptical comments of 
Thucydides’ Athenian delegate above, it is just as important to stress that the intricate 
religious argumentation of Aeschines and Demosthenes was contingent on its 
connection with the daily religious life and perspectives of their Athenians 
audience.225 
 Aeschines’ speech shows orators using narratological functions of oracles 
from traditional Greek storytelling in a distinctive new manner.226   The oracle 
structures his narrative by providing an external and authoritative ‘resolution’ to a 
dilemma.227  However, Aeschines’ emphasis on the clarity of divine wisdom is at 
odds with the larger body of ‘epiphanic’ narratives from ancient Greek storytelling.228  
While the tale differs from those of tragedy or historiography, his repeated invocation 
of a legendary oracle given to Solon does fit the  pattern present in Against Leocrates, 
where Delphi and Pythian Apollo are presented as unwavering allies of Athens that 
provide clear and productive oracular advice to the polis.229  While the general shape 
of the narrative was similar to those given by Lycurgus, Aeschines also placed far 
greater emphasis on the process of visiting and consulting the god at the sanctuary at 
                                                                                                                                      
225 For the overexposure of skeptical attitudes such as the one presented by Thucydides’ Athenian 
ambassadors in this excerpt, see Struck 2016, 9-10. 
226 Cf. Lyc. Leo 84, 93 and 99. 
227 See Maurizio 1997, 311. 
228 For the larger body see: Kindt 2016, 163-4 cf. Platt 2011 and Petridou 2016.   
229 Aeschin. 3.108; Lyc. Leo. 84-7 and 99. 
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Delphi.  These choices show the depth and flexibility of this public oracular 
discourse.  There is not a single type of oracle story that orators could use in their 
persuasive descriptions of the past.  Rather, Aeschines could pick up features of a 
wider tradition to suit his argumentative goals.  In this example, Aeschines takes care 
to situate the legendary story at the sanctuary of Delphi to support his own 
construction of traditional piety in the present. 
 Aeschines’ use of the oracle to conflate past and present also demonstrates the 
interconnectedness of oracular discourse with the other aspects of the audience’s 
religious life.  He quotes a curse that uses the same formulae as epigraphic evidence 
from the same period and beyond.230  The orator combines curse language with a wide 
range of supporting terms for polluted and impious individuals that are well attested 
in other public speeches.  Most strikingly, Aeschines inverts the most prevalent 
conception of oracular communication our sources.  To emphasise Demosthenes’ 
impiety, Aeschines argues that the gods had warned Athens in a voice nearly human.  
Aeschines’ careful argumentation shows not only keen attention to previous authors’ 
speculation on divine signals but also that oratory could appropriate this dialogue for 
immediate persuasive purpose.   
 The adversarial nature of Athenian law presents a rare opportunity to see an 
immediate response to the perspective on divine causation and communication 
presented by Aeschines. Demosthenes’ complete reinterpretation of τύχη and human 
comprehension of it reflects the scope of oracular argumentation during this period.231  
The direct prayer to Pythian Apollo suggests that Demosthenes deemed it necessary 
to respond to the accusations made by Aeschines through his narrative of Delphic 
                                                                                                                                      
230 Versnel 1985, 68; Eidinow 2007, 214 with notes. 
231 On τύχη again see Eidinow 2011, 146-9. 
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oracles past and present.  The prominence given to Apollo Pythios further 
demonstrates the growing importance of Apollo’s various forms to Athens during this 
period.232 Demosthenes’ use of the oracle from Dodona may also suggest that he 
fostered a personal association with this sanctuary, a possibility that will be explored 
in the next chapter.  His conscious appropriation of Aeschines’ language of oracular 
knowledge and divine forewarning shows the centrality of oracular discourse to 
explaining the divine.  Aeschines used legendary oracles and figures to stress the 
closeness of divinity to the human sphere, a world where gods tried to help humans 
and would actively punish them if their help was not wanted.  Conversely, 
Demosthenes’ world of limited human agency and generic prophecy exculpates his 
own decision making and mocks people like Aeschines who claim to comprehend the 
plans of the superhuman.  Despite their opposed theological arguments, both orators 
rely on oracular authority, often in very different forms, to convince their audience.
                                                                                                                                      
232 See chapter one. 
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Chapter Three: Oracles from Apollo to Zeus: Doubting Delphi or the 
Dawn of Dodona? 
 
Ἀλλαντοπώλης: Αἰγεΐδη φράσσαι 
κυναλώπεκα, µή σε δολώσῃ, 
λαίθαργον ταχύπουν, δολίαν κερδὼ πολύιδριν. 
οἶσθ᾽ ὅ τι ἐστὶν τοῦτο; 
 
Δῆµος: Φιλόστρατος ἡ κυναλώπηξ. 
 
Ἀλλαντοπώλης: οὐ τοῦτό φησιν, ἀλλὰ ναῦς 
ἑκάστοτε αἰτεῖ ταχείας ἀργυρολόγους οὑτοσί: 
ταύτας ἀπαυδᾷ µὴ διδόναι σ᾽ ὁ Λοξίας. 
 
Δῆµος: πῶς δὴ τριήρης ἐστὶ κυναλώπηξ; 
 
Ἀλλαντοπώλης: ὅπως; ὅτι ἡ τριήρης ἐστὶ χὠ  
κύων ταχύ. 
 
Δῆµος: πῶς οὖν ἀλώπηξ προσετέθη πρὸς τῷ 
κυνί; 
 
Ἀλλαντοπώλης: ἀλωπεκίοισι τοὺς στρατιώτας 
ᾔκασεν, ὁτιὴ βότρυς τρώγουσιν ἐν τοῖς 
χωρίοις. 
 
Δῆµος: εἶεν: 
Sausage Seller: “Scion of Aegeus, ponder the 
fox-dog lest he beguile you; he’s treacherous, 
swift of foot, a wily trickster and very crafty.”  
Did you get that one [that oracle]? 
 
Demos: The fox-dog is Philostratus 
 
Sausage Seller: That’s not it, no this one 
keeps demanding swift ships for collecting 
tribute.  Loxias is warning you not to give 
them to him. 
 
Demos: How can a trireme be a fox-dog? 
 
Sausage Seller: How? Because both triremes 
and dogs are fleet. 
 
Demos: And how come ‘fox’ is added to the 
‘dog’? 
 
Sausage Seller: Soldiers are like fox cubs 
because they eat grapes in the farmlands. 
 
Demos: Aha!
 
While directly applying the practices of Aristophanes’ farcical depiction of 
Athenian political debate to the texts of the Attic orators is clearly problematic, the 
antics of the Sausage Seller and the Paphlagonian above illustrate one of the 
difficulties the oracles from the fourth century speeches present.   Aristophanes’ 
rhētores prepare for their agōn by grabbing as many oracles as their arms can carry to 
try and impress the personification of the dēmos.233  As ludicrous as the scene is 
intended to be, it does bear some resemblance to the oracles used by Lycurgus, 
                                                                                                                                      
233 Ar. Eq. 996-1110 trans. Henderson. See also Muecke 1998. 
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Aeschines and Demosthenes that we have examined so far.  These orators sought out 
oracles from both distant Athenian myth and their present day to develop their various 
theological arguments.   
The comic oratory above, however, in which the characters squabble over the 
meaning of a hyperbolically abstruse oracle, is the type of exchange that we have not 
seen in the present survey of Athenian rhetoric. Aristophanes’ politicians directly 
contest the meaning of a single divine pronouncement presented by their opponent.  
In fourth century Athens, speechmakers almost exclusively turned to other oracular 
responses or even oracular sanctuaries, rather than challenging their opponent’s 
interpretation of divine communications.234  Public trials involved conjecture on all 
facets of the public and private life of litigants and defendants, and accusations of 
religious misconduct and pollution abound.  There are not, however, any accusations 
that an opponent had misinterpreted or misled the public in their use of an oracle.235   
The difference between the uses of oracles in oratory and its direct satire 
suggest that the conclusions about the latter are good to think with for the former.  
Aristophanes’ satirical use of oracles has often been treated as aligning with the 
scepticism of Athenians towards divination and superstition at the close of the fifth 
century.236  More recently, Smith and Muecke have re-examined these oracles to 
conclude, amongst other things, that Aristophanes’ abuse of chresmologoi indicates 
that divination formed a central part of Athenian political language.237  Smith also 
argues that Delphi has a privileged place in Aristophanic comedy, as the sanctuary is 
                                                                                                                                      
234 See esp. Dem. 18.253. 
235 Aeschines accuses Demosthenes of misleading Athens by deliberately not consulting Delphi rather 
than by misinterpreting divine signals (Aeschin. 3.130-1).   
236 Smith 1989, 1 n. 2 collects a good range of these mid-twentieth century views, e.g. Ehrenburg 1962; 
Strauss 1966.  
237 See also Parker 1985, 302: ‘The society that abuses diviners is the society that consults them’.  
Smith 1989, 155-6 argues that Aristophanes is against cynical exploitation of divination; Muecke 1998, 
270-3 sees the oracles from Knights as finding humour through exploring the limits of a linguistic 
system (inspired poetry). 
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spared the insults given to the oracles of Bacis, for example.238  In contrast, Bowden 
has advocated resisting distinguishing ‘reputable’ oracular sources from the rest, and 
stressed that recourse to any manifestation of the oracular was not an extraordinary 
occurrence in Athenian life.239  
This chapter will explore these trends in Athenian oracular consultation in the 
present sample of fourth century rhetoric.240 Bowden’s view that the oracles of 
Aristophanes reflect the uses of oracles in the assembly will be augmented by the role 
that Delphi and Dodona have been shown to have in oratory.241  
Beyond the citation of oracular responses, orators also adopted and contested 
for oracular authority using the wider storytelling tradition of featuring oracular 
communication.  While Smith’s case for the relative respect given to Delphi in 
Aristophanes is certainly supported by a similar position in fourth century oratory, 
references to Dodona also demonstrate that the oracular voice was unlikely to be 
challenged in Athenian public speech.  The absence of Bacis and other ‘collected’ 
oracles from our body of speeches is difficult to resolve through this comparison, but 
may be related to the increased prominence of Delphi in Athenian public life during 
the Lycurgan era.242   
 
A Matter of Interpretation 
As might be expected after reading this passage of Aristophanes, the majority 
of stories involving human interaction with oracles in the Greek tradition focus on the 
                                                                                                                                      
238 Smith 1989, 156. 
239 Bowden 2003, 270-2. 
240 Bowden 2003, 272 n. 78 does in fact seek to do the same. 
241 Bowden 2003, 272; 2005, 56. 
242 The lack of oracles from chresmologoi in this small sample does seem to run against the explanation 
of Parker 2005, 115: ‘…the Athenians seldom, after 479, sent delegations to the fixed shrines except 
with questions about cult, but even in the fourth century allowed chresmologoi a voice in public 
debates.’ 
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process of interpreting or translating divine signs into action.243  However, the uses of 
the oracular voice in fourth century rhetoric, have tended to minimise the role of 
human reflection of divine meaning in favour of clear prophecies and decisive action.  
This chapter seeks to collect the remaining oracles used by the Athenian orators of 
this period and determine whether the meaning of oracular pronouncements was ever 
contested or reinterpreted in the public discourse that these speeches represent.  I 
argue that the examples that have survived show a distinct tendency to avoid not only 
oracles with contestable interpretations but also stories in which characters reflect on 
the meaning of oracular responses. 
While exploring the seven remaining case studies of oracles in oratory, 
another question emerges: whether orators used oracles from different sanctuaries in 
different ways.  In the case concerning the crowning of Demosthenes examined in the 
previous chapter, the defendant used a pronouncement from the sanctuary of Zeus and 
Dione at Dodona to counter accusations built around an oracle from Delphi.  The 
litigant in that case, Aeschines, had also sought to highlight the good relationship he 
had developed with Delphi and its Amphictyony.244  Aeschines then claimed that 
Demosthenes had advised Athens against consulting Delphi, believing that the Pythia 
had ‘Philippised’.245 Thus, Demosthenes’ use of Dodona may have been motivated by 
concerns beyond the subject matter of the oracle in question.  Before discussion 
begins to look at how different orators could interpret the same oracular 
pronouncement, it will determine whether the differences between Athens’ 
relationship with the sanctuaries at Delphi and Dodona are reflected in the use of their 
oracles in Athenian public speech.   
                                                                                                                                      
243 Kindt 2016, 159-64. 
244 Aeschin. 3.106-30. 
245 Aeschin. 3.130 Δηµοσθένης δὲ ἀντέλεγε, φιλιππίζειν τὴν Πυθίαν φάσκων;. 
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Oaken Word 
The use of oracles from Delphi by Lycurgus and Aeschines in 330 was closely 
tied to the relationships each orator had cultivated with the sanctuary at Delphi.  In the 
first chapter of this study, it was suggested that the prominence given to Delphi by 
Lycurgus was both part of and a contribution to a broader cultural trend.  The impact 
and meaning of the oracles in the speech were thus influenced by the increased 
popularity of Apollo in his related roles as Pythios and Patroos in Athens during the 
mid-fourth century.  In this context, Apollo is presented as a constant ally of the polis 
in myth and recent memory, giving clear and productive advice to pious citizens. Any 
difficulties or consequences caused by these divinely sanctioned actions were actively 
minimised.246  Aeschines’ oracular narratives and argumentation are stylistically and 
structurally different to those presented by Lycurgus, but the position of Pythian 
Apollo remains constant.  This consistency in the usage of oracles and oracle stories 
from Delphi shows the necessity of addressing whether other oracular sanctuaries 
were used differently.247   
Bowden’s analysis of Athens’ relationship with Delphi contains a chapter 
entitled ‘What did the Athenians think of the Delphic oracle?’.248  Unfortunately, 
asking the same question of Dodona, or any other popular sanctuary, does not yield 
such fruitful results.  As Parke’s survey of the contact between Athens and Dodona 
showed over fifty years ago, the evidence for Athenian interaction with the sanctuary, 
let alone more qualitative investigation, is limited.249  A traditional starting point for 
discussing Athens’ relationship with Dodona during the fourth century has been 
                                                                                                                                      
246 Difficulties such as the sacrifice of Erechtheus’ daughter, Lyc. Leo. 99-100. 
247 There are five references to oracles from Dodona in total (Dem 21.52; Dem 18.253; Hyperides 4.24-
5 then the same oracle is cited at Dem 19.297-9 and Dinarchus 1.98) cf. ten from Delphi (Aeschin. 
3.108, 130; Dem. 21.52, 42.66; Isoc. 4.31, 6.17, 23-31; Lyc. Leo. 84, 93, 99. 
248 Bowden 2005. 
249 Parke 1967, 135-143. 
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Demosthenes’ alleged claim that the Pythia had ‘Philippised’ (φιλιππίζειν).250  It has 
been suggested that Athens turned to the sanctuary of Zeus in Epirus as a result.251  
While Athens certainly interacted with the Dodona in the centuries before this point, 
the sanctuary offers less clear epigraphic or archaeological evidence of polis level 
inquiries than has been available at Delphi.252  There is record that Zeus’ oracle 
sanctioned the emergence of the cult of Bendis in the late fifth century and there may 
have been an Athenian dedication at the sanctuary around this time to commemorate a 
naval victory by Phormio.253   
The literary evidence for Athens’ relationship with Dodona, although more 
abundant, is not without its problems, especially in tales that conflate the role of 
Dodona with that of Delphi.254 Both oracles feature in two of Herodotus’ tales of 
oracular knowledge: Croesus’ oracle test and the aition of the seer Euenius.255  
Various accounts of the Sicilian expedition involve an Athenian consultation of 
Dodona that was understood as having a double meaning.256 Pausanias includes an 
oracle from Dodona in the aftermath of the Codrus myth Lycurgus told in Against 
Leocrates.257  The complementary roles of oracles in all these examples suggest that 
some elements are shared between the oracular tradition of Dodona and Delphi.   
The role of Dodona in Attic tragedy shows that tragedians expected their 
audiences to be familiar with the oracle, but this reveals little about the direct 
                                                                                                                                      
250 Alleged by Aeschines, see Aeschin. 3.130.  See Parke 1967b, 116-7 and Eidinow 2007, 62 who note 
an increase in Athenian consultations at Delphi during the relevant period.   
251 Parke 1967b, 116-7 and Eidinow 2007, 62. 
252 Meyer 2013, 18; Eidinow 2007, 60-1.  This statement refers to Athenian involvement at Dodona, 
there is much compelling evidence discovered at the site pertaining to other areas of inquiry.   
253 Bendis: IG II2 1283; Parker 1996, 170; Eidinow 2007, 61 n. 37.  Phormio: Parke 1967a, 136.  
254 Parke 1967a, 132-5. 
255 Hdt. 1.47 (Fontenrose Q99; PW 52) and 9.93 (Fontenrose Q161; PW 108). 
256 The oracle referred to a hill called Sicily (Σικελία) near Athens, rather than the island. Paus. 
8.11.12; Dio. Chr. 17.17; contra Plut. Nic. 13. who attributes the prophecy to Ammon and ‘various 
oracles’ (ἀλλ᾽ ἑτέρους … µάντεις). 
257 Pausanias 7.25.2. 
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interaction of Athenians with the sanctuary. While an oracle from Dodona concerning 
Heracles features prominently in Sophocles’ Trachinae, determining what the 
Athenian public thought of Dodona from this performance, which is one of Bowden’s 
methods for Delphi, is difficult.258  Heracles laments misunderstanding the words of 
his father from the sanctuary without any suggestion that he has been deliberately 
deceived like Deianeira had been.259  Athens itself is not connected to either the oracle 
or the story, as it is in the Eumenides or Ion, limiting any insights into the relationship 
between Athens and Dodona outside the drama.  Dodona also appears in Prometheus 
Bound, accused by Io of giving oracles of ‘shifting speech’ (αἰολοστόµους) in 
response to her father’s inquiries.260  Her complaints are indirectly redressed by 
Prometheus as he describes the prophecy as ‘clear and at not at all riddling’ (λαµπρῶς 
κοὐδὲν αἰνικτηρίως).261  The divine and mortal interpretations of the oracle are key 
feature of the play, but this is difficult to apply to the world outside the theatre.  
Nevertheless, it can be said that Dodona was clearly one of the spaces in which 
Athenian tragedians could explore the friction between divine prophecy and mortal 
understanding.  While there is a discernible trend in tragedy for Delphi to act 
favourably toward Athens, the sample of oracles from Dodona is too small for a 
similar conclusion to be drawn.262 
Expanding beyond the texts, Bowden stresses the constant interaction of 
Athenian gods and heroes with Delphi and its oracle in art, tragedy and public 
speech.263  There is little evidence for a similar position for Dodona during the 
classical period. While there may not be as detailed a picture of ‘what Athenians 
                                                                                                                                      
258 Soph. Trach. 170-4, 821-5 and esp. 1165-75. See Bowden 2005, 40-55. 
259 Soph. Trach. 1165-75.  Deianeira had been tricked into poisoning Heracles by the centaur Nessos. 
260 Aesch. PV 661. 
261 Aesch. PV 833. 
262 Bowden 2005, 54-5. 
263 Bowden 2005, 64. 
 75 
thought of’ Dodona from these sources, Athenians were certainly interacting with the 
sanctuary at both a state and individual level throughout the fourth century.  The 
audience of an assembly speech of this period, then, was familiar with Dodona as an 
oracular sanctuary in their world and from its role in tragedy and other forms of 
storytelling.  In this tradition, both Dodona and Delphi could offer both clear and 
cryptic prophecies to human characters at the same time.  The following examples of 
oracles in Athenian rhetoric will show far less emphasis on the difficulty of 
comprehending divine wisdom. 
 
False Embassies and True Oracles 
An early instance of how orators could use oracles from Dodona is also the 
only oracle to be reinterpreted, or redirected, by another speaker.  This lone example 
of reinterpretation reflects the separation of oracular discourse in oratory from the 
larger body of literary sources on which existing scholarship has focused.  Lisa 
Maurizio’s model of oracular storytelling in the Greek world placed emphasis on the 
‘interpretation’ phase of the oracle story.264  The prophecy from the Trachinae above 
shows that Dodona could fit Maurizio’s framework. As Heracles so openly explains, 
both he and Deianeira thought that they had correctly interpreted the oracle only to 
realise its true meaning after being forced to reconsider.265  Oracles rarely have this 
revelatory role in surviving speeches from Athenian public discourse. 
Demosthenes prosecuted Aeschines in 343, preserved in a speech usually 
referred to as On the False Embassy, on the grounds that Aeschines had taken bribes 
from Philip during negotiations for the unpopular Peace of Philocrates in 346.266  
                                                                                                                                      
264 Maurizio 1997, 311. 
265 Soph. Trach. 1160-75. 
266 MacDowell 2000, 20-22. 
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While Demosthenes raises a similar number of religious issues and arguments as we 
saw in the case concerning the crown in 330, stories and accusations featuring oracles 
are far less prominent.267   Apart from the often vague details of the bribery, Martin 
argues that Demosthenes uses religious themes to argue that Aeschines is at the 
margins of Athenian politics and society.268  I suggest here that the references to 
Delphi contribute to Demosthenes’ characterisation of Aeschines as an outsider 
susceptible to Philip’s bribery.269  The oracle from Dodona that Demosthenes reads to 
the audience, however, is not an example of this broad strategy.  Thus, Demosthenes’ 
use of the two oracular sanctuaries is different, so far as can be deduced from a single 
speech. 
Before the oracle from Dodona is given, Demosthenes uses Athenian sentiment 
toward the Delphi to frame Aeschines as traitorously amicable with Philip.  As Scott 
has shown, Athens’ relationship with Delphi during late 340s was in no way simple.270  
This dynamic is evident in this speech from 343, as Demosthenes depicts Aeschines’ 
singing of a paean at a feast with Philip as high treason: 
ἁπάντων γὰρ ὑµῶν τουτωνὶ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων οὕτω δεινὰ καὶ σχέτλι᾽ 
ἡγουµένων τοὺς ταλαιπώρους πάσχειν Φωκέας ὥστε µήτε τοὺς ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς 
θεωροὺς µήτε τοὺς θεσµοθέτας εἰς τὰ Πύθια πέµψαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἀποστῆναι τῆς πατρίου 
θεωρίας, οὗτος εἰς τἀπινίκια τῶν πραγµάτων καὶ τοῦ πολέµου, ἃ Θηβαῖοι καὶ 
Φίλιππος ἔθυον, εἱστιᾶτ᾽ ἐλθὼν καὶ σπονδῶν µετεῖχε καὶ εὐχῶν, ἃς ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν 
συµµάχων τῶν ὑµετέρων τείχεσι καὶ χώρᾳ καὶ ὅπλοις ἀπολωλόσιν ηὔχετ᾽ ἐκεῖνος, 
καὶ συνεστεφανοῦτο καὶ συνεπαιώνιζεν Φιλίππῳ καὶ φιλοτησίας προὔπινεν. 
 
While you who are here and all other Athenians regarded the treatment of the 
Phocians as terrible and outrageous, such that you would not send any member of 
council or any judge to the Pythian games, but relinquished that traditional 
delegation, Aeschines attended the service of thanksgiving which the Thebans and 
Philip held to celebrate their victory and their political success, was a guest at the 
banquet, and took part in the libations and prayers with which Philip prayed for the 
destruction of the fortresses, the territory, and the armies of your allies. He even 
                                                                                                                                      
267 See Martin 2009, 49-84.   
268 Dem. 19.30, 182-7, Martin 2009, 50-1. 
269 Dem. 19.128. 
270 Scott 2014, 245-56. 
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joined Philip in wearing garlands and singing paeans, and lovingly drank in his 
honour.271 
 
While Delphi is not the focal point for this episode, which took place in 
Thebes, it is remarkable that Demosthenes used the sanctuary to provoke anti-
Macedonian sentiment in this way.  References to Delphi in the 330s, as has been 
established in previous chapters, have a strong tendency to support Athenian kings, 
heroes, politicians and festivals.  In the passage above, while Demosthenes laments 
the loss of the traditional theōria to the Pythian games (τῆς πατρίου θεωρίας), he also 
portrays the liberation of the sanctuary from the Phocians as a negative outcome for 
Athens.272  While a Macedonian army in mainland Greece and Philip’s subsequent 
pre-eminence at Delphi were distressing developments for Athens, the Assembly had 
also voted at that time to send troops to aid in the removal of Phalaecus and the 
remaining the Phocians.273  In this way, Demosthenes attempts to create a false 
polarity in past Athenian policy toward Delphi as anti-Phocian or anti-Macedonian. 
Demosthenes resurrects his image of the corruption of Delphi as he concludes 
his prosecution: 
ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ τὰ πάτρι᾽ ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ κατασταθῆναι καὶ τὰ χρήµατ᾽ εἰσπραχθῆναι τῷ θεῷ, 
οἱ µὲν ὄντες Ἀµφικτύονες φεύγουσι καὶ ἐξελήλανται, … ἡ πόλις δὲ τὴν προµαντείαν 
ἀφῄρηται. καὶ γέγονεν τὰ πράγµατα πάνθ᾽ ὥσπερ αἴνιγµα τῇ πόλει. ὁ µὲν οὐδὲν 
ἔψευσται καὶ πάνθ᾽ ὅσ᾽ ἐβουλήθη διαπέπρακται, ὑµεῖς δ᾽ ἅπερ εὔξαισθ᾽ ἂν 
ἐλπίσαντες, τἀναντία τούτων ἑοράκατε γιγνόµενα, καὶ δοκεῖτε µὲν εἰρήνην ἄγειν, 
πεπόνθατε δὲ δεινότερ᾽ ἢ πολεµοῦντες: οὗτοι δὲ χρήµατ᾽ ἔχουσιν ἐπὶ τούτοις καὶ 
µέχρι τῆς τήµερον ἡµέρας δίκην οὐ δεδώκασιν. 
 
Instead of the re-establishment of ancient rites in the Temple of Apollo, and the 
restitution of treasure to the god, men who were once Amphictyons are fugitives and 
exiles… and Athens is robbed of her precedence in the consultation of the Oracle.  To 
Athens the whole business is an insoluble puzzle. Philip has never been deceived, and 
has accomplished all his purposes, while you, after expecting the complete fulfilment, 
                                                                                                                                      
271 Dem. 19.128. 
272 See Cawkwell 1978, 103-4 for the complexity of Phocian, Athenian and Macedonian goals in the 
Peace of Philocrates. 
273 Philip at Delphi: Scott 2014, 245-6.  Assembly activity on 16 Skirophorion 346: Cawkwell 1978, 
104 and Harris 1995, 99. 
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have witnessed the entire disappointment, of your desires. You are nominally at 
peace; yet peace has brought you greater calamities than war. Meantime these men 
have made money by your misfortunes, and until today have never been brought to 
justice.274 
 
Here Demosthenes uses the audience’s expectations of Delphic imagery to 
highlight Aeschines’ successful treason.275 Athens losing promanteia is reflective of 
an upheaval of the city’s traditional relationship with Apollo so great that collusion 
with the enemy must be the only explanation.  As Parker has so clearly shown, the 
concept of Athens being abandoned by Apollo (or any key divinity) was not one that 
could be directly addressed in oratory.276  Rather, blame is assigned to the folly or, in 
this case, a conspiracy of individuals.277  Athens’ declining relationship with Delphi is 
used by Demosthenes to show the consequences of Aeschines’ treason.  As with the 
speeches from 330, insult to the god is described as insult to the sanctuary or temple 
as a whole (ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ… τῷ θεῷ).278   Demosthenes then contrasts practical language 
of Delphic consultation (…τὴν προµαντείαν ἀφῄρηται) with the language of 
epiphanic oracle stories (ὥσπερ αἴνιγµα τῇ πόλει).279  The emphasis on the polis in 
this sequence (ἡ πόλις… τῇ πόλει) suggests that Demosthenes could speak to a 
concern that Athens might lose a relationship with Delphi that comforted its 
citizens.280  Demosthenes juxtaposes Athens’ now limited ways of addressing external 
uncertainty with Philip’s apparent advantage (ὁ [Φίλιππος] µὲν οὐδὲν ἔψευσται… 
ὑµεῖς [δέ]). Delphi is not the main focus of Demosthenes’ accusations against 
                                                                                                                                      
274 Dem. 19.327-8. 
275 This speech is far too long to have been given in full within the customary time constraints of 
Athenian courtroom speeches.  MacDowell argues that internal evidence suggests the speech that 
remains was an expanded but not significantly amended version: MacDowell 2000, 23-4. 
276 Parker 1997, 1-2. 
277 Folly: Solon fr. 4 West; conspiracy: Aeschin. 3.130 et al. 
278 cf. Aeschin. 3.106. 
279 Epiphanic narratives: Kindt 2016, 163-4; αἴνιγµα as descriptive of oracular language in oratory: 
Aeschin. 3.121. 
280 On Delphi as reassurance see Bowden 2005, 158-9. 
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Aeschines, but the orator still can use Athens’ trust toward Delphi to develop a hostile 
image of the future without customary access to the sanctuary.  While Demosthenes 
never claims Apollo has abandoned or deceived Athens, this is perhaps the most 
disquieting presentation of Delphi in Athenian public oratory.  One of Lycurgus’ 
oracular narratives shows oracular ambiguity punishing an Athenian traitor and 
Aeschines later accused Demosthenes of committing impiety towards Delphi, but the 
prospect of Apollo not resolving Athenian inquiries and leaving the future an αἴνιγµα 
would have been disconcerting to the dēmos.281 
The differences between Demosthenes’ use of Delphi in the passage above 
and the speeches from 330 reflect the ongoing effects of Athenian activity during 
Lycurgus’ period of political ascendancy after Chaeronea.  Delphi could be presented 
as ambivalent toward Athens in 343, but by the late 330s it was exclusively presented 
as actively interceding on Athens’ behalf.  Athens’ apprehensive policy towards 
Delphi came to an abrupt halt in 340 when they announced their return to regular 
civic dedications by reinstalling the shields from Marathon inscribed with accusations 
of Theban treachery.282  Does Demosthenes’ use of Dodona before that very public 
gesture suggest that Athens had turned to the sanctuary in Epirus while access to the 
Pythia became practically and politically difficult?283 
ὅτι γὰρ ταῦτα φυλάττοισθ᾽ ἂν εἰκότως µᾶλλον ἢ πιστεύοιτε, τῶν θεῶν ὑµῖν µαντείαν 
ἀναγνώσοµαι, οἵπερ ἀεὶ σῴζουσι τὴν πόλιν πολλῷ τῶν προεστηκότων µᾶλλον. λέγε 
τὰς µαντείας. “Μαντείαι” 
 
ἀκούετ᾽, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῶν θεῶν οἷ᾽ ὑµῖν προλέγουσιν. εἰ µὲν τοίνυν 
πολεµούντων ὑµῶν ταῦτ᾽ ἀνῃρήκασι, τοὺς στρατηγοὺς λέγουσι φυλάττεσθαι: 
πολέµου γάρ εἰσιν ἡγεµόνες οἱ στρατηγοί: εἰ δὲ πεποιηµένων εἰρήνην, τοὺς ἐπὶ τῆς 
πολιτείας ἐφεστηκότας: οὗτοι γὰρ ἡγοῦνται, τούτοις πείθεσθ᾽ ὑµεῖς, ὑπὸ τούτων δέος 
ἐστὶ µὴ παρακρουσθῆτε. 
 
                                                                                                                                      
281 Lyc. Leo. 93; Aeschin. 3.108; see Bowden 158-9. 
282 Scott 2014, 253 with notes; Aeschin. 3.108-26. 
283 Eidinow suggests that Athens’ consultations at Dodona increased in this period, although without 
speculating on the potential causes. Eidinow 2007, 61 n. 37. 
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To enforce the warning that it is better to take those precautions than to be credulous, 
I will read to you an oracle of the gods — to whom Athens owes her salvation far 
more than to her most prominent politicians. Read the oracles.  “Oracles ” 
 
Men of Athens, hear the gods who are warning you. If they are addressed to you in 
time of war, they bid you beware of your commanders, for commanders are the 
leaders of warfare; if after conclusion of peace, of your statesmen, for they are your 
leaders, they have your obedience, by them you may haply be deceived. 
 
While this passage does not suggest that Demosthenes was attempting to hide 
the provenance of the oracle he presents, he certainly does not place any emphasis on 
the process of consulting the oracular sanctuary or even the circumstances 
surrounding the pronouncement.  Parke argues that the internal option of wartime or 
peacetime interpretations (εἰ µὲν τοίνυν πολεµούντων ὑµῶν… εἰ δὲ πεποιηµένων 
εἰρήνην) suggests that the oracle was contemporaneous with the Peace of 
Philocrates.284  This would place the consultation during a period in which Athens had 
limited access to Delphi, a situation for which Demosthenes paints Aeschines 
responsible.  However, the motivation for their enquiry, while ‘interesting to try and 
conjecture’ as Parke terms it, cannot be reconstructed with any degree of 
confidence.285  Thus, Demosthenes’ use of the oracle does not correspond with the 
common ‘crisis’ phase of the oracle stories presented by other orators.286  Without a 
clear dilemma to solve, the oracle shares few storytelling characteristics with the 
wider body of ‘epiphanic’ oracular narratives.287   
Nevertheless, Demosthenes presents the divine pronouncement using 
vocabulary similar to that of Aeschines’ far more involved story about Delphi.288  
Athens has been ‘forewarned’ by the gods (τῶν θεῶν οἷ᾽ ὑµῖν προλέγουσιν) to be on 
                                                                                                                                      
284 Parke 1967a, 141. 
285 Quote from Parke 1967a, 141.  Parke rightly avoids placing too much weight on his speculation.   
286 Lyc. Leo. 84, 93, 100; Aeschin. 3.108.  ‘Crisis’ terminology, see Maurizio 1997. 
287 On epiphany see Platt 2011; Kindt 2016, 163-4; Petridou 2016. 
288 Aeschin. 3.108, 21-34. 
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its guard (φυλάττεσθαι).289  While it is likely that the orators’ language reflects 
common oracular phrasing, Demosthenes also expected these words to have 
persuasive impact without being part of a detailed narrative. 
In this section, Demosthenes is attempting to persuade the audience not to be 
swayed by the endorsement that Eubulus, a prominent politician, will give to 
Aeschines in his defence.290  Martin argues that Demosthenes uses the oracle to 
prompt the audience to decide between the authority of Eubulus and the authority of 
Zeus.291  While Martin’s interpretation that the oracle is not used in an overly 
pejorative way is sound, it should be noted that Demosthenes’ argumentation 
highlights themes similar to the more emphatic oracular narratives of Aeschines or 
Lycurgus: 
… ἡ µαντεία δεῖν ὅπως ἂν µὴ χαίρωσιν οἱ ἐχθροὶ ποιεῖν. ἅπασι τοίνυν µιᾷ γνώµῃ 
παρακελεύεται κολάζειν τοὺς ὑπηρετηκότας τι τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ὁ Ζεύς, ἡ Διώνη, πάντες 
οἱ θεοί. ἔξωθεν οἱ ἐπιβουλεύοντες, ἔνδοθεν οἱ συµπράττοντες… ἔτι τοίνυν κἂν ἀπ᾽ 
ἀνθρωπίνου λογισµοῦ τοῦτ᾽ ἴδοι τις, ὅτι πάντων ἐχθρότατον καὶ φοβερώτατον τὸ τὸν 
προεστηκότ᾽ ἐᾶν οἰκεῖον γίγνεσθαι τοῖς µὴ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιθυµοῦσι τῷ δήµῳ. 
 
… the oracle bids you strive that the enemy shall not rejoice. Therefore, you are all 
exhorted by Zeus, by Dione, by all the gods, to punish with one mind those who have 
made themselves the servants of your enemies. There are foes without; there are 
traitors within….  Moreover, it can be shown by mere human reasoning that it is 
extremely injurious and dangerous to permit the intimacy of a prominent statesman 
with men whose purposes are at variance with those of the people.292 
 
Just as he would in On the Crown, Demosthenes contrasts divine knowledge 
with limited human reasoning.293  Although human logos (κἂν ἀπ᾽ ἀνθρωπίνου 
λογισµοῦ) can recognise that Athens is in a precarious situation, only the gods reveal 
that Athenians ought to punish the traitors in their city.  Thus, the oracle is given as a 
                                                                                                                                      
289 cf. Aeschin. 3.130 ἀλλ᾽ οὐ προύλεγον, οὐ προεσήµαινον οἱ θεοὶ φυλάξασθαι, µόνον γε οὐκ 
ἀνθρώπων φωνὰς προσκτησάµενοι; 
290 Martin 2009, 74. 
291 Martin 2009, 74. 
292 Dem. 19.300. 
293 Dem. 19.300 ἀπ᾽ ἀνθρωπίνου λογισµοῦ τοῦτ᾽ ἴδοι τις; Dem. 18.193 ὅσ᾽ ἐνῆν κατ᾽ ἀνθρώπινον 
λογισµὸν εἱλόµην. 
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method of counteracting human propensity to be deceived (…ὑπὸ τούτων δέος ἐστὶ 
µὴ παρακρουσθῆτε).294  Lycurgus also frames oracles a way of mitigating human 
limitations (τοὺς µὲν γὰρ ἀνθρώπους πολλοὶ ἤδη ἐξαπατήσαντες) as part of his 
prosecution of Leocrates.295  Lycurgus emphasises the closeness of Athens and Delphi 
as crucial to obtaining divine advice, whereas Demosthenes gives the oracle from 
Dodona without the same attention to the details of Athens’ relationship with the 
sanctuary.  Nevertheless, the oracle from Dodona is fulfilling a very similar 
argumentative purpose in On the False Embassy. Despite the differences between 
Athens’ history with the oracular sanctuaries of Dodona and Delphi, they are 
presented as helping Athens overcome uncertainty.  Neither Apollo nor Delphi are 
depicted as offering unclear or potentially problematic advice.  The consistency in 
these features shows a common oracular discourse that orators in the fourth century 
could draw from that was not entirely dependent on the sanctuary from which the 
oracle came. 
 
Denigrating Demosthenes 
This analysis has shown a consistency in vocabulary, themes and purpose of 
oracular discourse concerning both Dodona and Delphi in Athenian public oratory 
from the late fourth century.  Existing scholarship has demonstrated these types of 
similarities shared between other genres and authors from the Ancient Greek world. 
For Kindt, the uniting question of this oracular discourse concerns the availability of 
divine knowledge to human inquirers. 296  As a result, there is usually a crucial phase 
of interpretation and reinterpretation of oracles that leads to a revelation or 
                                                                                                                                      
294 Dem. 19.299. 
295 Lyc. Leo.  79. 
296 Kindt 2016, 157-8. 
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resolution.297  While the limited nature of human comprehension is a theme shared 
between these literary sources and speeches from the courts and assembly in Athens,  
these  public speeches have rarely focused on interpreting the meaning of oracular 
advice.  The oracles presented by Lycurgus, Aeschines and Demosthenes have, for the 
most part, stressed the clarity or at least directness of divine communication in 
oracles.  While these orators have debated the theological ramifications of oracles, 
there has not been any discussion concerning the meaning of individual oracles.298 For 
an example of an orator returning to a previously cited oracle to question its meaning 
we must wait until the very end of the classical period.   
In 324/3, Athens was in the midst of the Harpalus affair.  Harpalus, 
Alexander’s imperial treasurer, had fled Babylon for mainland Greece with a 
considerable grudge against Alexander and considerable resources at his disposal.299  
Athens eventually accepted Harpalus as a suppliant in 343, after much debate in the 
assembly, then detained the man and his reported 700 talents while the polis 
negotiated with Macedon at Olympia.300  During the embassy, Harpalus escaped from 
Athens and the city found only 350 of the 700 talents left on the Acropolis.  
Demosthenes’ intimate involvement at all stages of the affair made him a prime 
suspect to have appropriated funds.  Rather than wait for a drawn out eisangelia 
procedure, Demosthenes pre-emptively launched an enquiry through an Areopagus 
that had often acted in his favour.301 
While there is doubt about who delivered the speech Against Demosthenes, it 
was certainly written by Dinarchus.  For our exploration of the way oracles are used 
                                                                                                                                      
297 Kindt 2016, 157; Maurizio 1997, 311-2. 
298 Theological ramifications: Aeschin. 3.108-30 cf. Dem. 18.192-99, 252-6. 
299 Worthington 1992, 41-3; Diod. 17.108.4-6. 
300 Worthington 1992, 50; Din. 1.70, 89; Hyp. 5.9-10. 
301 Worthington 1992, 51 n. 35. 
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in the speech, this presents an interesting challenge.  Lycurgus, Aeschines and 
Demosthenes all used oracles and oracle stories in a way dependent on their 
engagement, on behalf of Athens, with Delphi or Dodona.  Dinarchus, however, was 
born in Corinth and does not appear to have ever gained Athenian citizenship.302 The 
combination of Dinarchus’ position as a metic and non-speaking logographer may 
contribute to the reserved rhetoric surrounding the oracle from Dodona: 
ἀκούσατε, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι…καὶ τῆς µαντείας τῆς ἐλθούσης ἐκ Δωδώνης παρὰ τοῦ Διὸς 
τοῦ Δωδωναίου: σαφῶς γὰρ ὑµῖν πάλαι προείρηκε φυλάττεσθαι τοὺς ἡγεµόνας καὶ 
τοὺς συµβούλους. λέγε τὴν µαντείαν πρῶτον. “Μαντεία” 
 
I want you also, Athenians, to hear…the oracle sent from Dodona from Dodonian 
Zeus; for it has long been warning you clearly to beware of your leaders and advisers. 
Read the oracle first. “Oracle”303 
 
The first time Dinarchus employs an oracle, it forms a very minor part of an 
argument compelling the jurors to hand down their most severe penalty on 
Demosthenes.  The logographer does, however, adopt religious themes and language 
similar to Aeschines’ condemnation of Demosthenes ten years before. 304  
Demosthenes is again called the ‘cursed man’ of Greece in the strongest terms (τὸν 
τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀλιτήριον).305  Further, Dinarchus attributes the present misfortunes of 
Athens to Demosthenes and urges the citizens not to continue sharing them (µὴ µὰ 
Δία…τῆς Δηµοσθένους δωροδοκίας καὶ ἀτυχίας κοινωνεῖν).306   However, these 
arguments are not combined with the detailed oracular narrative of curses, oaths and 
impiety that Aeschines employed in Against Ctesiphon.307   
                                                                                                                                      
302 Worthington 1992, 8; Dion. Hal. Dinarchus, 2. 
303 Din.1.78. 
304 See Worthington 1992. 
305 Din. 1.77, cf. Aeschin. 3.157. 
306 Din 1.77, cf. Aeschin. 3.130-1. 
307 Although many of the same terms are used e.g. ὁ µιαρὸς οὗτος καὶ ἀσεβὴς καὶ αἰσχροκερδὴς, Din. 
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Dinarchus does appear to carefully incorporate these existing criticisms into a 
prosecution that picks apart Demosthenes’ defence speech from 330.  Demosthenes’ 
focus on the lack of control humans have over their fate (τύχη) in On the Crown is 
actively turned against him as Dinarchus argues that the leader of Athens has not 
allowed the city to recover its fortunes (…καὶ µεταβαλέσθαι τὴν τῆς πόλεως τύχην 
ἐᾶσαι).308  The idea that Demosthenes has thrown the city into misfortune (τὸν εἰς τὰς 
δεινοτάτας ἀτυχίας ἐµβεβληκότα τὴν πόλιν) reverses Demosthenes’ claim that the 
city always enjoyed good fortune (ἐγὼ τὴν τῆς πόλεως τύχην ἀγαθὴν ἡγοῦµαι).309  
Demosthenes constructed this argument for the immutability of τύχη using an oracle 
from Dodona that asserted Athens’ good fortune. 310   Dinarchus’ inversion of 
Demosthenes’ famous defence, although less intricate, also relies on an oracular 
pronouncement.   
οὐκ ἐὰν σωφρονῆτε καὶ καλῶς καὶ ὑπὲρ ὑµῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς πόλεως βουλεύησθε: 
ἀλλὰ δέξεσθε τὴν ἀγαθὴν τύχην, ἣ τιµωρήσασθαι παρέδωκε τῶν ῥητόρων τοὺς τὴν 
πόλιν διὰ τὴν αὑτῶν δωροδοκίαν ταπεινὴν πεποιηκότας, καὶ φυλάξεσθε, καθάπερ οἱ 
θεοὶ προειρήκασιν ὑµῖν ἐν ταῖς µαντείαις πολλάκις, τοὺς τοιούτους ἡγεµόνας καὶ 
συµβούλους. ἀκούσατε δ᾽ αὐτῆς τῆς µαντείας. λέγε τὴν µαντείαν. “Μαντεία” 
 
Not if you [men of Athens] are prudent and make the right decision for yourselves 
and Athens. No, you will welcome good fortune, who presented to you for 
punishment those politicians who through their own bribery have humiliated the city. 
[sc. if you are prudent…] You will also be on your guard, as the gods have often 
cautioned you in oracles, against the leaders and counsellors of this type. Listen to the 
oracle itself. Read the oracle. “Oracle ”311 
 
Despite Dinarchus’ focus on reversing Demosthenes’ arguments concerning 
fate in On the Crown, the second citation confirms that this oracle from Dodona is 
different to the one cited by Demosthenes in 330.  In fact, Dinarchus uses the same 
                                                                                                                                      
308 Din. 1.77. 
309 Din. 1.77 and Dem. 18.253.  See also Demosthenes’ prayer (εὐτυχίαν µοι δοῦναι καὶ σωτηρίαν, 
Dem. 18.141). 
310 Dem 18.253. 
311 Din. 1.98. 
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oracle Demosthenes presented in 343 in the case on the embassy.312 The choice to 
present the ‘beware of your leaders’ oracle rather than the ‘good fortune’ oracle 
suggests that the latter would not add nuance or authority to the argument Dinarchus 
was constructing.  The speaker argues insistently that an impersonal conception of 
τύχη should not absolve Demosthenes of responsibility and that his personal 
misfortune (ἀτυχίας) has exacerbated the city’s bad circumstances.313  Even though 
the ‘good fortune’ oracle from On the Crown was an important part of Demosthenes’ 
argumentation, it appears that the oracle cannot be reinterpreted to suit Dinarchus’ 
counter-argument.  Thus, the adversarial format of these speeches drastically alters 
the process of interpreting oracular pronouncements.  The wording of the ‘good 
fortune’ oracle was such that Dinarchus could not reinterpret its meaning to persuade 
a new audience. 
The oracle that was read to the audience of Against Demosthenes in 323, the 
‘beware your leaders’ oracle, concludes Dinarchus’ treatment of Demosthenes’ 
allegedly nefarious political history.314  Although Demosthenes used the same oracle 
in 343, there is no attempt by the speaker in 323 to highlight this fact or to offer any 
different interpretation of the pronouncement.315  Both Dinarchus and Demosthenes 
draw the same phrase (µίαν γνώµην; µιᾷ γνώµῃ) from the oracle in an attempt to unite 
the juries to prosecute their respective defendants with ‘one mind’.316  Both orators 
also emphasise the susceptibility of the people to deception by their leaders.  
Dinarchus conflates the deceptive deeds of politicians with their specious words  
                                                                                                                                      
312 Dem. 19.299 see Parke 1967a, 140-2. 
313 Din. 1.77 above; Din. 1.91: τῆς Δηµοσθένους πονηρίας καὶ ἀτυχίας ἀπολαύειν, 92: καὶ 
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τῶν ἔργων καὶ τῶν λόγων καὶ τῆς τύχης. 
314 Worthington 1992, 256. 
315 At either point: Din. 1.77 and 98.   
316 Din. 1.99; Dem. 19.299. 
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(πράττωσιν ἐξαπατῶντες ὑµᾶς τοὺς ῥᾷστα πειθοµένους τοῖς τούτων λόγοις).317  
Demosthenes similarly highlights the ability of those in authority (τοὺς ἐπὶ τῆς 
πολιτείας ἐφεστηκότας) to mislead (ὑπὸ τούτων δέος ἐστὶ µὴ παρακρουσθῆτε).318  In 
both cases, the correspondence of the two orators’ argumentation around the oracle of 
Dodona clearly shows that the same response was used in both cases.319 While Parke 
was right to diplomatically suggest that this original response from Dodona was of ‘a 
general kind’, the bland generality of the ‘beware your leaders’ oracle can also be 
approached from another perspective.  The consistent reuse of this oracle 
demonstrates a desire for clarity from the divine in both arguments.  Dinarchus and 
Demosthenes have used this pronouncement to denounce different politicians 
(Demosthenes and Eubulus respectively), but they both present divine communication 
as a means to counter being misled by their leaders (ἐξαπατάω /παρακρούω). 
Dinarchus’ recycling of a response from Dodona used by Demosthenes twenty 
years prior further demonstrates consistency in the use of oracles during this period of 
Athenian politics.  Human susceptibility to deception and misinterpretation is 
juxtaposed with the clarity and benevolence of divine advice.  Although Dinarchus’ 
prosecution inverts much of Demosthenes’ theological defence in On the Crown, the 
oracle that formed a part of Demosthenes’ argument was not challenged.  Moreover, 
the oracle that contributes to Dinarchus’ model of political responsibility shares the 
same function in On the False Embassy.  Rather than being used to ‘rouse the 
superstitious feelings of the jury’, or amounting to ‘another form of topos in the 
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rhetorical repertoire’, the oracles used by the orators reflect a coherent discourse on 
the form and function of oracular communication.320  
 
In Meidias Res 
The speeches examined so far in this chapter have shown that oracles from 
Dodona and Delphi, while not entirely interchangeable, were used for very similar 
purposes.  I have also argued that orators, unlike tragedians or historians, avoided or 
actively reinterpreted the oracular tradition that highlighted the obscurity of divine 
language.  The earliest extant citation of an oracle in Attic oratory, from the 
prosecution of Meidias in 347/6, conforms with these preliminary conclusions.  
Demosthenes presents two oracles, one each from Dodona and Delphi, to amplify the 
religious implications of Meidias’ assault.321  The oracles from Against Meidias are, 
however, among the only direct quotations of oracular responses from this corpus that 
have been preserved with the text of the speech.322  Demosthenes uses these oracles to 
encourage the audience to view an offence against a chorēgos at a festival as both 
asebeia and hubris.  Although there are many corruptions in the oracles, the 
consensus is that their content is genuine.323  While the main focus of this analysis is 
on the function of oracular argumentation in these speeches, the text of the oracles 
provides further support for a consistent group of themes and vocabulary used by the 
orators to influence their audience.   
Demosthenes prosecuted his long-time rival Meidias in 347/6 using an 
uncommon procedure called a proboulē that involved a preliminary hearing before the 
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Martin 2009, 22.  Speculation that the oracles we have were inserted into the MS at some point seems 
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assembly.324  This hearing, although it was decided by a jury, did not carry any 
immediate penalties for either a guilty defendant or a frivolous prosecutor.  Although 
Meidias had allegedly assaulted Demosthenes at the Dionysia of 348, the cited charge 
was less specific, given as ‘wrongdoing concerning the festival’.325 Demosthenes 
introduces the oracles as he argues that Meidias’ assault on him amounted to impiety 
due to his position as chorēgos: 
ἴστε γὰρ δήπου τοῦθ᾽ ὅτι τοὺς χοροὺς ὑµεῖς ἅπαντας τούτους καὶ τοὺς ὕµνους τῷ θεῷ 
ποιεῖτε, οὐ µόνον κατὰ τοὺς νόµους τοὺς περὶ τῶν Διονυσίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὰς 
µαντείας, ἐν αἷς ἁπάσαις ἀνῃρηµένον εὑρήσετε τῇ πόλει, ὁµοίως ἐκ Δελφῶν καὶ ἐκ 
Δωδώνης, χοροὺς ἱστάναι κατὰ τὰ πάτρια καὶ κνισᾶν ἀγυιὰς καὶ στεφανηφορεῖν.  
ἀνάγνωθι δέ µοι λαβὼν αὐτὰς τὰς µαντείας. 
 
You surely realise that all your choruses and hymns to the god are sanctioned, not 
only by the regulations of the Dionysia, but also by the oracles, in all of which, 
whether given at Delphi or at Dodona, you will find it ordained to the city to set up 
dances after the ancestral custom, to fill the streets with the savour of sacrifice, and to 
wear garlands.326 
 
As noted above, this passage is the only that survives in which oracles from 
Dodona and Delphi are presented together.  Demosthenes draws no distinction 
between the two (ὁµοίως ἐκ Δελφῶν καὶ ἐκ Δωδώνης).  As with many of the other 
citations of oracles we have seen, the context for the original inquiries is not given to 
the audience.  As a result, there is no emphasis on the process of consulting the oracle 
or on the relationship of Athens (or Demosthenes) with the oracular sanctuaries.327  
The oracle from Dodona that Demosthenes gives in On the False Embassy is similarly 
devoid of surrounding information, perhaps suggesting that the abbreviated 
introductions to oracles in the 340s were influenced by the Athens’ restricted access 
                                                                                                                                      
324 See MacDowell 1990, 13-4. 
325 Dem. 18.193 ἀδικεῖν περὶ τὴν ἑορτήν. Cf. MacDowell 1990, 14-15. 
326 Dem. 21.51. 
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to Delphi during its occupation by the Phocians.328  In contrast to the minimal 
introduction to the oracles, Demosthenes has two substantial oracular responses read 
to the assembly.329  Even so, the orator unpacks the words from Delphi and Dodona 
for the audience: 
εἰσίν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ αὗται καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαὶ µαντεῖαι τῇ πόλει κἀγαθαί. τί 
οὖν ἐκ τούτων ὑµᾶς ἐνθυµεῖσθαι δεῖ; ὅτι τὰς µὲν ἄλλας θυσίας τοῖς ἐφ᾽ ἑκάστης 
µαντείας προφαινοµένοις θεοῖς προστάττουσι θύειν, ἱστάναι δὲ χοροὺς καὶ 
στεφανηφορεῖν κατὰ τὰ πάτρια πρὸς ἁπάσαις ταῖς ἀφικνουµέναις µαντείαις 
προσαναιροῦσιν ὑµῖν. οἱ τοίνυν χοροὶ πάντες οἱ γιγνόµενοι καὶ οἱ χορηγοὶ δῆλον ὅτι 
τὰς µὲν ἡµέρας ἐκείνας ἃς συνερχόµεθ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα, κατὰ τὰς µαντείας ταύτας 
ὑπὲρ ὑµῶν ἐστεφανώµεθα...  
 
Besides these oracles, men of Athens, there are many others addressed to our city, 
and excellent oracles they are. Now what conclusion ought you to draw from them? 
That while they prescribe the sacrifices to the gods indicated in each oracle, to every 
oracle that is published they add the injunction to set up dances and to wear garlands 
after the manner of our ancestors. Therefore, in the case of all the choruses that are 
constituted, together with their chorus-masters, during the days on which we meet in 
competition, these oracles make it clear that we wear our crowns as your 
representatives…330 
 
While Demosthenes does not give contextual details for the responses, he does 
use similar language to the other orators communicating oracular meaning to their 
audience.  The clarity of the gods’ will is again stressed by the repetition of verbs with 
the prefix πρό-.331  Perhaps due to the abbreviated details of consultation, the oracles 
themselves, rather than the gods responsible for them, have ‘foreshown’ (ἐφ᾽ ἑκάστης 
µαντείας προφαινοµένοις), ‘prescribed sacrifice’ (προστάττουσι θύειν) and ‘further 
                                                                                                                                      
328 Dem. 19.299.  Most commentators have seen the oracle from Against Meidias as drawn from a state 
record of responses: see Fontenrose 1978, 187-194; Martin 2009, 209.   Martin would argue that 
Demosthenes’ minimalistic framing of oracles was in alignment with his tendency to avoid explicitly 
religious argumentation. See Martin 2009, 209. On Phocian ascendency in the 350s see Scott 2014, 
237-45.   
329 There is debate over the number of independent responses that make up this block of text. There 
appear to be two from each sanctuary, but the differences in dialect and verse may not signify that the 
two Delphic oracles are from distinct responses. See Fontenrose 1978, 253; MacDowell 1990, 270-1 
and 274; Martin 2009, 22 n. 22. 
330 Dem. 21.54-5. 
331 Given lack of temporal specificity in this particular instance, it is difficult to decide on the force of 
the prefix here.  Unlike Aeschin. 3.130, there is no emphasis on knowledge in advance (LSJ vol. IX 
πρός C. III 3 b.), suggesting that the more common implication of direction (LSJ vol. IX πρός C. I 2, 
3).  Nevertheless, these are intensified compound forms of the base verbs. 
 91 
ordained’ (προσαναιροῦσιν).332  Unlike the majority of oracles in public discourse, 
these oracles do not form part of an argument alluding to the weakness of human 
reasoning.  Nevertheless, the use of προφαίνω and προσαναιρέω shows the orator 
using language that both he and his audience associated with clarity and the 
expression of divine wisdom.  As Demosthenes begins to relate the oracles to 
Meidias’ offenses, he stresses the connection between crowns and divinely ordained 
festivals as similarly clear (δῆλον ὅτι…κατὰ τὰς µαντείας ταύτας).  Thus, even when 
orators do not actively present oracles as a remedy to human fallibility, the 
vocabulary of divine communication remains positive and straightforward: 
εἰ µὲν τοίνυν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, µὴ χορηγὸς ὢν ταῦτ᾽ ἐπεπόνθειν ὑπὸ Μειδίου, 
ὕβριν ἄν τις µόνον κατέγνω τῶν πεπραγµένων αὐτῷ: νῦν δέ µοι δοκεῖ, κἂν ἀσέβειαν 
εἰ καταγιγνώσκοι, τὰ προσήκοντα ποιεῖν…τὸν οὖν εἴς τινα τούτων τῶν χορευτῶν ἢ 
τῶν χορηγῶν ὑβρίζοντ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ἔχθρᾳ, καὶ ταῦτ᾽ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἀγῶνι καὶ ἐν τῷ τοῦ θεοῦ 
ἱερῷ, τοῦτον ἄλλο τι πλὴν ἀσεβεῖν φήσοµεν; 
 
Now if I had not been chorus-master, men of Athens, when I was thus maltreated by 
Meidias, it is only the personal insult that one would have condemned; but under the 
circumstances I think one would be justified in condemning also the impiety of the 
act…If, then, a man commits a malicious assault on any member or master of these 
choruses, especially during the actual contest in the sacred precinct of the god, can we 
deny that he is guilty of impiety?333 
 
These two passages bookend Demosthenes’ quotation and very neatly 
illustrate the purpose of this section of the speech.  Demosthenes argues that Meidias’ 
punch represents an offence (ἀσεβῆµα) to the gods who established the choruses.334  
Both MacDowell and Martin argue that the oracles do not directly (or even indirectly) 
support Demosthenes’ interpretation of Meidias’ actions as impiety.335  Although the 
                                                                                                                                      
332 Προφαίνω is used in other contexts to refer to oracular pronouncements; προστάσσω usually used in 
human (esp. military) contexts; προσαναιρέω is rare (concerning oracles cf. Pl. Rep. 461E), although 
ἀναιρέω is one of the more common ways of describing oracular speech. 
333 Dem. 21.51-5. 
334 See MacDowell 1990, 18; Martin 2009, 22-4. 
335 The oracles show divine sanctioning of the choruses and wearing crowns, but offer no inviolability 
to chorus leaders.  The law presented concerning interference with choruses (Dem. 21.56-7) refers to 
chorus members (performers) not their chorēgos.  MacDowell 1990, 18; Martin 2009, 23-4. 
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oracles do not specifically define the action of assaulting a chorēgos as asebeia, it is 
clear that Demosthenes believed that they would help establish the religious 
significance of both Meidias’ punch and his general anti-democratic character.336  
Thus, the oracles from Against Meidias demonstrate that orators expected the oracular 
voice to have a persuasive function without the characteristic hallmarks of oracle 
stories. 
 
Believe the Hype 
The interplay of oracles from Dodona and Delphi also occurs in the 
Hyperides’ defence of Euxenippus from the late 330s.337  Euxenippus was facing 
eisangelia proceedings for allegedly misreporting a dream he had during an official 
envoy.338  Hyperides’ brief defence speech argues that a private citizen could not be 
impeached by this procedure and that the defendant could not have been bribed to 
misreport his dream because he had no ties to Macedon.339  In Hyperides’ dismissive 
speech, he appeals to the authority that Pythian Apollo has over dreams.340 
εἰ δέ, ὥσπερ νυνὶ λέγεις, ἡγοῦ αὐτὸν καταψεύσασθαι τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ χαριζόµενόν τισι 
µὴ τἀληθῆ ἀπηγγελκέναι τῷ δήµῳ, οὐ ψήφισµα ἐχρῆν σε πρὸς τὸ ἐνύπνιον γράφειν, 
ἀλλ᾽ ὅπερ ὁ πρότερος ἐµοῦ λέγων εἶπεν, εἰς Δελφοὺς πέµψαντα πυθέσθαι παρὰ τοῦ 
θεοῦ τὴν ἀλήθειαν. 
 
If, as you now maintain, you thought that he misrepresented the god and, out of 
partiality for certain persons, had made a false report to the people, rather than 
propose a decree disputing the dream you ought to have sent to Delphi, as the 
previous speaker said, and inquired the truth from the god341 
 
                                                                                                                                      
336 Martin argues that the audience would not have been expecting an argument that focused so heavily 
on religious issues, Martin 2009, 22.  For Demosthenes’ characterisation of Meidias as anti-democratic 
see: Wilson 1991; Ober 1994. 
337 No earlier than 330 and no later than 324, Worthington, Cooper and Harris 2001, 103. 
338 Athens had sent three citizens to a sanctuary of Amphiaraus in Oropus to determine, through their 
dreams, whether all the land in the area was the property of the god.  On this dream see Harris 2009, 
157. 
339 Hyp. 4.7, 21-2; Worthington, Cooper and Harris 2001, 104. 
340 For a comprehensive review of dreaming and incubatory sanctuaries in the Greek world, see 
Renberg 2016. 
341 Hyp. 4.15. 
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Athenian decision-making concerning the sanctuary at Oropus deserves more 
attention than can be given here, but the way that Hyperides talks about the process is 
revealing.  Even though the subject matter is a dream, Delphi is portrayed as a 
definitive method for determining the truth.  Suspicion that Euxenippus might have 
given a false account (καταψεύσασθαι) or not testified the truth to the people (µὴ 
τἀληθῆ ἀπηγγελκέναι τῷ δήµῳ) should have been addressed by asking for the truth 
from Apollo (πυθέσθαι παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ τὴν ἀλήθειαν).  Hyperides succinctly attempts 
to show that eisangelia is an inappropriate procedure for this affair not only because 
Euxenippus is a private citizen, but also because this is an area in which humans 
should seek divine assistance.  As with more detailed oracular narratives, Hyperides 
frames Delphi as method of overcoming (alleged) human deception and barriers to 
accessing knowledge. 
The orator introduces the oracular authority of Dodona later in the defence as 
he seeks to show that Euxenippus’ alleged misconduct concerning the cult of Health 
(Ὑγιεία) was in fact divinely sanctioned: 
ὑµῖν Ὀλυµπιὰς ἐγκλήµατα πεποίηται περὶ τὰ ἐν Δωδώνῃ οὐ δίκαια … οὐ προσήκοντα 
αὐτὴν ἐγκλήµατα τῇ πόλει ἐγκαλοῦσαν. ὑµῖν γὰρ ὁ Ζεὺς ὁ Δωδωναῖος προσέταξεν ἐν 
τῇ µαντείᾳ τὸ ἄγαλµα τῆς Διώνης ἐπικοσµῆσαι: 
 
Olympias has made complaints against you about the incident at Dodona…I 
explained to her envoys that the charges she brings against the city are not justified. 
For Zeus of Dodona directed you through the oracle to adorn the statue of Dione.342 
 
Hyperides gives Athens’ furnishing of a cult statue at Dodona as an example 
to show that dedications by poleis in other territories were customary.  The directions 
from Dodona closely follow Bowden’s summary of the presentation of Delphi in 
oratory, as the ‘arbiter of correct conduct.’343  The god directs Athens to take actions 
                                                                                                                                      
342 Hyp. 4.24-5. 
343 Bowden 2005, 57. 
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(ὁ Ζεὺς ὁ Δωδωναῖος προσέταξεν… ταῦτα τοῦ θεοῦ προστάξαντος.) that are 
presented as unproblematic, despite the objections of the regent of Molossia, 
Olympias. 344  Thus, Hyperides’ attempt to defuse potential arguments from the 
prosecution suggests that oracles from Dodona and Delphi were used in very similar 
ways in the 320s, even after Athens’ reengagement with Delphi in the Lycurgan era.   
 
Isocrates in Isolation 
ταύτην τε γὰρ οἰκοῦµεν δόντων µὲν Ἡρακλειδῶν, ἀνελόντος δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ…ἐκείνην τ᾽ 
ἐλάβοµεν παρὰ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ταῖς µαντείαις χρησάµενοι ταῖς 
αὐταῖς. 
 
For we inhabit Lacedaemon because the sons of Heracles gave it to us, because 
Apollo directed us to do so … and Messene we received from the same people, in the 
same way, and by taking the advice of the same oracle.345 
 
The philosophical rhetoric of Isocrates offers a valuable counterpoint to the 
symbouletic oratory on which this thesis has focused.346  While the uses of oracles in 
Isocrates were not presented directly to the Athenian dēmos, most of his speeches 
were composed in the style of public speech and certainly had an impact on the 
generation of logographers and rhētores explored here.347 The comparison also has 
value because the most detailed oracle story that Isocrates presents is in the 
Archidamus, written in 366 from the perspective of the eponymous Spartan prince.348  
The Spartan perspective of the hypothetical speech demonstrates how Athenians 
might have conceived of the function of oracular authority in the assembly of another 
poleis.  Isocrates’ Archidamus urges the Spartan assembly not to accept the terms of 
                                                                                                                                      
344 Olympias, Alexander’s mother, held the regency over the region, Molossia, that controlled the 
sanctuary at Dodona. 
345 Isoc. 6.24. 
346 The bibliography examining Isocrates’ works between philosophy and oratory is large.  See esp. 
Halliwell 1997; Balla 2004; Livingston 2007. 
347 Papillon 2004, 15-6. 
348 Date: Papillion 2004, 12. 
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surrender that have been offered to them by Thebes in the aftermath of the Battle of 
Leuctra in 371.  The speaker recounts the Dorian settlement of Laconia in the time of 
Heracles: 
πὶ δὲ τρίτης γενεᾶς ἀφίκοντο εἰς Δελφούς, χρήσασθαι τῷ µαντείῳ περί τινων 
βουληθέντες. ὁ δὲ θεὸς περὶ µὲν ὧν ἐπηρώτησαν οὐκ ἀνεῖλεν, ἐκέλευσε δ᾽ αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ 
τὴν πατρῴαν ἰέναι χώραν… σκοπούµενοι δὲ τὴν µαντείαν, εὕρισκον Ἄργος µὲν κατ᾽ 
ἀγχιστείαν αὑτῶν γιγνόµενον … Λακεδαίµονα δὲ κατὰ δόσιν… Μεσσήνην δὲ 
δοριάλωτον ληφθεῖσαν. 
 
In the third generation thereafter, they came to Delphi, desiring to consult the oracle 
about certain matters. Apollo, however, made them no answer to the questions which 
they asked, but merely bade them seek the country of their fathers.  Pondering the 
meaning of the oracle, they discovered that Argos was theirs because of kinship… 
and Lacedaemon was theirs from a gift... and that they had taken Messenia as a spoil 
of war.349 
 
Isocrates’ story of the Dorian consultation of Delphi is, despite some 
similarities, unlike the oracle stories presented by Athenian speakers in the assembly.  
The Pythia does not offer a direct answer (οὐκ ἀνεῖλεν) to the initial inquiry, but 
rather offers a vague response that forces the Dorians to re-examine their own 
preconceptions and discover three connections their ancestors had to the land.  
Epiphanic interactions with Delphi are commonplace in Greek literature, with both 
positive and negative outcomes, but are almost entirely absent from Athenian public 
speech.350  The story of Callistratus being executed in Athens after consulting Delphi 
is one of the few that could have prompted reflection on the process of 
comprehending oracular wisdom.  The focus of Lycurgus’ narration of that story, 
however, is on the fair and harsh punishment of traitors by the polis, not on any 
moment of clarity in the subject of the oracle.351  In contrast, the oracle presented in 
the Archidamus follows the ‘emplotment’ of prophecies in Greek colonisation 
                                                                                                                                      
349 Isoc. 6.18-9. 
350 See Kindt 2016, 163-4; Platt 2011; Petridou 2016. 
351 Lyc. Leo. 93 above. 
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stories.352 Isocrates’ hypothetical speaker tells the foundation story of Sparta using the 
symbolic language of Greek colonisation — crisis, Delphic consultation and 
resolution.    
  Isocrates then expands on the foundation narrative, using oracular authority 
to justify Sparta continuing to occupy Messenia despite the Theban demands to 
surrender: 
ἐπερόµενοι δὲ τὸν θεόν, κἀκείνου προστάξαντος δέχεσθαι ταῦτα καὶ τιµωρεῖν τοῖς 
ἠδικηµένοις, ἐκπολιορκήσαντες Μεσσηνίους οὕτως ἐκτήσασθε τὴν χώραν. 
 
And you, after inquiring of Apollo, and being directed by him to accept this gift and 
avenge the wronged, you then besieged the Messenians, forced them to surrender, 
and thus gained possession of their territory.353 
 
Archidamus is here exhorting the Spartan assembly to view Messenia 
rightfully theirs, bequeathed to them by their forefathers as directed (προστάξαντος) 
by Pythian Apollo.  The language of divine communication employed by Isocrates is 
here almost identical to that used fifty years later by Hyperides.354  Although Isocrates 
refers to the god at Delphi and Hyperdides to the god at Dodona, the oracles ‘order’ 
(προστάξαντος) the enquirers to carry out actions that the speakers wish to portray as 
upstanding.   Similarly, the clear differences between the modern ‘authenticity’ of the 
oracles used by Isocrates and Hyperides has no discernible impact on how the 
logographers have used them.355  For the logographer, oracular authority could justify 
or encourage actions regardless of the recency of the consultation. 
                                                                                                                                      
352 Dougherty 1993, 6. 
353 Isoc. 6.23 = PW 296 = F. Q13. 
354 Hyp. 4.24-5 αῦτα τοῦ θεοῦ προστάξαντος. Cf. Isoc. 6.23 ἐπερόµενοι δὲ τὸν θεόν, κἀκείνου 
προστάξαντος δέχεσθαι ταῦτα. 
355 Fontenrose 1978, 273 classes the oracle given to the Spartans as ‘not genuine’. The oracle 
instructing Athens to furnish a cult image of Dione at Dodona is viewed as historical by Parke: Parke 
1967a, 142.  Given that Hyperides recorded the oracle within ten or so years of the initial consulation, 
Fontenrose would likely also consider it genuine. 
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Isocrates capitalises on the famous interactions between the mythical early 
founders of Sparta and the oracle of Delphi to develop an argument that he thought 
might have been approporiate for Archidamus to have given.  The speaker goes on to 
highlight that the Messenians also consulted Delphi, only to be ignored: 
…πεµψάντων ἀµφοτέρων εἰς Δελφούς, κἀκείνων µὲν σωτηρίαν αἰτούντων, ἡµῶν δ᾽ 
ἐπερωτώντων ὅτῳ τρόπῳ τάχιστ᾽ ἂν κρατήσαιµεν τῆς πόλεως, τοῖς µὲν οὐδὲν ἀνεῖλεν 
ὡς οὐ δικαίαν ποιουµένοις τὴν αἴτησιν… καίτοι πῶς ἄν τις µαρτυρίαν µείζω καὶ 
σαφεστέραν τούτων παράσχοιτο; 
 
…both sides sent delegations to Delphi, the Messenians appealing for deliverance and 
we inquiring how we could most speedily make ourselves masters of their city, the 
god gave them no answer, thus showing that their appeal was unjust… How could 
anyone furnish testimony more significant or clearer than this?356 
 
 There are no other examples in Athenian speechwriting of this period that 
infer a just result from a lack of oracular response, perhaps further highlighting that 
the oracles in the Archidamus serve a different purpose to those of later speeches.  
Nevertheless, these examples show Isocrates’ attempt to incorporate the oracular 
features of colonisation stories into rhetoric.  While the content of the oracle itself is 
unlike those of later oratory, there are similarities in the language used to describe 
oracular consultation.  Delphi is portrayed as being a constant ally of the audience for 
whom the speech was intended.  Archidamus uses communication from Apollo, again 
referred to as ‘the god’ (ὁ δὲ θεὸς…οὐκ ἀνεῖλεν…ἐπερόµενοι δὲ τὸν θεόν), to justify 
actions that were contested by other poleis.357  In contrast, the Archidamus offers the 
only example of a Delphic response in rhetoric that required internal reflection on 
behalf of the enquirers to lead to a positive resolution. Archidamus uses the 
‘enigmatic mode’ of oracular communication to stress the tripartite connection that 
the Dorians discovered and developed with the lands of Sparta and Messene.   
                                                                                                                                      
356 Isoc. 6.31-2. 
357 Isoc. 6.18-23 cf. Lyc. Leo. 87, 93, 99; Hyp. 4.15. 
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Conclusion 
ἀκούετε, ἄνδρες δικασταί, ὅτι ταὐτὰ λέγει ὅ τε Σόλων ἐν τοῖς νόµοις καὶ ὁ θεὸς ἐν τῇ 
µαντείᾳ, κελεύων τοῖς κατοιχοµένοις ποιεῖν τοὺς προσήκοντας ἐν ταῖς καθηκούσαις 
ἡµέραις. ἀλλὰ τούτων οὐδὲν ἔµελεν Θεοπόµπῳ οὐδὲ Μακαρτάτῳ τουτῳί… 
 
You hear, men of the jury, that Solon in the laws and the god in the oracle use the 
same language, bidding the relatives to perform rites for the departed on the proper 
days. But neither Theopompus nor the defendant Macartatus cared at all for these 
things…358 
 
To conclude this chapter, it is worth looking at the most ‘dull’ citation of an 
oracle in the speeches that we have covered.359  The speaker of Against Macartatus 
cites an oracle from Delphi that endorses a wide variety of cult practices, only a few 
of which relate to the funeral customs that are the focus of the argument.360  Bowden 
has put forward that this type of oracle represents one end of a spectrum, at the other 
end of which are the farcical oracle exchanges such as the passage of the Knights in 
which Athenian politicians trade hyperbolically obscure oracles.361  In oratory, the 
oracle above establishes some sort of normative practice, one that the speaker says the 
accused has transgressed.  In contrast, the humour of the passage from Aristophanes 
derives from a wilful and sizeable exaggeration of the expected use of oracles by 
Athenian public figures. 
This chapter has shown that there are more influences on this spectrum of 
oracles than have previously been examined.  Demosthenes’ use of Delphi in On the 
False Embassy illustrated that contact with the oracular sanctuary was so crucial for 
the Athenian public that the prospect of losing access to Delphi could be framed as a 
profound existential threat.  The oracle from Dodona in the same speech showed that 
                                                                                                                                      
358 Dem. 43.66. 
359 Fontenrose refers to the ‘dull’ instructions that this oracle and others similar give for cult activity, 
Fontenrose 1978, 32-3. 
360 Dem. 43.66 = PW 283 = Fontenrose H29. 
361 Bowden 2005, 56. 
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the oracular voice was cited as a method of overcoming uncertainty in the polis, even 
if the prophecy came from a place other that Delphi.  The contrast between how 
Delphi was portrayed in 343 and 330 also suggests that the orators’ use of oracles in 
their speeches both reflects the relationship of Athens with its oracular sanctuaries at 
different points in time. 
Dinarchus’ recycling of the ‘beware of your leaders’ oracle demonstrated the 
tendency to avoid reinterpreting or challenging the core meaning of oracles in the 
public sphere.  Although the speaker contests many theological ideas and arguments 
in prosecuting Demosthenes, the oracle itself has the same meaning and is used for 
the same argumentative purpose.  The oracle from Dodona encouraging Athenian 
activity at that sanctuary, cited by both Demosthenes and Hyperides, further 
demonstrated the emphasis on the clarity of the oracular voice in speeches from this 
period.  Both speakers use the oracles as a way of authorising behaviour that they 
want their audience to view favourably.  
This example sat in opposition to the final oracle from Isocrates’ earlier 
logographic exercise, the Archidamus.  Isocrates’ unperformed rhetoric highlighted 
the idiosyncratic way of using the oracular voice in speeches presented to the 
Athenian public.  Although Isocrates’ narration of the foundation of Sparta frequently 
mentioned the approval of Pythian Apollo for the Dorian cause, the meaning of the 
oracular response itself was elusive.  In a manner consistent with the wider body of 
Greek aitia, the founders only uncovered the meaning of the oracle through reflection 
and a series of difficulties.  Rather than complicating the patterns that have emerged 
in the usage of oracles by orators of the later fourth century, the oracular narrative in 
the Archidamus throws the other oracles of Athenian rhetoric into sharper relief.  
Isocrates’ speech shows that the ‘enigmatic mode’ of oracular communication that 
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features in foundation stories, while being suited to hypothetical defence of Spartan 
control over Messenia, was not a persuasive way of introducing oracular authority in 
Athenian oratory. 
 101 
 
Conclusions 
 
ὡς δὲ ἀπελθόντες οἱ θεοπρόποι ἀπήγγελλον ἐς τὸν δῆµον, γνῶµαι καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαὶ 
γίνονται διζηµένων τὸ µαντήιον καὶ αἵδε συνεστηκυῖαι µάλιστα…. κατὰ ταῦτα τὰ 
ἔπεα συνεχέοντο αἱ γνῶµαι… οὗτος ὡνὴρ [Θεµιστοκλέης] οὐκ ἔφη πᾶν ὀρθῶς τοὺς 
χρησµολόγους συµβάλλεσθαι… ὡς τούτου ἐόντος τοῦ ξυλίνου τείχεος. 
 
When the messengers had left Delphi and laid the oracle before the people, there was 
much inquiry concerning its meaning…The opinions [of the Athenians and the 
chresmologoi] were confounded by these lines…[Themistocles] claimed that the 
readers of oracles had incorrectly interpreted the whole of the oracle…. [and that] 
they should believe their ships to be the wooden wall and so make ready to fight by 
sea. 362 
 
The most famous interaction between Athenian politians and the oracular is 
one that this thesis has so far avoided.  Herodotus’ story of Themistocles and the 
‘wooden wall’ oracle can, however, help to highlight some of the results of this study. 
The oracles used in the Athenian assembly during the fourth century bear little 
resemblance to Herodotus’ account of a very important oracle debated in the Athenian 
assembly at the start of the fifth century.363  In the brief passage above and throughout 
his narrative of Athens’ response to the Persian invasion before battle at Salamis, 
Herodotus emphasises the uncertainty of the city’s future.364  The forboding and 
enigmatic oracle is exacerbated by the conflicting interpretations of the divine advice 
put forward by Athens’ public figures. 
The oracles presented in the assembly during the late fourth century have 
significantly differed from those in Herodotus’ account at almost every level.  There 
                                                                                                                                      
362 Hdt.7.142-3. 
363 This passage of Herodotus is covered in detail in almost all of the monographs on Delphi cited in 
the thesis so far: Crahay 1956, 295-304; Parke and Wormell 1956, 169-170; Fontenrose 1978, 124-9; 
Bowden 2005, 100-8 cf. Kindt 2016, 50-2. 
364 See esp. Hdt. 140-2 for the unique ‘double consultation’.  I agree with Bowden’s reconstruction of 
the orgininal oracle being a single response to an inquiry into cult maintenance if Athens were 
evacuated, see Bowden 2005, 106-7. On the consistency of the verses given as separate responses by 
Herodotus, see Crahay 1956, 295-302; Harrison 2000, 151-2. 
 102 
is no evidence in that orators contested or even ruminated on the meaning of oracular 
pronouncements in the assembly.  On an authorial level, Herodotus accentuates the 
enigmatic mode of oracular communication, whereas Athenian orators stress the 
clarity of divine communication to the polis.365   
 
Chresmoi and Characteristics 
This thesis has collected and analysed the oracles used in Athenian speeches 
between 347/6 and 324.  It should be noted in conclusion that these year limits are 
imposed by the source material, as no speech presented to the assembly before 
Against Meidias uses oracles as part of its argumentation.366  During the ensuing 
period, roughly 18% of the speeches that survive feature oracles.367  Although it has 
not been the main focus of this analysis, the disparity between the late fourth century 
and the  earlier ‘wave’ of Attic orators (Antiphon, Andocides and Lysias), from whom 
a comparable number of speeches but no oracles remain, deserves some 
consideration.  A possible explanation for the quantum of difference is the relative 
percentage of forensic and assembly speeches.  Almost all of Lysias’ speeches are 
from private cases, in which recourse to the oracular seems to have been less 
common.368   
                                                                                                                                      
365 The possible exception is Lycurgus’ story of Callistratus misinterpreting an oracle, Lyc. Leo. 93.  
The demise of a man exiled from Athens for treason could well be understood as an example of the 
oracle supporting Athens. As noted throughout, examples that deviate from these general rules are used 
to convey specific meaning that reinforces norms: Callistratus misinterpreted a Delphic oracle because 
he was impious (Lyc. Leo. 93); Demosthenes avoided consulting Delphi to mislead the demos 
(Aeschin. 3.130). 
366 The exclusion here is Isocrates, whose works include oracle stories (Isoc. 6.23-31).  An interesting 
aside is Lysias’ On the Sacred Orgas, which manages to avoid the oracular realm as it has been treated 
here, despite Delphi’s central role in the dispute.  On which see Bowden 2005, 90. 
367 12 oracles and oracle stories from roughly 64 complete speeches from the Attic orators. I include in 
this number most potentially spurious speeches from the Demosthenic corpus as they remain reliable as 
evidence for speechwriting during the period, even if Demosthenes himself did not write them.  
Fragments have been excluded. 
368 Todd 2007, 1 n. 2 surmises that there are six symbouletic and epideictic speeches from of the 31 
speeches in the Corpus Lysianicum.  Dem. 21.51 and Dem. 43.66 are the only forensic speeches to 
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Any conclusions drawn from the comparison between the first and second 
‘waves’ of Athenian oratory alone are, however, speculative.  While this analysis has 
primarily focused on the texts of Athenian speeches, I have also sought to incorporate 
the growing body of scholarship holistically examining the relationship between 
Athens and Delphi.369  The increase in Athenian dedications, theōriai, artisanry and 
theatrical involvement at Delphi is related to the emergence of oracles as persuasive 
features of public speeches.  The contrast between the first and second halves of the 
fourth century is in this way telling.  Athens’ restricted access to Delphi during the 
Peloponnesian War and its lingering aftermath may contribute to the discrepancy 
between these two periods of oratory.370  In contrast, Athens actively expanded its 
relationship with the sanctuary and its oracle from the middle of the fourth century 
onwards.   
The oracles used by Lycurgus and Aeschines are complemented by the 
orators’ interaction with Delphi outside of the assembly.  Lycurgus in particular was a 
key leader of a wider Athenian movement that emphasised the worship of Apollo as 
an ancestor of the Ionic people.  The cult of Apollo Patroos, increased Athenian 
building activity at Delphi and growth in genealogies that link Apollo to Athens all 
contributed to a climate in which oracles from Delphi ‘meant something special’ to 
Athens.371  I have argued that the oracles quoted in these speeches should also be 
included in our understanding of Athens’ self-association with Delphi.  Orators 
invariably cite Delphi as an ally of the Athenian polis in its mythological past and 
                                                                                                                                      
feature oracles (although Against Meidias may not fit any of these speech classifications particularly 
well). 
369 E.g. Humpreys 2004; Bowden 2005; Scott 2008; Csapo and Wilson 2014; Csapo forthcoming. 
370 The impact of the war on how Delphi appears in Athenian sources is well covered by Bowden 2005, 
57-64, 75-9 and Scott 2008, 211-21.    
371 Quote from Bowden 2005, 57 in reference to Demosthenes’ prayer to Pythian Apollo at Dem. 
18.141. 
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recent history.  The increase (or introduction) of oracles in public oratory during the 
fourth century, then, both reflected and progressed this religious and cultural change 
in Athens.   
End Quote 
The focus of this thesis has been to explore the ways in which oracles were 
used in Athenian oratory.  I have shown that orators not only read verbatim quotes of 
the Pythia to the audience but also appropriated various features of a broader tradition 
of oracular storytelling tradition in their attempts to influence the votes held by their 
audience. Any distinction between directly quoted oracles and oracle stories has, for 
the most part, proven to be a false dichotomy.  Orators relied on the impact of both 
methods of invoking oracular authority, regardless of whether the oracle could be read 
back from a recent consultation or whether it was passed down through an oral 
storytelling tradition.372  Moreover, there are also key points of argumentation that 
relied on the audience’s experiences and emotions toward oracles and oracular 
sanctuaries rather than the words of any oracle itself.  This body of oracles and 
oracular argumentation reaffirms that oracles must be understood as ‘inseparable from 
the stories told about them’.373 
 What, then, should we make of the oracles of oratory and the ‘stories told 
about them’?  For Kindt, one of the clearest responses to this question for other texts 
has been that oracle stories were a way of making sense of the external world.  The 
process of narrative structuring and the forced reflection of the ‘enigmatic mode’ of 
oracular communication shows how humans of ancient Greece perceived their 
relationship with their divinities.374  The function of oracles in oratory relied on and 
                                                                                                                                      
372 Even the oracles at Dem. 21.51-2 and Dem. 43.66 are referred to during the body of the speech. 
373 Kindt 2016, 14. 
374 Kindt 2016, 162-5. 
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developed this tradition of exploring meaning through the oracular voice.  Orators 
introduced this oracular authority, however, to strengthen a particular way in which 
they are encouraging the assembly to view human and divine interaction.  I suggest 
that the consistent clarity of divine wisdom in rhetorical oracle stories was a 
purposeful appropriation of existing oracular narrative tradition to suit a persuasive 
form of puplic speech that flourished and diversified during this period. 
 
Normative narratives? 
The narrative elements of the oracles of oratory are often similar to those in 
other literary sources.  Most tales, even the very succinct, presented a ‘crisis’ and lead 
to a ‘confirmation’.375  However, we have consistently seen orators tell stories about 
oracles that minimise the difficulty of comprehending divine communication.  Oracles 
that do not require interpretation, by either the characters in the tales or their 
audience, offer a different perspective on the ‘human quest for meaning’ present in 
oracle stories from foundation myths or the history of Herodotus.376  Nevertheless, 
this study has demonstrated that the oracles in oratory speak to the same theological 
issues as other sources using oracular discourse by addressing human susceptibility to 
deception and misinterpretation.  Orators tell us that humans struggle to see the real 
motives for the actions of others and that the solution to this is invariably through 
recourse to the oracular. 
Lycurgus’ stories showed two Athenian kings saving their city from foreign 
invasion by following the instructions of Pythian Apollo.  Most strikingly, the kings 
acted without considering the consequences of the oracle, or even whether they had 
                                                                                                                                      
375 Terms from Maurizio 1997.  The missing option would be an example of ‘refutation’, explaining the 
recognition of one’s misinterpretation of an oracle.  The only tale that would (potentially) feature this 
phase is that of Callistratus: Lyc. Leo. 93. 
376 Quote from Kindt 2016, 157. 
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interpreted divine speech correctly.  It has been suggested elsewhere that Lycurgus’ 
retelling of the Erechtheus myth heavily redacts the problematic concepts that were 
the likely focus of Euripides’ version.377  The contrast between the roles of the oracle 
in each of these retellings of the same story is informative.  While the oracular 
instruction remains the same, Euripides’ story explored the limits of patriotism while 
Lycurgus’ reinterpretation sought to demonstrate the necessity of unwavering 
patriotism in the face of an uncertain future. 
Between the two narratives of kingly sacrifice endorsed by Delphi is the only 
tale from oratory in which a person misunderstands an oracular pronouncement.  
Lycurgus uses the story of the treacherous Callistratus’ optimistic interpretation of 
‘τεύξεται’ as a contrasting example to the pious acquiescence to Delphi of the 
Athenian kings.378 Although the ‘enigmatic mode’ is not a key feature of Lycurgus’ 
oracular narratives, the orator does define the human by its opposition to the divine.  
In this way, the oracles of oratory are in conversation with the oracular themes of 
wider Greek thought. 
Aeschines develops his accusations of Demosthenes’ impiety through a long 
and detailed narrative of Athenian interaction with Delphi.  Unlike the condensed and 
simple storytelling of Lycurgus, Aeschines places emphasis on the process of 
consulting the Pythia and the associated features of the oracular world, such as a curse 
and an oath.  Aeschines’ story seeks to highlight Demosthenes’ irresponsible 
relationship with Delphi and all things divine by emphasising the clarity of Apollo’s 
communication to the polis.  The oracular narratives of Against Ctesiphon illustrate 
the interaction between oratory and religious storytelling.  Aeschines’ conscious 
                                                                                                                                      
377 Wilson 1996, 313-4. 
378 Lyc. Leo. 93. 
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inversion of the riddling divine language of other oracle stories demonstrates that 
orators drew from the same tradition to develop new and persuasive interpretations of 
human and divine actions. 
Demosthenes’ response to Aeschines’ storytelling showed alternate methods 
of invoking oracular authority.  Demosthenes could employ a prayer to Pythian 
Apollo and an oracle from Dodona to support the validity of his competing 
interpretation of divine involvement in Athens’ affairs.  Demosthenes prayed to 
ensure the truthfulness of his words and the oracle endorsed a theological challenge to 
the negative model of personal responsibility presented by Aeschines.379  These two 
speeches show orators using oracles to coordinate and authorise their narratives of the 
human relationship with the divine.  These oracles do not involve highlighting the 
separation between human and divine language, but rather frame the oracular as a 
reliable means of overcoming human limitations within the traditional structures of 
the polis. 
The oracles that featured less prominently in the speeches collected in the final 
chapter conform to these patterns.  The oracular is presented in oratory as a 
counterweight to the deception present in both Athenian politics and more general 
human nature.  The image of Delphi in On the False Embassy showed that Apollo’s 
favour for Athens was so important to the audience that orators could use a lack of 
oracles to symbolise a menacing future.   The consistency of oracular favour and 
directness in the various examples from Dodona demonstrate that divine 
communication was portrayed as clear and beneficial regardless of the sanctuary from 
which it came.380  
                                                                                                                                      
379 Eidinow 2007, 149-50. 
380 See below for consideration of the oracles and chresmologoi not cited by these orators. 
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The Oracular and the Spectacular 
In fourth century rhetoric, then, orators turned to the oracular to establish 
moral and religious certainty in their audience.  For the most part, orators involved 
oracular authority without quoting long verses of hexameters from the Pythia or 
recounting long stories of interpretation and epiphany spurred by an enigmatic 
prophecy.  Oracular authority in rhetoric did, however, rely on the textual and oral 
traditions in which these storytelling and ritual features played an important role.   
The oracles of oratory offer further insight into the role of the divine in the 
everyday lives of people in the ancient world.  The importance of the oracular in these 
people’s lives certainly did not depend on the ‘historicity’ of an individual oracular 
response.  The way in which orators adapt and appropriate oracular authority in their 
speeches demonstrates that the oracular realm remained a crucial way of addressing 
future uncertainty in the shifting times of the late fourth century.           
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